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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) and 63-46b-16 and Rule 14 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE 1 
A. Issue: Is there sufficient evidence in the record 
to sustain the Utah State Tax Commission's (the "Commission's" or 
the "Tax Commission's") Finding of Fact that Kennecott Corpora-
tion's ("Kennecott's") state-assessed property was assessed as of 
January 1, 1988 using the capitalized net revenue method? 
B. Standard of Review: The standard of appellate 
review applicable to this issue is that there must be substantial 
evidence in the record, considered as a whole, to support this 
Finding of Fact by the Commission. First Nat'l Bank v. County 
Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). 
ISSUE 2 
A. Issue: Did the Commission erroneously conclude 
that the appraisal methods used to value Kennecott's 
state-assessed real property and those used by Salt Lake County 
(the "County") to value county-assessed commercial and industrial 
real property were not the same? 
-1-
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B. Standard of Review: The standard of appellate 
review applicable to this issue is that there must be substantial 
evidence in the record, considered as a whole, to support this 
Conclusion of Law by the Commission. First Nat'l Bank v. County 
Bd. of Equalization, supra. 
ISSUE 3 
A. Issue: Did the Commission err in failing to apply 
the 20% reduction enunciated in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304(1) 
(1987) to Kennecott's state-assessed real property as of January 
1, 1988 under Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 796 
P.2d 1256 (Utah 1990)? 
B. Standard of Review: The standard of appellate 
review applicable to this issue is a correction of error stan-
dard. The Commission's decision should be upheld only if it is 
not erroneous. Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). 
ISSUE 4 
A. Issue: As an alternative to Issue 3 above, did the 
Commission err in failing to grant Kennecott's state-assessed 
property the 14% reduction in value which the Commission granted 
to the railroads as of January 1, 1988? 
B. Standard of Review: The standard of appellate 
review applicable to this issue is a correction of error 
-2-
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standard. The Commission's decision should be upheld only if it 
is not erroneous. Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Common, supra. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
1. Art. XIII, Sec. 2(1), Utah Constitution: 
All tangible property in the state, not 
exempt under the laws of the United 
States, or under this Constitution, 
shall be taxed at a uniform and equal 
rate in proportion to its value, to be 
ascertained as provided by law. 
2. Art. XIII, Sec. 3(1), Utah Constitution: 
The Legislature shall provide by law a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment on 
all tangible property in the state, 
according to its value in money, . . . . 
The Legislature shall prescribe by law 
such provisions as shall secure a just 
valuation for taxation of such property, 
so that every person and corporation 
shall pay a tax in proportion to the 
value of his, her, or its tangible prop-
erty, . . . . 
3. Art. I, Sec. 24, Utah Constitution: 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1) (1987): 
By May 1 the following property shall be 
assessed by the commission at 100% of 
fair market value, as valued on January 
1 A verbatim presentation of the constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are included in the Adden-
dum at page B-l. 
- 3 -
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1, in accordance with this chapter: 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(2) (1987): 
The method for determining the fair mar-
ket value of productive mining property 
is the capitalized net revenue method or 
any other valuation method the commis-
sion believes, or the taxpayer demon-
strates to the commission's satisfac-
tion , to be reasonably determinative of 
the fair market value of the mining 
property. . . . In no event may the 
fair market value of the mining property 
be less than the fair market value of 
the land, improvements, and tangible 
personal property upon or appurtenant to 
the mining property. 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (1987): 
(1) If the county assessor uses the 
comparable sales or cost appraisal 
method in valuing taxable property for 
assessment purposes, the assessor is 
required to recognize that various fees, 
services, closing costs, and other 
expenses related to the transaction 
lessen the actual amount that may be 
received in the transaction. The county 
assessor shall, therefore, take 80% of 
the value based on comparable sales or 
cost appraisal of the property for pur-
poses of assessment under Subsection 
59-2-103(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This is a petition for review by Kennecott from an 
order of the Utah State Tax Commission issued on March 3, 1992 in 
which the Commission refused to reduce the value of Kennecott's 
-4-
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centrally-assessed property, holding that Kennecott's property 
had been assessed according to the capitalized net revenue method 
in 1988 and that Kennecott's assessment at 100% of its fair mar-
ket value pursuant to that method was proper, fair, reasonable, 
and required by the constitution and laws of the State of Utah, 
II. Course of Proceedings Below. 
On April 29, 1988, Kennecott received from the Property 
Tax Division of the Commission (the "Division") its Notice of 
Assessment assigning the assessed value of Kennecott's mining 
properties and associated facilities as of January 1, 1988. 
Kennecott filed a timely Request for Agency Action with the Com-
mission protesting this assessment. Thereafter, Kennecott filed 
an Amended Request for Agency Action. 
In its Amended Request for Agency Action, Kennecott 
sought a reduction in the assessed value of its real property by 
twenty percent (20%), asserting that the Division's failure to 
grant this reduction to Kennecott's state-assessed real property, 
while having this 20% reduction extended to county-assessed com-
mercial and industrial real property, and other state-assessed 
real property, i.e., railroad property, violated Kennecott's 
rights under Article XIII, §§2,3 and 4 of the Utah Constitution 
as well as Kennecott's rights to equal protection of the law as 
guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
-5-
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Kennecott also asserted that this failure deprived Kennecott of 
its property without due process of law, in violation of the Utah 
and United States Constitutions• 
Additionally, Kennecott asserted that, as of January 1, 
1988, the Commission had reduced the value of railroad real and 
personal property from 100% of that property's fair market value 
without reducing the value of Kennecott7s real and personal prop-
erty, and that this action constituted unlawful discrimination in 
violation of these same Utah and federal constitutional 
provisions. 
On May 10, 1990 the Commission held a formal hearing 
respecting Kennecott's Amended Request for Agency Action. After 
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Amax, issued July 18, 1990, 
the Commission issued an Order on October 28, 1991 directing the 
parties to submit written briefs addressing the affect of the 
Amax decision on Kennecott's Amended Request. On March 3, 1992, 
the Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Final Decision ("Final Decision") , a copy of which is 
included in the Addendum at page A-l, denying Kennecott any 
reduction in its assessed value as of January 1, 1988. 
III. Decision of the Commission. 
In its Final Decision, the Commission ruled that 
(1) Kennecott's state-assessed property was assigned an assessed 
-6-
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value as of January 1, 1988, using the capitalized net revenue 
method; (2) Kennecott did not show that the appraisal methods 
used to value Kennecott's state-assessed real property and those 
used by the County to value locally-assessed commercial and 
industrial real property were the same; (3) the Commission denied 
Kennecott's request to apply the 2 0% reduction set out in Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-304(1) (1987) (the "20% Statute") to Kennecott's 
state-assessed real property as of January 1, 1988 under the Amax 
decision; and (4) the Commission refused to grant to Kennecott's 
state-assessed property the 14% reduction in value which was 
granted by the Commission to the railroads as of January 1, 1988. 
IV. Statement of Facts. 
Prior to the hearing, Kennecott, the Division and the 
County signed two stipulations which were received into evidence 
2 
at the hearing. See Transcript at 5; Record at 203-07. The 
parties stipulated as follows: 
(1) As of January 1, 1988, all of Kennecott's 
real property, improvements and personal property subject to 
2 The record on appeal consists of the record compiled and numbered by the Commission (the 
"Record"), the reporter's transcript of the hearing (the "Transcript"), and the depositions of Brent Eyre ("Eyre 
Deposition") and Larry Butterfield ("Butterfield Deposition"). The Eyre and Butterfield Depositions were, by 
stipulation, accepted into evidence and used in lieu of testimony. Transcript at 4; Eyre Deposition at 4-5; 
Butterfield Deposition at 3-5. 
- 7 -
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assessment by the Division was assessed at $617,771,073. Record 
at 205. 
(2) The Division did not apply Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-3 04 (1987) to Kennecott's property as of January 1, 1988 
and did not discount or reduce Kennecott's assessment of 
$617,771,073 by 20% or any other percentage. Record at 205. 
(3) As of January 1, 1988, the Division reduced 
the fair market value of all Union Pacific Railroad, Denver and 
Rio Grande Railroad and Southern Pacific Railroad property in 
Utah by 14%. This reduction was applied to all the railroads' 
state-assessed taxable property, which included both real and 
personal property. Record at 205. 
(4) Kennecott, which did not receive a 14% reduc-
tion in the value of its state-assessed property for 1988, and 
the railroads, which received a 14% reduction in the value of 
their state-assessed property, were both property owners whose 
property was assessed by the Division pursuant to the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987). Record at 206. 
(5) The County agreed that it would not contest 
the valuation of Kennecott's property in 1988 by the Division 
except to the extent Kennecott sought a reduction in that valua-
tion as a result of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. State Tax 
-8-
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Commission, 716 F. Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1388), or related theories. 
Record at 2 04. 
The methods employed by the Division to value Kenne-
cott's property as of January 1, 1988 consisted of (1) a compara-
ble sales, or market value, method for Kennecott's land; (2) 
replacement cost new less depreciation method (RCNLD), or cost 
method, for Kennecott's buildings and other real property 
improvements, and; (3) historical cost less depreciation for per-
sonal property. This was characterized in the hearing as the 
"summation" method of valuing Kennecott's property. Transcript 
at 51. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. KENNECOTT IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE 
20% STATUTE BECAUSE, AS IN AMAX, KENNECOTT'S 
PROPERTY WAS VALUED USING THE SAME METHODS 
USED BY COUNTY ASSESSORS, WHO APPLIED THE 20% 
STATUTE. 
In Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commis-
sion, 796 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1990)3, the Court held that since the 
Tax Commission used the same methods to value Amax's property 
that Tooele County used to value county-assessed property, it 
would unconstitutionally violate the uniform and equal require-
ments of Article XIII, §§ 2 and 3 and the equal protection 
A copy of the Amax decision is included in the Addendum at page D-l. 
- 9 -
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requirement of Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution not to 
4 
apply the 20% Statute to Amax's property. The Commission 
refused to apply the Amax decision and analysis to Kennecott's 
property because it ruled that Kennecott's property was valued 
using the capitalized net revenue method instead of the same 
methods employed by county assessors. 
Despite the Commission's decision, the evidence at the 
hearing established the following: (1) the capitalized net reve-
nue method was not used to arrive at the assessed value of Kenne-
cott's centrally assessed property in 1988; and (2) the appraisal 
methods used to value Kennecott's centrally assessed property and 
those used by the County to value county-assessed commercial and 
industrial property were identical; (3) Kennecott's property was 
valued at its full fair market value; and (4) all comparable 
County-assessed property, regardless of appraisal methodology, 
was valued at full fair market value and then reduced by applica-
tion of the 20% Statute by County assessors. 
Therefore, under Amax, Kennecott is entitled to the 
benefit of the 20% Statute in 1988. The Commission's refusal to 
apply the 20% statute ignores Amax and violates the uniform and 
4
 The statute at issue in Amax was Utah Code Ann. section 59-5-4.5 (1973 & Supp. 1986). In 1987, the 
20% Statute was recodified at Utah Code Ann. section 59-2-304(1). 
- 1 0 -
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equal requirements of the Utah Constitution and the equal protec-
tion requirements of the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE TAX COMMISSION ERRED IN 
FAILING TO GRANT KENNECOTT THE 14% REDUCTION 
IN VALUE WHICH WAS GRANTED TO THE RAILROADS 
BY THE TAX COMMISSION AS OF JANUARY 1, 1988. 
In Union Pacific v. Utah State Tax Commission, 716 F. 
Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988)5 the court held that the 20% Statute 
discriminated against the railroads for arbitrary reasons which 
violated the federal Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory 
Reform Act of 1976 (the "4-R Act") . Therefore, the railroads, 
which like Kennecott are state-assessed property, were granted a 
14% reduction by the Commission in the assessed value of their 
real and personal property for 1988. 
The Commission refused to apply a similar 14% reduction 
to Kennecott's property because it claimed (1) that the methods 
used to value railroad property are dissimilar from those used by 
the counties to value commercial and industrial property and by 
the Division to value Kennecott's property, and (2) that the fed-
eral 4-R Act does not apply to mining property. 
Despite the Commissions holding, Kennecott is entitled 
to equal treatment with the railroads under the equal protection 
and uniformity guarantees of the federal and Utah constitutions. 
A copy of the Union Pacific decision is included in the Addendum at page E-l. 
- 1 1 -
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Utah's equal protection requirements prohibit arbitrary classifi-
cations which discriminate against similarly situated taxpayers• 
Federal requirements prohibit the intentional systematic under-
valuation of property which is comparable to the taxpayer's prop-
erty. Allowing railroad property to be taxed at 86% of its 
value, while requiring Kennecott's property to be taxed at 100% 
of its value violates both federal and state equal protection 
requirements as well as Utah's uniformity requirement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. KENNECOTT IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE 
20% STATUTE BECAUSE, AS IN AMAX, KENNECOTT'S 
PROPERTY WAS VALUED USING THE SAME METHODS 
USED BY COUNTY ASSESSORS, WHO APPLIED THE 20% 
STATUTE. 
A. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the Tax Commis-
sions failure to apply the 20% Statute to Amax 
was unconstitutional because Amax's property was 
valued using the same methods used to value 
county-assessed property. 
In Amax, the Utah Supreme Court held that Amax Magne-
sium Corporation ("Amax"), which owned state-assessed property in 
Tooele County, was entitled to the same 20% discount in the valu-
ation of its taxable property that was extended to 
county-assessed property because Amax had shown that its property 
had been assessed using valuation methods similar to those used 
by county assessors. Amax was in the business of extracting mag-
nesium from the brine waters of the Great Salt Lake and its plant 
-12-
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was state-assessed as property appurtenant to a mining operation, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (1974). Id. at 1258. Amax 
claimed that it should receive the benefit of the 2 0% Statute 
because the assessment of its property at 100% of its value, 
while county-assessed property was assessed at only 80% of its 
value violated the equality and uniformity requirements of Utah 
Constitution Article XIII, §§ 2 and 3 and the equal protection 
requirement of Article If § 24. The Utah Supreme Court agreed 
with both arguments. 
1. Equality and Uniformity. 
The Court acknowledged that in Rio Algom v. San Juan 
County, 681 P. 2d 184 (Utah 1984)7 it had upheld the 20% Statute 
against a facial constitutional challenge, but it distinguished 
Rio Alqom because the Rio Algom plaintiffs had not shown that 
their properties were assessed at fair market value or that they 
bore a disproportionate share of the property taxes in the 
county. Amax, 796 P.2d at 1259. 
Amax, on the other hand, did not challenge the facial 
validity of the 20% Statute; rather it established that the stat-
ute, as applied to Amax, violated the constitutional requirements 
6 Amax's primary argument was that its plant was not appurtenant to a mining operation and should 
have been county-assessed property. The Court, however, ruled against that argument. S>ee,id- at 1258-59. 
7 A copy of the Rio Algom decision is included in the Addendum at page F-l. 
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of equality and uniformity because its property was valued using 
similar valuation methods as those used by county assessors. Id. 
at 1260. 
The Court stated that the purposes of the 20% Statute 
were (1) to prevent overvaluation by recognizing transactional 
costs which lessen the amounts received by a seller, and (2) to 
equalize the tax burden between state and county assessments. 
Id. at 1260. Since Amax showed that its property was valued 
using the same cost and market methods used to value 
county-assessed property, the Court stated that it: 
strains reason to assert that if assessors 
using the cost and market appraisal methods 
overvalue county properties, the same 
overvaluation would not occur with state 
properties appraised by the same methods. 
Id. The Court continued: 
Assuming that the legislature was correct in 
determining that the market value appraisal 
method overvalues property by 20 percent, it 
would be unconstitutional to apply [the 2 0% 
Statute] to county-assessed properties and 
not to state assessed properties. 
Id. Consequently, the Court held that the assessment of Amax's 
property at 100% of its value violated Article XIII's equality 
and uniformity requirements. 
2. Equal Protection. 
In analyzing Amax's equal protection claim, the Court 
relied upon the rule set forth in Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. 
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State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989), that in order to establish a 
violation of the Utah Constitutions equal protection require-
ment, a party must show that the law creates certain classes of 
persons and that the law discriminates against a class without a 
reasonably related legitimate government purpose. See, Amax at 
Relying on the fact that Amax's property was valued 
using the same methods used by county assessors, the Court 
stated: 
If county properties assessed by the cost 
appraisal method receive a 2 0 percent reduc-
tion and state properties assessed by the 
same method receive no reduction, then [the 
20% Statute] has created two classes of prop-
erties assessed by the cost appraisal method 
and arbitrarily discriminates against one 
class merely because it is a state-assessed 
property. 
Id. Additionally, the Court noted that the purposes of the 2 0% 
Statute, i.e., the equalization of state and county-assessed 
property, were not met when the same valuation methods were used 
for both state and county assessments. Instead, application of 
the 20% Statute to county-assessed, but not state-assessed prop-
erty, "aggravates the taxing disparity" between state-assessed 
and county-assessed property. Id. at 1261-62. 
8 The Amax Court did not decide the federal constitutional issue, because "if the challenged statute can-
not withstand attack under the state constitution, there is no reason to reach the federal question.'' _Id. at 1261. 
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Since the Amax Court held that the application of the 
2 0% Statute to county-assessed property but not to Amax violated 
Articles I and XIII of the Utah Constitution, it remanded the 
case to the Commission for revaluing Amax's property pursuant to 
the 20% Statute. Id. at 1262. 
B. As in Amax, the Tax Commissions refusal to apply the 
20% Statute to Kennecott is unconstitutional because 
Kennecott's property was valued using the same methods 
used to value county-assessed property. 
The Commission ruled that the Amax decision did not 
apply to the valuation of Kennecott's property in 1988. The Com-
mission based this conclusion upon its factual determinations 
that (1) Kennecott's property had been assessed using the 
capitalized net revenue method, and (2) that Kennecott did not 
show that its property had been assessed using the same methods 
used to value county-assessed property. 
Neither of these factual determinations, however, are 
supported by substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole. 
See First National Bank v. County Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d 
1163 (Utah 1990) . In fact, the record clearly shows that 
Kennecott was not valued using the capitalized net revenue 
method, but was valued using the same methods used to value 
county-assessed property. Therefore, according to the Amax anal-
ysis, the Commission should be required to apply the 20% Statute 
to its valuation of Kennecott's property for 1988. 
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1. The Tax Commission erroneously found that Kenne-
cott 's property .as assigned its assessed valu3 as 
of January 1, 1988 using the capitalized net reve-
nue method. 
In its Findings of Fact, the Commission states: "Min-
ing properties in Utah are valued using only one method, the 
'capitalized net revenue method' as set forth in Utah Code Ann, 
§ 59-2-201, which method is more fully set forth by the Rules of 
the Tax Commission in Rule R884-24-7P." Findings of Fact f 9. 
Additionally, the Commission states: "The assessment of 
Kennecott was not made by using either the comparable sales 
method or the cost appraisal method, but was made by using the 
capitalized net revenue method." Findings of Fact f 13. 
The Commission's decision should not be upheld because, 
although there is substantial evidence to show that Kennecott's 
property was not valued using the capitalized net revenue method 
in 1988, there is no evidence to support the Commission's finding 
that the capitalized net revenue method was used to assign an 
assessed value. 
Section 4 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution 
states: "All metalliferous mines or mining claims . . . shall be 
assessed as the legislature shall provide." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-201(1)(e) and (f) state that all mines and mining claims, 
machinery used in mining, and property or surface improvements 
upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims shall be assessed 
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by the Tax Commission at 100% of fair market value. Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-2-201(2) states: 
The method for determining the fair market 
value of productive mining property is the 
capitalized net revenue method or any other 
valuation method the Commission believes, or 
the taxpayer demonstrates to the Commission's 
satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative 
of the fair market value of the mining prop-
erty . . . In no event may the fair market 
value of the mining property be less than the 
fair market value of the land, improvements, 
and tangible personal property upon or appur-
tenant to the mining property (emphasis 
added). 
Therefore, Utah's Constitution requires the legislature to spec-
ify the method for valuing mining property. The method the leg-
islature has chosen is the capitalized net revenue method or any 
other method that the Commission believes, or the taxpayer demon-
strates, to be reasonably determinative of the fair market value 
of the mining property. 
Brent Eyre, who is responsible for the assessment of 
mines and railroads for the Tax Commission, testified that in 
1988 the application of the capitalized net revenue method to 
Kennecott's property resulted in a valuation that was less than 
the fair market value of the property based upon standard valua-
tion methods. Consequently, Kennecott's property was valued 
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using a summation of assets approach instead of th* capitalized 
9 
net revenue method. Transcript at 50-51. 
In arriving at the value of Kennecott's land, the Divi-
sion looked at values of comparable adjacent commercial/industry 
property in the same area. Transcript at 29-30, 75. In valuing 
Kennecott's improvements to the land, the Commission relied upon 
the Marshall & Swift guidelines for determining replacement cost 
new less depreciation. Transcript at 3 0-31, 67. Therefore, 
other methods, i.e. the replacement cost new less depreciation 
method and the comparable sales method, were used to value Kenne-
cott's real property, not the capitalized net revenue method. 
Q: [By Mr. Winterhoiler] All right. Now when you ultimately reached a valuation, an assessed 
value for Kennecott, which approach was used? 
A: [By Mr. Eyre] The statute states that the value for mining property will be determined by the 
capitalized net revenue method. The statute goes on to state that in no event will the value of 
mining property be less than the summation of the value of the land, improvements, and tangi-
ble property associated with the mine. 
In the case of the 1988 assessment of Kennecott, Kennecott was just concluding their major 
modernization project, was not in full production as of yet, I believe, on the lien date. And 
thus, in our complying with the regulation for the capitalized net revenue method, the five-year 
average of Kennecott's net revenue, coupled with the massive capital expenditures that were 
allowed to reduce the revenue, made it so that the net revenue approach was less than the 
summation of the value of the land, improvements, and tangible property. 
So the valuation placed on Kennecott's property was the summation of the physical assets. 
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2. The Commission erred in concluding that Kennecott 
did not show that the appraisal methods used to 
value Kennecott's state-assessed real property and 
those used by the County to value county-assessed 
commercial and industrial real property were the 
same. 
In its Findings of Fact, the Commission states: 
During the period in question, locally 
assessed commercial and industrial real prop-
erty located in Salt Lake County was assessed 
by the County using a combination of the com-
parable sales method, the cost appraisal 
method, and the income approach. 
Findings of Fact f 4. Additionally, the Commission states: 
The assessment of Kennecott was not made by 
using either the comparable sales method or 
the cost appraisal method, but was made by 
using the capitalized net revenue method. 
Findings of Fact 5 13. Finally, the Commission states: 
The petitioner [Kennecott] has not shown that 
the appraisal methods used by the Petitioner 
and those used by Salt Lake County were the 
same. 
Conclusions of Law f 15. 
(a) The County uses three standard valuation 
methods. 
In his deposition, which by stipulation became part of 
the record at the hearing, Larry Butterfield, Chief Appraiser for 
the County, testified that the County uses three methods for 
valuing real property on its tax rolls: the replacement cost new 
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less depreciation method, the comparable sales method, and the 
income method. Butterfield Deposition at 22-24. 
In describing the cost method employed by the County in 
valuing buildings, Mr. Butterfield testified that the assessor 
considers the building's age, construction, composition, square 
footage, and condition and then refers to the widely accepted 
Marshall & Swift Costing Manual to determine replacement cost and 
depreciation. Mr. Butterfield identified this method as the 
10 Q. [By Mr. Winterholler] It is my understanding, then, that the method employed by your office 
in appraising industrial buildings is a replacement cost minus depreciation method? 
A. [By Mr. Butterfield] That is one approach. 
Q. What are the other approaches? 
A. There is the market approach to value which is where the appraiser would probably try to find 
similar projects that have been sold and try to compare the market value from the sole [sold] 
property to the subject property 
A. Yes. We also use the income approach to value. 
* * * 
Q. Now, is that a method which is used primarily for industrial property or commercial property 
or both? 
A. Of the three approaches to value there is no primary method that we currently use. 
Q. You may use any one? 
A. We may use any one of the three. 
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replacement cost new less depreciation method ("RCNLD"). 
Butterfield Deposition at 20-22. 
Describing the comparable sales (or the market) 
approach to value, Mr. Butterfield stated that the appraiser 
would look for similar property that had recently been sold and 
Q. [By Mr. Winterholler] What does he do? 
A. [By Mr. Butterfield] What he does is he goes out on the site, makes a determination or looks 
at the property, turns around and starts making notes about what the property is, the condition 
of the property, possibly what it's made of, what he could classify it as, and the type of 
construction. He probably would try to pick up the year of build on it. 
And then the next step would be to measure it to cotne up with square footage of it 
* * * 
Q. Let's assume he knows what the square footage is; he knows what the cubic footage is; he 
knows what the general condition of the building is; he knows the years in which it was built; 
and he has a general idea of how well it's been maintained. Where does he look after that? 
A. He would go into the Marshall & Swift Manual, costing manual, and see what costs it would 
have, replacement costs, and then he would turn around and take the condition and age for 
depreciation. 
Q. As I understand it, the method he employs in appraising that building is primarily a Marshall 
& Swift replacement cost minus depreciation method. 
A. This is true. 
* * * 
A. Yes. I really don't know how many there is, but most generally the Marshall & Swift system 
everybody uses, because it is quite well-known and quite valid and quite easily accepted by all 
appraisers. 
Q. Is it my understanding, then, that the method employed by your office in appraising industrial 
buildings is a replacement cost minus depreciation method? 
A. That is one approach. 
- 2 2 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
compare them to the subject property. Butterfield Deposition at 
23.12 
Finally, describing the income approach, Mr. 
Butterfield testified that the assessor would look for similar 
property that had recently been leased in order to determine the 
13 economic value of the property. Butterfield Deposition at 23. 
Thus, the County's assessors use three methods to value 
property within the County: First, the cost method, or RCNLD, in 
which the appraiser examines the footage, condition and age of 
the building and then refers to the Marshall & Swift costing man-
ual to determine the replacement cost of the building and 
A. [By Mr. Butterfield] There is the market approach to value which is where the appraiser 
would probably try to find similar projects that had been sold and try to compare the market 
value from the sold property to the subject property. There is also -
Q. [By Mr. Winterholler] Relative to industrial property, can you tell me how many industrial 
properties in Salt Lake County are assessed using a market — as I understand, is that the same 
thing as a comparable sales method? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So if I use those terms interchangeable, I'm not misleading you. 
A. They are interchangeable. 
A. [By Mr. Butterfield] We also use the income approach to value. 
Q. [By Mr. Winterholler] How do you get that information? 
A. We find comparable properties that have been recently leased or rented out, and then we 
would use that and we would develop an economic rent. We would try to arrive at an 
economic rent to see what the building would rent, the subject property, would rent for. 
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depreciation; second, the market, or comparable sales, method in 
which the appraiser looks for similar properties that have 
recently sold and compares them with the subject property; and 
third, the income approach in which the appraiser tries to 
develop an economic rent for the subject property. These are the 
only methods employed by the County Assessor's Office. 
. . 14 Butterfield Deposition at 24. 
(b) The Division used the same standard methods 
used by the County to assess Kennecott's 
property in 1988. 
Brent Eyre also identified the same three standard 
methods which are used by the Division in valuing property, Tran-
script at 77, and stated that the cost approach and the income 
approach were employed in the valuation of mining properties in 
1988. Transcript at 77-78. 
In specifically discussing how Kennecott's property was 
valued in 1988, Phillip Despain, Manager of Ad Valorem Taxes for 
Kennecott, testified that the Division used the comparable sales 
Q. [By Mr. Winterholler] Now, is that a method which is used primarily for industrial property or 
commercial property or both? 
A. [By Mr. Butterfield] Of the three approaches to value, there is no primary method that we 
currently use. 
Q. You may use any one? 
A. We may use any one of the three. 
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method to value Kennecott's land and the RCNLD method based upon 
the Marshall & Swift manual to value Kennecott's buildings. 
15 
Transcript at 29-32. Mr. Despain also testified that the 
15 Q. [By Mr. Winterholler] Mr. Despain, this land value which was assessed by the Property Tax 
Division, do you know the method they employed in order to arrive at that assessment? 
A. [By Mr. Despain] Yes. They used what would be called the comparable sales method. 
Q. In order to arrive at the land value? 
A. At the land value. 
Q. What about buildings and improvements by the Property Tax Division? Do you know the 
method employed by the Property Tax Division to arrive at that value? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Tell me what that method was. 
A. They~they appraisers will come out and inspect the-each building and improvements, 
measure for buildings, determine what type of construction and so forth, determine square 
footage, and then, as a understand it, they used the recognized publication called Marshall & 
Swift, where they can look in this manual and find a particular type of building and get a 
replacement cost new less depreciation based on the square footage. 
Q. So, in other words, is the cost model you're describing from Marshall & Swift a replacement 
cost minus depreciation model? 
A; That's my understanding, yes. 
Q. You're familiar with the Marshall & Swift manual, are you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, with respect to improvements other than buildings, do you know how the Property Tax 
Division values those improvements? 
A. Yes. I do. 
Q. How do they do it? 
Footnote continued on next page, 
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capitalized net revenue method was not used in 1988 to value 
Kennecott's property. Id. 
Therefore, the evidence at the hearing was that there 
are three standard methods of valuing property used by both the 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
A. Well, they come out, and in their appraisal they'll see retaining walls, concrete, asphalt paving, 
roads, and so forth. And then they have another source that lists the construction costs, 
current construction costs, to build similar type facilities. For example, asphalt paving, they—it 
would tell them how much it costs for a-per square foot. And they measure the asphalt 
paving and come up with a replacement cost. 
Q. So it's your understanding that this method of valuing improvements other then buildings by 
the Property Tax Division is a replacement cost minus depreciation methods; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Is that the method that was employed when you testified about replacement costs minus 
depreciation for the valuation which is included on Exhibit 5— 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, are you familiar with the income approach to value? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. Does this Exhibit 5 contain an income approach to value? 
A. No. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Why does it not? 
A. Well, we went through the income approach, called the capitalized net income method; and 
the values, assessed value using that method is considerable less than the method that was 
used to arrive at these numbers. So it was not used. 
Q. So you're talking about-you mean that the replacement cost method valued Kennecott's 
property higher than the income method would have done? 
A. Yes. 
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County Assessors and the Division: the cost approach, the income 
approach and the market approach. In valuing mining property, 
both the Commission and the County Assessors use the RCNLD method 
as implemented in the Marshall & Swift costing manual. For valu-
ing land, both the County and the Commission rely primarily on 
the market method, looking for sales of comparable land to the 
subject property. Finally, the income method primarily used for 
mining property is the capitalized net revenue method. This 
method, however, was not used for Kennecott in 1988 because the 
resulting value was less than the value of Kennecott's property 
computed by other methods. 
3. Kennecott's state-assessed property was assessed 
at 100% of its fair market value while all county-
assessed property was assessed at 80% of its fair 
market value. 
That Kennecott7s property was valued at least at 100% 
of its fair market value is not in dispute and is clearly estab-
lished in the record. Prior to the hearing, the parties stipu-
lated that the Division's valuation of Kennecott's property would 
not be contested other than to determine if Kennecott was enti-
tled to a reduction because of the 20% Statute. See Stipulation 
submitted as Exhibit No. 4; Record at 203-04. At the hearing, 
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Brent Eyre testified that Kennecott's property was valued at 100% 
of fair market value. Transcript at 82-83. 
It is also indisputable that county-assessed property 
was only valued at 80% of its fair market value. Larry 
Butterfield testified that county-assessed property was assessed 
at 100% of fair market value before application of the 20% Stat-
ute and that, consequently, county-assessed property was assessed 
17 
at only 80% of its fair market value. This is consistent with 
16
 Q. [By Mr. Winterholler] Kennecott's value at $617,771,070, which you've got next to 
you, is the value which was arrived at by the Property Tax'Division; isn't that 
correct? 
A. [By Mr. Eyre] That's correct. 
Q. And that value is the value which the Property Tax Division considered to be 100 
percent of fair market value, isn't it? 
A. If that's our charge and that's what we put on the assessment, yes. We would 
stipulate to that fact. 
17 Q. [By Mr. Winterholler] What do you mean by statutory market value as opposed to 
fair market value? 
A. [By Mr. Butterfield] In our tax files within the tax system of Salt Lake County we 
call -- the full fair market value is the first value. It's 100 percent. From that we 
have taken the 80 percent and then that's called the statutory value. 
Q. Now, the statutory value as opposed to the fair market value, what value was 
reported to a tax payer on his tax notice? 
A. The full fair market value. 
Q. Is that the basis upon which that tax payer paid taxes in 1988? 
A. No. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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the Court's conclusion in Amax. See 796 P. 2d at 1259 ("Section 
59-5-4.5 allows county assessors to assess property at 80% of its 
reasonable fair cash value"). Additionally, Mr. Butterfield tes-
tified that the 2 0% Statute was applied to all county-assessed 
real property regardless of the valuation method used. 
18 Butterfield Deposition at 41 ; Transcript at 111-12. Therefore, 
Kennecott's state-assessed real property was assessed at 100% of 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Q. What's the basis upon which the tax payer paid taxes in 1988? '' 
A. He paid on 80 percent of the full fair market value. 
Q. So, in other words, if I understand you correctly, on commercial and industrial 
property which was locally assessed in Salt Lake County in 1988, locally assessed 
commercial and industrial property was valued at 80 percent of its full fair market 
value? 
A. That is correct. 
Butterfield Deposition at 29; see also. Transcript at 106-108. 
18 Q. [Mr. Winterholler] Let me back up. It's true, is it not, that in arriving at the 
statutory value of commercial and industrial property in Salt Lake County, 
which is locally assessed under 59-2-304, Exhibit No. 1, that you multiply the 
fair market value arrived at by either comparable sales or replacement cost 
minus depreciation or whatever income approach is used and by 80 percent 
to arrive at the statutory value? 
A. [Mr. Butterfield] Yes, this is true. 
Q. And that's applied to all property. It doesn't matter how you achieve the 
value. 
A. This is correct. 
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its value while all county-assessed real property was assessed at 
only 80% of its value. 
4. The Tax Commissions refusal to apply to 20% Stat-
ute to 
lates 
equal 
Kennecott's 
the uniform 
protection 
state-assessed property 
and ecrual assessment and 
requirements of the 
vio-
the 
Utah 
Kennecott has shown that (1) its real property was val-
ued by the Division using the same valuation methods used by the 
County to assess property; (2) its property was valued by the 
Division at 100% of fair market value; and (3) all 
county-assessed real property, regardless of valuation method, 
was valued at only 80% of fair market value. 
Therefore, as in Amax, the Tax Commission's refusal to 
equalize Kennecott's assessment with county-assessed property 
violates the uniform and equal requirements of Article XIII, §§ 2 
and 3 of the Utah Constitution because Kennecott bears a tax bur-
den greater than its pro rata share of the property taxes in the 
County, merely because its property is state-assessed. See Amax 
at 1259-60. 
Additionally, the Commission's Final Order violates the 
equal protection requirements of Article I, § 24 of the Utah Con-
stitution because the 20% Statute arbitrarily discriminates 
against state-assessed property without a reasonably-related, 
legitimate government purpose. See id. at 1261-62. 
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Kennecott's appropriate relief, as stated in Amax, is 
as follows: "If both just value and equal proportionality cannot 
be obtained because some assessments are made at a fixed percent-
age of true value, then equality must prevail so that the fixed 
percentage of true value must be uniformly applied." Id. at 
12 60. Therefore, Kennecott is entitled to a reduction of the 
assessed value of its real property in 1988 by 2 0%. 
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING 
TO GRANT KENNECOTT THE 14% REDUCTION IN VALUE 
WHICH WAS GRANTED BY THE COMMISSION TO THE 
RAILROADS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1988. 
The Commission refused to apply the 14% reduction which 
it granted to railroads in 1988 to Kennecott's property for two 
reasons: First, the Commission asserted that the methods used by 
the state to value railroad property are dissimilar from those 
used by the county to value commercial and industrial property, 
and by the Commission to value Kennecott's property. The Commis-
sion stated that historical cost is used for railroads, replace-
ment cost is used by the county, and the capitalized net revenue 
method is used for Kennecott's property. The Commission also 
distinguished the stock and debt approach, distinctive to rail-
road valuation, from the comparable sales method which is rou-
tinely used to value commercial and industrial property. 
Second, the Commission asserted that Union Pacific v. 
State Tax Commission, 716 F. Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988), has no 
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bearing on Kennecott's claim for reduction based upon the 20% 
Statute because the federal 4-R Act does not apply to mining 
property. According to the Commission, Kennecott falls into a 
different classification from railroads and may not claim the 
same relief granted to railroad property. 
A. In Union Pacific, application of the 20% Statute 
was held to discriminate against state-assessed 
railroad property. 
In Union Pacific, three railroad companies sued the 
Commission claiming that their 1984 and 1985 property tax assess-
ments discriminated against them in violation of the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (the "4-R Act"). See 49 
USCA § 11503 (1982 & Supp. 1988). The railroads claimed discrim-
ination in two ways: first, the valuation method employed by the 
Commission overvalued their property; and second, the Commis-
sion's refusal to apply the 20% Statute made them bear a higher 
percentage of taxes than county-assessed taxpayers. The court 
held that the Commission's assessment discriminated against the 
railroads in violation of the 4-R Act. 
In analyzing the railroads' overvaluation claim, the 
court summarized the three standard techniques to assess railroad 
property: the cost approach, which is based on historical costs; 
the stock and debt approach, which is a form of the comparable 
sales method; and the income approach. See id. at 547-551. The 
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court considered a variety of valuation methods for railroads, 
each promoted by an economic expert. The court noted that true 
market value for purposes of ad valorem taxation is always an 
estimate based upon each appraiser's best judgment and that each 
appraiser approaches the task of valuation a little differently. 
See id. at 554. The court held, conseguently, that there was no 
single correct formula for computing fair market value, and that 
the choice of methodology, as long as the chosen methodology has 
a rational footing, is not as important as the requirement that 
once true market value is determined, the property should not be 
taxed discriminatorily. Id. at 556-57, 565-66. Based on this 
conclusion, the court accepted the Commission's formula for 
19 computing fair market value. See id. at 563. 
In addressing the railroads' 20% Statute claim, the 
court held (1) the state's and county's valuations before apply-
ing the 20% Statute were the figures understood to be fair market 
value, id. at 565; (2) even though the methods used to value 
railroads were a cost method and a comparable sales method, the 
state did not apply the 20% Statute to the valuations, id. ; 
(3) the Commission discriminated against the railroads by assess-
ing them at a higher rate than other commercial and industrial 
19 Not only did the court accept the Commission's formula as being rational, it recognized that it ma 
have been preferable to the other methods presented. See 716 F. Supp. at 557. 
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property, jLd. at 566; and (4) the extent of the discrimination 
violated the 4-R Act which provided relief to the railroads, id. 
B. Railroad property as of January 1, 1988 was valued 
at 100% of its fair market value before applica-
tion of a 14% discount. 
The Commission overemphasized the distinctions in 
appraisal methodology between Kennecott's and the railroad's 
property. As pointed out in Union Pacific, the method used to 
arrive at fair market value is not as important for discrimina-
tion purposes as how property is taxed once fair market value is 
determined. 
Brent Eyre testified that the railroads in 1988 
received a 14% discount in the value of their "taxable property" 
even though no other state-assessed property received any dis-
count from fair market value, and that this 14% discount was a 
reduction from the fair market value of the railroads' assess-
20 
ments. Transcript at 83-84. Further, he understood the 
20 
Q. [By Mr. Winterholler] Now, your division is in charge of valuing 
mining companies, or you are in charge of those divisions in the 
Property Tax Division whose responsibility it is to value mining 
companies, public utilities, and railroads? Is that correct? 
A. [By Mr. Eyre] That's correct. 
Q. And other state-assessed property, including, say, for example, oil 
wells or oil producing properties, is that correct? 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Division's statutory and constitutional duty was to assess all 
property within its charge at 100% of fair market value, and that 
Utah law does not permit the Division to assess any property at a 
different percentage of fair market value than others. See 
21 Transcript at 90-92. Nevertheless, the Division assessed 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. In 1988 the only classification or the only category--I hesitate to use 
the word classification-but the only category of property which 
received a discount from 100 percent fair market value under your 
division were the railroads; isn't that correct? 
A. In 1988? 
Q. In 1988. 
A. That's correct. 
21 Q. [By Mr. Winterholler] Your understanding of the statutes relating to the assessment and taxa-
tion of centrally assessed property in the state and of the statutes which relate to the assess-
ment of centrally assessed property in the state requires the State Tax Commission, the Prop-
erty Tax Division, to assess all that property at 100 percent of fair market value, doesn't it? 
A. [Mr. Eyre] That's correct. 
Q. In fact, those statutes and rules do not permit the Tax Commission to assess some property at 
80 percent, some at 90 percent, and some at 10 percent, do they? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And yet, in 1988, one category of state-assessed property was assessed at less than 100 percent, 
wasn't it? 
A. They were valued at 100 percent. The assessed value that was ultimately used to determine 
their tax liability was less than that, the 100 percent of fair market value, that's correct. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
-35-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
railroad property at only 86% of its fair market value in 1988 
while it assessed Kennecott's property at 100%. 
C. The allowance of a 14% reduction to state-assessed 
railroad property but not to Kennecott's 
state-assessed property is unconstitutional. 
The plaintiffs in Union Pacific were entitled to relief 
according to the 4-R Act, which provided statutory relief for 
railroads discriminated against by state and local taxing author-
ities. Even though Kennecott does not qualify for relief under 
the 4-R Act, it is protected from discriminatory taxation by both 
the Utah and the United States Constitutions. 
In Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 
22 
637 (Utah 1989) the Court stated that the uniform operation of 
laws requirement of the Utah Constitution in Art. I, § 24 was 
substantially similar to the federal equal protection clause and 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Q. And that category of state-assessed property upon which that discount was given was railroad 
property, wasn't it? 
A. That is correct. 
* * * 
Q. . . . Is it not your understanding that the statutes of this state require the State Tax Commis-
sion to assess all state-assessed property at 100 percent of its fair market value? 
A. That's correct. 
2 2
 A copy of the Blue Cross decision is included in the Addendum at page G-l. 
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that the court's analysis under the Utah Constitution provision 
was at least as rigorous as that required by the federal 
constitution. 
The purpose of the uniform operation of laws require-
ment is to prevent the legislature from "classifying persons in 
such a manner that those who are similarly situated with respect 
to the purpose of a law are treated differently by that law, to 
the detriment of some of those so classified." Id. at 637, 
citing Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 
884, 888 (Utah 1988); see also, Amax, 796 P.2d at 1256. 
In this instance, Kennecott and the railroads are 
similarly situated because they are both centrally-assessed 
taxpayers according to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987). Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1) (1987) requires that all centrally-
assessed property be assessed by the Commission at 100% of fair 
market value. Because of the Commission's reduction of the 
assessed value of railroad property in 1988, however, Kennecott 
is taxed at 100% of its property's value, while the railroads are 
taxed at only 86% of their property's value. 
The stated purpose of the 20% Statute, i.e., to account 
for transactional costs and to equalize state and local assess-
ments, does not justify this detrimentally different treatment of 
Kennecott's property. Therefore, the Commission's refusal to 
-37-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
grant Kennecott a 14£ r-educti 
' v i o l a t e s t h e uni form o p e r a t i o n of law c l a u s e m U t a h ' s 
C Dns t i 1r i t i on . 
The Cornr.^  J S I *, . . 
protect:, r -ranaar : imil^r **a>ation 'iispariv, —~ , a~ > • 
Lause by ' T.i" \ Jt,^ 4- . : *
 L ^ cH^c** > _^'; --V1L-
Coal Co. v. County Commissioner of Webster County, 48? : . ( 
x
~ Allegheny *< -:- A 
.*sessc > .* . Vilegru-^ oropert: : r v^ ^ : 
habii, 11I 1 M M T M I I imii'iiiri in n o while valiunq nlher similarly 
situated properties urn the basis t 1 IFPV T OIJJI tbsessnu lit . IIIIL 
resiilteii in gross disparities between valuations of properties in 
l hi' sdnit" "Idss hi it1, iiiiiii I "iM» 1 "i 1 Webster county's treatment of 
Allegheny, the Court acknowledged: 
The use of a genera] ai Ijustment as a transi-
tional substitute for an individual reap-
praisal violates no constitutional command. 
As long as general adjustments are accurate 
enough over a short period of time to equal-
ize the the differences in proportion between 
the assessments of a class of property hold-
ers, the Eqi ia] Protection Clause is 
sati sfied. 
Id* it °4 ,. 
Alleghem -* \ in the Addendum at page H-l. 
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It also stated: 
In each case, the constitutional requirement 
is the seasonable attainment of a rough 
equality and tax treatment of similarly situ-
ated property owners. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
And that: 
The States, of course, have broad latitude to 
impose and collect taxes. A State may divide 
different kinds of property into classes and 
assign to each class a different tax burden 
so long as those divisions and burdens are 
reasonable. 
Id. at 344 (emphasis added). 
However, the Court concluded: 
We have no doubt that petitioners have suf-
fered from such "intentional systematic 
undervaluation by state officials" of compa-
rable property in Webster County. Viewed in 
isolation, the assessments for petitioners' 
property may fully comply with West Virginia 
law. But the fairness of one's allocable 
share of the total share of the property tax 
burden can only be meaningfully evaluated by 
a comparison with the share of others simi-
larly situated relative to their property 
holdings. The relative undervaluation of 
comparable property in Webster County over 
time therefore denies petitioner the equal 
protection of the law. 
Id. at 346 (emphasis added). 
The Court noted that West Virginia's constitution and 
laws required that taxpayers "be taxed at a rate uniform through-
out the state according to its estimated market value." Id. at 
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345 The Court held that the Webster G ziiii: i t} 's assessmei it j: i: ac-
tices violated the federal constitution because: 
liiLcntiona* „•, kernel L . unaer vaiaat i^^ ,:\ 
srate officials of other taxable property :r 
the same class contravenes the constitutional 
right of one taxed on the full value of his 
property..
 xCitations omitted). 
Id. 
The h o l d i n g i n A l l e g h e n y s h o u l d i out in i tin ut i i l 
t h i s a p p e a l . U t a h ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n and l a w s , lllikH West V i r g i n i a ' s , 
«
j q u n t j 11, '''ppt*f y " ' • form and ° q u a l r a t e , :>pe-
' n t i c a l l y , U tah Code A,,, - . , e q i i L i e ^ ,it m i- 1,11,11-fist-v* 
p r o p e r t y t o be a s s e s s e s 1* -0% or : «* . dtll*ct v a l u e n o n e t h e -
l e s s , th> I 'omnns' ' " ' , i n t e n t i o n a l l y inci s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
iiin-ijervalued r a i l r o a d p r o p e r t y , which Lv u t n l u l . i 10 1 > n< 
c l a s s a s K e n n e c o t t ' s s t a t e - a s s e s s e d p r o p e r t y , in c o n t r a v e n t i o n oi 
II* 1 J I l J I t i t . ' " . 1 I I " 1 "! 1 1 1 ,! I il I I l| I ll| 1  III I ! II I " | 1 ( l l t :, 
Kennecott is entitled to the same reduction in 
value which was granted to the railroads in 1988. 
The Nebraska Supreme iVnn h \n Northern Natural udo 
Company v. State Board of Equalization, «< N.W.IM '* V i Neb 
«•..-. " "* - consider I the 
ei feet * :\L - - United :,-*_.. > >lei . "i. »h,iii 
prohibited Nebraska from, imposing its personal property • ax on 
«\ I n|i> nil the Northern Naluial C ia.s ilrnsmn is included in the Addendum al -\uzj. 
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railroad and car companies. The district court had ruled in each 
case that the personal property tax was an unfair and discrimina-
tory tax burden according to the 4-R Act. 
In Northern Natural Gas, the petitioner, a 
state-assessed pipeline company, sought to be equalized with the 
railroad and car companies who were also state-assessed. The 
court held that if Nebraska's State Board of Equalization (the 
"Board") had arbitrarily undervalued a particular class of 
property so as to make another class disproportionately higher, 
the court must correct this constitutional inequality. Id. at 
256. This is so even if the undervaluation is the result of the 
Board's involuntary action under compulsion of federal law. Id. 
Otherwise, the Board would violate the equal protection require-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
The court stated that the preferred correction is to 
lower the value of the property of the party who is required to 
pay tax on 100% of the property's fair market value in order to 
equalize taxes with the property of those who are required to pay 
tax on less than 100%. 
[T]he right of the taxpayer whose property 
alone is taxed at 100 per cent of its true 
value is to have his assessment reduced to 
the percentage of that value at which others 
are taxed even though this is a departure 
from the requirement of statute. The conclu-
sion is based on the principle that where it 
is impossible to secure both the standard of 
the true value, and the uniformity and 
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equality required by 'law, the latter require-
ment is to be preferred a<^ -,----» mst and ulti-
mate purpose of \aw. 
Td. , citing , Sioux Ci'Ly Bridge v Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441, 
446 (1923). 
Therefore order t:o satisfy the due process and 
equal pi' " ,JI« ,l , ', , qtn i ' rnpnl'i1 <'"I • h "nlted States and "till m n 
stitutions, and the uniform and equal assessment requirement:: "::>i 
the Utah Constitution, Kennecott should be granted the same 14% 
reduut n HI n i in MI i.l". ;.tate Hiss^ssed real and personal 
property as was granted the railroads in L988. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on t hp above, Kennecott is entitled to, ' 1)
 n 
.'.O'i red111. I n m is^e -.aed a m IMI property as 
granted in Aroax; nr in the alternative, (A} i i >i.'. ruijuil i ni in 
assessed value of its real and personal property as was yranted 
to the rail, mads i i i t.'bu 11 M Union Pacific. 
DATED this / ^ ^ d a y of ,Tii~~ 99 2 
IES B. LEE 
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Property Tax Division for all of the Centrally assessed 
property of Kennecott located in Utah on January l, 1988, was 
$635,570,036. Kennecott timely appealed that assessment by a 
Request for Agency Action filed May 31, 1988, and a later 
Revised Request for Ager.cy Action filed September 9, 1988. 
Kennecott and the Property Tax Division entered into a 
Stipulation on December 9, 1988 in which they stipulated that 
the assessed value should be reduced to $617,771,020 as a 
preliminary assessment, but they agreed that the final 
valuation could be higher or lower following either further 
negotiations or litigation. 
The affected counties were given notice of the 
proposed reduction to Kennecott's valuation, and Salt Lake 
County (the county) objected and filed a Petition for 
Commencement of Adjudicative Proceedings on January 10, 1989. 
Salt Lake County also filed a Motion to Consolidate on January 
20, 1989. Kennecott objected to the Motion and Petition on 
February 6, 1989. 
On March 3, 1989, the Tax Commission executed and 
issued an Order of Approval in which they approved the 
preliminary determination of value at the stipulated amount of 
$617,771,020, but the Order of Approval specifically provided 
that "the acceptance of the assessed value in no way limits any 
other issues relating to the appeal, and such issues shall be 
left to further resolution." 
On August 7, 1989, Petitioner filed Petitioner's 
Amended Request for Agency Action. In that Amended Request, 
Kennecott raised the issues of economic and functional 
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should be reduced by 14% to grant to them "the same 
percentage reduction of 14% that the state assessed 
railroads received for their taxable property" 
pursuant to the decision of the United States District 
Court in Union Pacific v. Utah State Tax Commi .on, 
716 F. Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988). 
No testimony or evidence was presented at the hearing 
to indicate that the value of Kennecott's property was any 
amount other than the amount of $617,771,020 to which Kennecott 
and the Property Tax Division stipulated. Therefore, the only 
issues before the Commission at the time of the hearing were 
the two issues raised by Kennecott. 
At the time of the hearing there were at least two 
pending motions which had not been ruled upon by the 
Commission. Kennecott had filed a Motion to Strike, and Salt 
Lake County had filed a Motion for Consolidation. 
Subsequent to the date of the formal hearing, but 
prior to the issuance of a final decision on this case, the 
Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Amax 
Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 796 P2d 
1256 (Utah 1990) which held that Amax Magnesium was entitled to 
the 20% discount in the valuation of its taxable property which 
is extended to some county assessed property pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §59-2-304. That case was decided by the Utah Supreme 
Court on July 18, 1990, and on July 20, 1990, the Petitioner 
filed with the Tax Commission in this proceeding a copy of the 
Amax decision with a Submission of Decision in a Related Case 
in which they requested that the principles of the Amax case be 
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a p p l i e d \ o » I'IIL, od^e iri«;l ': h if' K^nnpfott s p r o p e r t y assessment 
be Immediately reduced . 
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2 . The p e r i o d in q u e s t i o n is t h e l i e n d a t e January 
3 . For t h e l i e n da1"0 January 1 hi* 
Respondent , pursuant; to st ipu lai uni uwi the iitdet it Approval 
e n t e r e d !.', • i! n.fwi.1
 :i;31 . >sessed * h*j P e t i t i o n e r ' s 
t a x a b l e c e n t r a l ly I ' lsessed (jtopei'ty HW<. iu,n I HI MI M DPI rv 
which may I i been -issessed by Lake «oui»t
 1 a t 
$61 • ' l ,'),'" , i ne ] \u\ \u \ , I i I | | f" i y improvements and 
p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y . That jam*- n i memi ipprn HH I y t h e 
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Commission, subject to any changes that might be made through 
this proceeding. 
4. During the period in question, locally assessed 
commercial and industrial real property located in Salt Lake 
County was assessed by the county using a combination of ne 
comparable sales method, the cost appraisal method, and the 
income approach. The value so determined for such real 
property was then reduced 20% pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304. The 20% reduction does not apply to 
personal property and was not applied to personal property by 
the county. 
5. As of January 1, 1988, the fair market value of 
all real and personal property of Union Pacific Railroad, 
Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, and Southern Pacific Railroad 
in Utah was valued by a combination of the cost appraisal 
method, the income approach, and the stock and debt approach. 
The values determined by each of those approaches were then 
correlated based upon the judgment of the appraiser, and the 
final correlated value so determined by the appraiser was then 
reduced by 14%, pursuant to a decision of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Utah entered December 29, 1988. This 
reduction was applied to the railroads' state assessed unitary 
property which includes both real and personal property. 
6. The correlation process is not a precise 
mathematical process, but depends strongly upon the judgment of 
the appraiser. Different appraisers can begin with the same 
estimates of value based upon the three different approaches or 
methods of valuation, and if they have different opinions of 
-6-
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the relative importance of 'he dLtfprenf approaches » " no M M , 
then the final determination «'f m l U P of each appraiser could 
IIH -; i qn 11 nit I,1 iiiffprpnr Nevertheless, paoh i f those 
determi nat i )ns >it "/aiue mav 3t ll I I M ,I M M iml i cdaufi d d e 
determination :r -*<* : n * -n: ket value cr ~re ::"te:^ ; 
7. T - methods ^"' irrr-v^.es *":r 
determining /i-.- : - .- jads isjeiM 
Division *r •• Commission ~^~ ;im:*a: 
f hosp i - ^ounties in dPtp*fining - - * 
- ummei c i a . LIHI ' |Jl 
.pry iissimilar For example, f he ^s* -e^ :c : 
r.i ] 1 r'i-ids uses historical rost frnn * ^^cin^irz ec : is 
U1 UI B d i I I.M i I i t lh I I mj
 L l d l 
p r o p e r t i e s uses e s t ima ted replacement cost do e s t i m a t e d \y an 
ipprapni l l e rv i rp such as Marshal l and Switt Tim, * h i l e t he 
M S I*-1!1! ' M i n i " 7 1 , r " T " M h ? * . l l 1 ' " 1 ' **IM 1 M 1 ' l"iP 
f i n a l v a l u a t i o n oi a r a i l r o a d it i^placement cos t is used in i 
r a i l r o a d v a l u a t i o n , f HP t ) t a l / a l u e under tiie ros t method will 
i i i 11 eatnn " 'mil * ' t -,t r n'.'il Mist J a I I P I r n 
t"he liCL'ount mg i ecoidb S i m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n s exi i in i h 
u t i l i z a t i o n of i-he nn'oine approach , t he comparable »aies 
I|4"JI ii ill iiid hn I IMM mil ipprnanh which M u t i l i z e d f i r 
r a i l r o a . l ni Ijat LOH Mislead " ' i mmpdrikj a n v-rf J 
because t h e r e a re very few n1 -iiiy s a l e s - t r a i l r o a d 
p r n p e t t i e s T use as oomparablps 
II II III ' 1 I l i e o f I- iMI M M HUHI i I III I > iSGHS 0 I I I I P I I 
iris r. " reduced below its estimated fair market value *-or I *8H 
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9. Mining properties, such as those owned by 
Petitioner, are not in the same category of properties as 
railroad properties or most commercial and industrial 
properties. They have different characteristics and under Utah 
law they are assessed by different methodologies. Mining 
properties in Utah are valued using only one method, the 
"capitalized net revenue method" as set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§59-2-201, which method is more fully set forth by the Rules of 
the Tax Commission in Rule R884-24-7P. Under Utah law, that 
methodology is exclusive to the assessment of mines. 
10. Kennecott was valued pursuant to the same 
methodology and on a uniform and equal basis with all other 
mines in the State of Utah. 
11. Kennecott is not valued by the unit approach, and 
does not operate as a unit across state lines. 
12. The assessment of Kennecott was not made by the 
county assessor, but was made by the Property Tax Division of 
the State Tax Commission. 
13. The assessment of Kennecott was not made by using 
either the comparable sales method or the cost appraisal 
method, but was made by using the capitalized net revenue 
method. 
14. The capitalized net revenue method calculates 
fair market value without any consideration to transactional 
costs, i.e., it assumes that the fair market value is available 
to the owner without incurring transactional costs. 
15. The ratio of real property to personal property 
for Petitioner is substantially different than the ratio of 
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real j-1 Ll-eJ: ' ,< '-" s -rnl property fur either the railroads or 
for commercial and industiii, t'L ..^ i »*S I Sr4-i:;p»1 hv the c:imty. 
i Petitioner has not .si./n.; r: ... • . .- D 
t-sttijii ' li i . ropp'-tv , i i )t isspsse-: • * \~d 
Mist value In tiot, ' iiiiy <J-JH .• i* • - . n xa assessed 
at its triii- marKet value 
^ M t i o n ^ r h*s m.r -ubmitted any evidence to 
establish Ui.it ne t-J < n n-i » . is di s p r o p o r t i o n a t e 
to the amount of property it uwiio. 
'•'
 s:
 -NS__OF LAW 
1 "I'lrn, , * ion Article XIII, Section 
_,:.
 fc- -vices as follows: 
Section 2 
i I 'I All tangible property m i In-
state, not exempt under the l^ws of the 
United States, or under this Constitution, 
shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate 
in proportion to its value, to be 
ascertained as provided by law. 
2 "Jit» ! i'" ••» Constitution, A r t : .e X 111 
Section 3{i> provides as foi. ws: 
Section 3 
(J) "The Legislate* ihall provide by 
law a uniform and equal rate of assessment 
on all tangible property in the state, 
according to its value in money, except as 
otherwise provided in Section 2 of this 
Article- The Legislature shall prescribe by 
law such provisions as shall secure a just 
valuation for taxation of such property, 
that every person and corporation shall pay 
a tax in proportion to the value of his 
her, or its tangible property, providt-d 
that the Legislature may determine ~:-
manner and extent nf raxing livestock 
3. Utah ' u"iJ,i> Aim 'i 59-2 201 i |,;n;vitie6 -M-'/tept 
r • xlows: 
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By May 1 the following property shall be 
assessed by the commission at 100% of fair 
market value, as valued on January 1, in 
accordance with this chapter: 
(a) All property which operates as a unit 
across county lines, if the values must be 
apportioned among mere than one county or 
state; . . . . 
(e) All mines and mining claims except in 
cases as determined by the commission, where 
the mining claims are used for other than 
mining purposes, in which case the value of 
mining claims used for other than mining 
purposes shall be assessed by the assessor 
of the county in which the mining claims are 
located: and. 
(f) All machinery used in mining, all 
property or surface improvements upon or 
appurtenant to mines or mining claims. For 
the purposes of assessment and taxation, all 
processing plants, mills, reduction works, 
and smelters which are primarily used by the 
owner of a mine or mining claim for 
processing, reducing, or smelting minerals 
taken from a mine or mining claim shall be 
considered appurtenant to that mine or 
mining claim, regardless of actual location. 
4. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-201(2) provides as follows: 
The method for determining the fair market 
value of productive mining property is the 
capitalized net revenue method or any other 
valuation method the commission believes, or 
the taxpayer demonstrates to the 
commission's satisfaction, to be reasonably 
determinative of the fair market value of 
the mining property. The rate of 
capitalization applicable to mines shall be 
determined by the commission, consistent 
with a fair rate of return expected by an 
investor in light of that industry's current 
market, financial, and economic conditions. 
In no event may the fair market value of the 
mining property be less than the fair market 
value of the land, improvements, and 
tangible personal property upon or 
appurtenant to the mining property. 
(Emphasis added) 
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5. r - : 
If tne ; runty assessor .seb *ne eompara:,.-. 
sales JZ tne :,;st ippraisal ~ethcd 
determining tne fair rar.<et value .: ~*:<anlj 
proper"; f": issessrrent ' r r 
assessor :s :equired 10 recogr.^e t..at 
vdj..;,.: fees, services, closing C'-sts ind 
other expenses related to -he transaction 
lessen -ne i:tual amount "hat ~iay re 
received in m e transact; ^ n The :ounry 
assesscr snail, therefore, * axe 80% 0: tne 
value based on comparable sales or cost 
appraisa* of the property i. its fa:: "a: -
value. 
6 lit ah O Dde .A 1:1 n §59 -2-304(2), as < i»f January 1, 
] 988 1; 1: ::>\ ' i ded tl lat the Commi ssi on wo 1 1] d devel op and i implement 
met hod s o f appr a i s a 1 wh I c h wou 1 d 1 1 01 i nc 1 ude a s p • a 1: t :: • £ 
f a I r ma 1: ket v a 1 ue t he "' i nt ang ib 1 e va 1 ues" a s o 111:1 ined 
Si ibsecti ::)i 1 (111 ) a nd tl lat thereafter Subsectioii I I I would no 
longer apply. Instead, the methods levelled I" t 1 he "' "im 
were to then be fully implemented. 
, 11 n n J, n , 1,,,
 d|Jove provisions 1 he ! ,eq i s 1 a tu r P h,-
been given the authority to p r n n n h 1 uniloiiii amid \ in I I ii 
jf assessment nn all tangible property in the state airi Il 
I'pnm c in in,1 a 1 nation for taxation of such property in 
iidei I ui every nut 11 y I n pay 1 .IAHS 1 in |ii upur t inn 1 n 1 In-1 1 I in 
it thai entity n property Pursuant tj that, .iuthoiily planted 
under the constitution, the Legislature Has enacted j559-2-201 
I II I ill "I i - ' L • I I I t . 
in Thn Legislature has made a determination that 
when fair market vaiue io calculated by using eithet the 
1 i n i p a in a m 1 f1 111 n i p t n u n I i n 11111* 1 u .i \\\\w i 1 •• a 1 im>l i n n l f ; h e n : j in i=? 
t r a n s a c t i o n nobt > 1I111I1 nave hewn included in piiii il unrf 
de te rmined v a l u e . The L e g i s l a t u r e a l s o mad*- Hie 
- 1 1 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determination that when fair market value is calculated by any 
other method, such as the capitalized net revenue method, there 
are no transaction costs which have been included as part of 
the determined value. There is a reasonable relationship 
between that legislatively determined classification and the 
purpose of §59-2-304(1), the purpose of which is to equalize 
the tax burdens imposed upon the various properties. 
9. The Legislature found no basis for intangible 
values or transaction costs for centrally assessed properties 
as is indicated by the exclusion of centrally assessed 
properties from the provisions of §59-2-304, and also by the 
express provisions of §59-2-201. The Legislature has 
determined that centrally assessed properties, including mine 
properties such as Petitioner's, are tcr' be assessed by the 
Commission using methods other than the comparable sales method 
or the cost appraisal method. Those centrally assessed 
property valuation methods, including the capitalized net 
revenue method, have been determined to not include transaction 
costs in the calculation of fair market value. The Legislature 
has, therefore, specifically excluded properties such as that 
which is owned by the Petitioner from the operation of 
§59-2-304 because of the difference in methodology. 
10. The 20% reduction provided by Utah Code Ann. 
§59-2-304 applies only to real property valued by either the 
comparable sales method or the cost appraisal method. It does 
not apply to personal property. 
11. The federal "4-R" Act does not apply to mining 
properties such as the property of Petitioner. 
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12. If the property of Petitioner had been valued by 
the county pursuant to the capitalized net revenue method, the 
values so determined would not have been reduced 20% because of 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304. 
13. Utah Code Ann. §§59-2-1007 and 59-1-210(7) 
provide that the Tax Commission may equalize an assessment with 
other similarly assessed property, and ensure that assessments 
are just, equal and their burden is distributed without favor 
or discrimination. 
14. It is Petitioner's position that the Commission 
should equalize the assessment of Petitioner's property with 
property which is similarly assessed. However, the 
Petitioner's property has not been deemed by the Legislature to 
be similarly assessed with properties whi^ dh do receive the 20% 
or 14% reductions. The subject property as a mine property is 
centrally assessed under the above provisions and also under 
section 4 of Article XIII of the Utah State Constitution and 
the relevant statutes and rules of the Commission. It is 
therefore in the same category as other property which is 
centrally assessed and all centrally assessed property is taxed 
at 100% of fair market value. 
15. The Petitioner has not shown that the appraisal 
methods used by the Petitioner and those used by Salt Lake 
County were the same. Therefore, the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 796 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1990) does not control or 
govern these proceedings. In the present case, although the 
methods used by the Respondent and the county may be referred 
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to by the same names (i.e. income appr Jh, cost approach, and 
market approach) the techniques and methodologies used within 
each of those separate methods are quite different with respect 
to the subject property. 
16. In the alte ative, Petitioner asserts that it 
should be accorded the 14% reduction allowed to railroads. The 
controlling case to this issue is Union Pacific vs. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 716 F.Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988). As a result of 
that case, railroads under the federal "4-R" Act have a 14% 
reduction in the assessed values of their property. The 
subject property, however, is not a railroad property and is 
also not governed by the federal "4-R" Act. It is therefore, 
not similar to railroad properties that receive the 14% 
reduction. The subject property is rehired by law to be 
assessed at 100% of its full market value. 
17. The Commission finds further that the case Rio 
Algom Corp. vs. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) 
states the rationale and principles which are controlling in 
this case. The Rio Algom Court found that a "certain degree of 
de facto classification is unavoidable" and the Legislature has 
a proper amount of discretion in meeting the requirements of 
uniformity mandated under the Utah Constitution. The court 
stated: 
Under Article XIII, §3, the property taxes 
paid on each property are required to be 
uniform and in proportion to the value of 
the property. Although the objective is 
easily stated, its attainment is more 
difficult. Because of the many different 
kinds of property and the various factors 
that affect their value, the determination 
of what constitutes equal "in proportion to 
the value of his, her, or its tangible 
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property," under Article XIII, §3, cannot be 
made by application of any single property 
formula. 
Of primary importance is the determination 
of what valuation method should be utilized, 
and that depends on the nature of the 
properties to be taxed. Residential, 
commercial, transportation, mining and 
public utilities, etc., must be treated 
differently because of the economic 
conditions that give value to such 
properties. Rio Algom at 188. 
18. Petitioner claims that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution does not allow 
Petitioner to be treated differently than those properties 
which are accorded the 20% and 14% reductions. However, 
Petitioner does not fall within the classifications of these 
other properties, so Petitioner has not shown that it is 
unlawfully treated differently than otjaer mines or others 
within its classification. Therefore, the equal protection 
clause does not mandate a reduction of the value of 
Petitioner's property. 
19. The distinctions between property such as that 
owned by Petitioner and other properties in the state is a 
reasonable one which has been made by the Legislature in the 
exercise of its proper discretion and is neither arbitrary nor 
capricious. The distinctions and classifications established 
by the Legislature do not result in an intentional or 
systematic overvaluation of the Petitioner's property from the 
valuation of the property of other taxpayers within the same 
class. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company vs. Webster 
County West Virginia, 109 S.Ct. 633, 102 L.Ed.2d 688 (1989). 
-15-
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20. Valuations of different types of properties 
cannot be determined by the application of a single or uniform 
formula. The value of a mine is not determined by the 
application of the same formula or meth~ :>logy as is used to 
determ ne the value of a home. Likewi neither a mine nor a 
home can be determined by the application of the same formula 
or methodology as is used to determine the value of a railroad. 
21. The valuation of property is not subject to 
mathematical precision. Different appraisers can use the same 
general methodology such as the income approach, but by making 
slightly different assumptions, such as capitalization rate, 
they may arrive at substantially diverse conclusions of fair 
market value. However, each of those determinations of value 
may still be a fair and reasonable determination of the fair 
market value of the property. 
22. "Market Value" is a term that cannot be applied 
in an overly rigid fashion, and is not subject to mathematical 
precision. It cannot be determined to the nearest dollar. It 
is a term which is at best a reasonable approximation based 
upon the best evidence available and the judgment and 
experience of the person making the determination of value. 
While the term has a precise meaning, an appraisal is not a 
wholly fixed, precise, or exact number. 
23. The factual premise of the Legislature was that 
properties valued by either the comparable sales method or the 
cost appraisal method had elements of transaction costs 
included in those values, and that since those costs were not 
included in values determined pursuant to other methods, those 
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transaction costs should not be required to bear a portion of 
the tax burdens. It was the Legislature's way of equalizing 
taxes as required by the constitution. There was no evidence 
presented at the hearing that the premise assumed by the 
Legislature was not correct. 
24. In Amax, supra, the valuation methods of the 
Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission were 
identical in all respects to the valuation methods of the 
county. In this proceeding, the property of Petitioner is 
valued using a different method than was used for residences or 
railroads. 
25. The Utah Supreme Court in Amax, supra, did not 
hold Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304(1), unconstitutional, but it held 
that the 20% reduction required by the statue must be applied 
to the property of AMAX because it had been valued by exactly 
the same methodology used by the county in valuing county 
assessed property. 
26. Based on the above, the Commission determines 
that the relief sought by Petitioner cannot be granted. The 
assessment of Petitioner's property at 100% of its fair market 
value pursuant to the capitalized net revenue method is proper, 
fair, reasonable, and required by the constitution and laws of 
the state of Utah, and does not contravene any provision of 
-17-
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federal law or violate any provisions or requirements of the 
United States Constitution. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order 
of the Utah State Tax Commission that: 
1. The Motion to Consolidate filed by the County, 
and the Motion to Strike filed by Petitioner are hereby 
denied. Any other pending motions are also denied. 
2. The request for a reduction in the value of 
Petitioner's property is hereby denied, and the value of 
Petitioner's property for the lien date of January 1, 1988, is 
affirmed at $617,771,020. It is so ordered. 
DATED this y day of y//?A<cA^ • 1992. 
T 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION-. 
Se B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
(Umi^k. 
S. Blaine Willes* 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1), 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
*Since the hearing on this case, Commissioner G. Blaine Davis 
has been replaced by Commissioner S. Blaine Willes. 
Commissioner Willes has been duly advised of the ^f^?^V?5d 
circumstances regarding this case and is qualified 
decision. 
GBD/sj/9416w 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Kennecott Corporation - Utah Copper 
c/o Kent Winterholler 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Robert L. Yates 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
2001 South State #N2323 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Mike Reed 
Salt Lake County Auditor 
2001 South State Street, #N2200 
Salt Lake City, UT S4190 
Karl Hendrickson 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Anne R. Dunyon 
Tooele County Assessor 
County Courthouse 
Tooele,, UT 84074 
Glenn W. Caldwell 
Tooele County Auditor 
County Courthouse 
Tooele,, UT 84074 
J. Mike Monson 
Director, Property Tax 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Brent Eyre 
Assistant Director 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
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L. Brent Gardner 
Utah Association of Counties 
55 South State Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Deputy County Attorney 
9 Exchanaa Place #1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Lee Dever 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
DATED this 3 day of /Jfa^JL.^ , 1992, 
-20-
00000043 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TabB 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. VERBATIM PRESENTATION OF CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS/ 
STATUTES, AND RULES 
Constitution 
Article I, Section 24 B-2 
Article VIII, Section 3 B-3 
Article XIII, Section 2(1) B-4 
Article XIII, Section 3(1) B-6 
Article XIII, Section 2 B-4 
Article XIII, Section 3 B-6 
Article XIII, Section 4 B-7 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987) B-8 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (1987) B-10 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1991) B-ll 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (e) (ii) (1991) - B-12 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 (1973 & Supp. 1986) B-13 
49 USCA § 11503 (1982 & Supp. 1988) B-14 
Rules 
Utah Admin. Code § R884-24-7P B-15 
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Art. I, § 23 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CD 
I 
Utah I^aw Review. — The Condemnor's Li-
ability for Damage* Arising Through Institut 
ing, Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Do-
main Proceedings, 1967 Utah L Rev 548 
Comment. Highway Noise Damage and 
Utah Eminent Domain Law, 1972 Utah L Rev 
116 
City of Oakland v Oakland Raiders Defin-
ing the Parameters of Limitless Power. 1983 
Utah L Rev 397 
Eminent Domain Compensation in Western 
States A Critique of the Fair Market Value 
Model. 1984 Utah L Rev 429 
The Failure of Subdivision Control m the 
Western United States A Blueprint for Local 
<Government Action. 1988 Utah I. Rev 569 
J o u r n a l of Energy U w Mnd Policy. 
Comment. The Only Way to Manage a Desert 
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8 
J Energy L & Poly 95 (1987) 
Harvard Law Review. — Constitutionality 
of Zoning, 37 Harv L Rev 834 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 26 Am Jur 2d Eminent 
Domain <*& 7, 13 et seq 
C.J.S. - 29A C J S Eminent Domain $ 3 
A.L.R. — Building restrictions, an property 
right* for taking of which compensation must 
bo made, 4 A L R 3d 1137 
Restrictive covenant, right to enforcement 
thereof us tompeii«ahle property right, 4 
A L R 3 d 1137 
Deduction of benefits in determining com 
Dentation or damages in proceeding involving 
opening, widening, or otherwise altering high-
way, 13 A L R 3 d 1149 
Property for exchange for other property re-
quired fur public use. condemning. 20 A L R 3d 
862 
Restrictive covenant, existence of, as ele-
ment in fixing price of property condemned, 22 
A L R 3 d 961 
Eminent domain right to enter land for pre-
liminary survey or examination, 29 A L R 3d 
1104 
Entry upon or exploration of laud before con-
demnation, 29 A L R 3d 1104 
Schools liability of public schools and insti-
tutions of higher learning for taking or damag-
ing private properly lor public use. 33 A L R 3d 
703 
Seuure of property as evidence in criminal 
prosecution or investigation as compensable 
taking, 44 A L R 4th 366 
Validity, construction, and application of 
state relocation assistance laws, 49 A L R 4th 
491 
Inverse condemnation state court class ac-
tions. 49 A LR4th 618 
Court appointment of attorney to represent, 
without compensation, indigent in civil action, 
52 A L R 4th 1063 
Eminent domain industrial park or similar 
development as public use justifying condem 
nation of private property 62 A L R 4lh I 183 
Key Numbers. Eminent Domain *~ 3 
Sec. 23. (Irrevocable franchises forbidden.) 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, privilege or 
immunity. 
History: Const. 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Alcoholic beverages 
Pioneer Memorial Building 
Public purpose 
Alcoholic beverages. 
h'ortner Liquor Control Act held not uncon-
stitutional as violative of this section Utah 
MfrH ' Ass'n v Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P 2d 
229 (1933) 
State legislature was acting within its power 
in enacting former Liquor Control Act. which 
in effect revoked previously granted license au-
thorizing the sale of light beer Riggms v Dm 
tnct Court, 89 Utah 183, 51 P 2d 645 (19351 
Pioneer Memorial Building. 
Act pertaining to leasing of portion of state 
capitol grounds to Daughters of Utah Pioneers 
for erection and maintenance of Pioneer Me-
morial Building, and amendments thereto 
making appropriation** then-fur, us well an ap 
propnation of $150,04X1 for that building, did 
not violate this section Thomas v Daughters 
of Utah Pioneers. 114 Utah 108, 197 P 2d 477 
(1948). appeal dismissed for want of a properly 
presented substantial federal question. 336 
U S 930, 69 S Ct 739. 93 L Ed 1090 (1949) 
Public purpose. 
Construction and operation of parking facil 
ity by city agency as part o( a slum clearance 
122 
DECLARATION OK RIGHTS Art 1, § 24 
project did not unconstitutionally grant bene-
fits to private individuals, any benefits were 
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter 
mutation of urban blight Tribe v Salt I^ake 
City Corp, 540 P 2d 499 (Utah 1975) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am Jur 2d Franchises 
^ 9 to 23 
C.J S. - 37 C J S Franchises fe 26 
Key Numbers . - Franchises ** 11 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation 
History: C o n s t 1896. 
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-
vate or special laws, Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 
26 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general 
Age of majority 
Agent for service of process 
Automobile license law 
Construction with Art VI, $ 26 
Contract carrier permit 
Cosmetologists' license law 
Criminal actions 
— Investigations 
— Prosecution 
Sentence 
Criminal sentence 
Disparate lax assessments 
Excess revenue relunds 
Ciuest statutes 
Inheritance Tax Law 
Insurance premium tax exemption 
Intoxicating liquor 
Licenses 
Massage parlor ordinance 
Municipal employment prerequisites 
Notice requirements 
Property 
— Responsibility for water service 
Public employees' retirement system 
Public officers' bonds 
Public officers' salaries 
Road poll tax 
School activities 
Search warrants 
Sunday closing laws 
Tax sales 
Unfair Practices Act 
In general. 
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever 
uniform laws can be enacted State v 
Holtgreve. 58 Utah 563, 200 P 894, 26 A L R 
696 (1921) 
Objects and purposes of law present touch 
stone for determining proper and improper 
classifications State v Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 
P 2d 920, 117 A L R 330 (1938), State v J i l i 
R E Walker, hit , 100 Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 
(1941) 
One who assails legislative classification as 
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such 
State v J B & R E Walker, Inc , 100 Utah 
523, 116 P2d 7b6 (1941) 
damnification is never unreasonable or arbi 
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features BO 
long SB there IB Home basis lor differentiation 
between classes or subject mutters included, as 
computed to those excluded, provided difleren 
tialion beurH leasonable relation to purposes of 
act State v J R A R E Walker. Inc , 100 Utah 
523, 116 P2d 766 11941) 
Before legislative enactment can be inter 
fered with, court must be able to say that there 
is no fair reason for the law that would not 
require equally its extension to those which it 
leaves untouched State v J H & R E Walker, 
Inc, 100 Utah 523, 116 P2d 766 11941) 
Only where some persons or transactions ex-
cluded from operation of law are, as to the sub-
ject matter of the law, in no differentiate class 
from those included in its operation, is the law 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary 
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis 
to differentiate can be found, law must be held 
constitutional State v J B & R E Walker, 
Inc, 100 Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941) 
Inability of legislature to make perfect clas 
sification does not render statute unconstilu 
tional State v J B & R E Walker, Inc , 100 
Utah 523. l i b P 2d 766 (1941) 
In determining whether classification made 
by legislature it* unconutitulional, discrimina 
tion is very essence of classification and is not 
objectionable unless founded upon unreason 
able distinctions Crontund v Salt l^ake City, 
113 Utah 284. 194 P 2d 464 (1948) 
An act is never unconstitutional because of 
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Art VIII. § 2 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — An Intermediate Ap C J . 8 . — 16 C .J S Constitutional U w 
peltate Court — DoeH Utah Need One' , 1979 §* 169 to 214 
Utah L Rev 107 A.L.R. -Judicial power to order discontinu 
Am. Jur. 2d. — I6A Am Ju r 2d Const itu «nce of life sustaining treatment, 48 A L R 4th 
tional Law ** 306 to 310 Ml Am .lur 2d 6 7 
Cniiria n oi Mm Key Numbers. - Constitutional U w «=* 67 
' to 7ft. Courts *» 147'/,, 206< !2'/,», States •=» 52 
Sec. 2. (Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law 
unconstitutional — Justice unable to partici-
pate.) 
The Supreme Court shall he the highest court and shall consist of at least 
five justices The number of justices may he changed by statute, but no change 
shall have the effect of removing a justice from office A chief justice shall be 
selected from among the justices of the Supreme Court as provided by statute 
The chief justice may resign as chief justice without resigning from the Su-
preme Court The Supreme Court by rule may sit and render final judgment 
either en banc or in divisions The court shall not declare any law unconstitu-
tional under this constitution or the Constitution of the United States, except 
on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the Supreme Court If a 
justice of the Supreme Court is disqualified or otherwise unable to participate 
in a cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief justice is 
disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining justices, shall call an 
active judge from an appellate court or the district court to participate in the 
cause 
History: Const. I89«; L. 1943, S..I R. 2; C'roM-Reference*. - Election following ap 
I9H4 (2nd 8 8 ) , 8.J.K. I pointment 1 o judicial office, t 20 I 7 7 
Siututory provisions, t 78 2 1 et aeq 
W 
I NOTES TO DECISIONS 
GJ 
ANAI VSIS thai he wa* otherwise disqualified to hear the 
cane Sime statehood it has lieen the practice to 
"Disqualification" construed call in a district judge when a member of the 
Effect of syllabus of case Supreme Court IH ill "or otherwise unable to lie 
Powers of district judge sitting in place of de present at hearing of a cause " Accordingly, 
censed just ice * here just ice enter* armed Ion ea of nation as a 
. . .„ . ,.
 A . reserve officer, a district judge mav be called 
"Disqualification roniitrurd
 m ( r l U h | o w v M o n 8 0 n , 1 0 2 Utah .178. I l l 
I he term disqualified as used in Ibis arti
 p ^ ? H 4 | l J M 2 > K o r e | u> l h | | | t a w w . e 
, le is used in its natural and oidinnry se,.«e. ^ ^
 y ^ ^ l ( ) 2 U u h <r>tt 
and thus includes illness or a physical disahil , ^ ^
 |JjM2i 
ity or other condition incapacitating a member 
of the court and may even include the death of Effect of syllabus of eaae 
such member In re Thompson s Estate, 72 Where it IH not clear from separate opinions 
Utah 17. 2b» V 101 (1928*
 0 r l n | 1 ( O U r t exactly what the holding is, the 
This section negates the idea that if a justice decision of the court should be ascertainable by 
is temporarily disqualified, there should be an reading the syllabus Shields v Utah Light & 
appointment by the governor The term 'dis Traction Co . 99 Utah 307, 105 P 2d 347 (19401 
qualified" used therein has been interpreted to 
mean not only personal interest in the particu- Power* of district Judge sitting in place of 
lar caae on the part of a justice, or that he was deceased justice. 
counsel during the trial or prior pro* eedings. or Under this section, when a justice dies, a va 
186 
cancy in his office occurs and the remaining 
justices have authority to call in or permit a 
district judge to sit with them in a particular 
case which is argued before the vacancy is 
filled by appointment of the governor and the 
appointee qualifies Such district judge is at 
least a judge de facto, and he may participate 
in the case and in the court's decision and the 
rehearing therein even after vacancy has been 
filled by appointment In re Thompson's Ea 
tate, 72 Utah 17, 269 P 103 <1928l 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. 20 Am Jur 2d Courts * 87 
et seq 
C I S 21 C.J S Courts H 291 4»>4 to 
48b 
A L K . Disqualification of judge for hav 
ing decided difierer.t case against litigant 21 
A L R 3 d 1369 
Power of successor or substituted judge in 
civil case to render decision or enter judgment 
on testimony heard by predecessor, 22 
A l . l t Id 922 
Disqualify iiI ion of judge on ground of being 
a witncHs m the cane 22 A LK id 1198 
Disqualification of judge (or bias against 
counsel for litigant. 2J A L K .1(1 1416 
Disqualification of judge because of his or 
anothers holding or owning stock in corpora 
tion involved in litigation. 25 A L R 3d 1331 
Key Numbers Courts *=» 248 
Sec. 3. (Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.| 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordi-
nary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the 
United States The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all 
other matters to he exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all 
writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction 
or the complete determination of any cause 
History: Const 1896; 1943, S J R 2 ; 1984 
(2nd SS.) , S.I II I. 
Compiler 's Notes — Provisions similar to 
those in this section were formerly found in 
Art VIII. Sec 4 
Cross References. — Original and appel 
late jurisdiction, * 78 2 2 
NOTKS TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appellate jurisdiction 
Certiorari 
Habeas corpus 
legislative enlargement 
powers 
or abridgement of 
Appellate jurisdiction 
Appellate jurisdu tion connotes review of the 
action of an inferior court rederal courts are 
not inferior courts to the Utah Supreme Court 
and supreme courts answer to certified ques 
tions in a case that originated in or is to he 
adjudicated in a federal court is not an exercise 
of appellate jurisdiction within the meaning of 
this section Holden v N L Indus Inc n29 
P2d 428 (Utah I98U 
Certiorari. 
Under this set tion the Supreme Court, and 
not a justice thereof, is authorized to issue a 
writ of certiorari, and a statute conferring such 
power on a Supreme Court justice must give 
way to the Constitution Carter v West. 38 
Utah 381, I M P 1025 (1911) 
Where, due to untimeliness, a criminal con 
viction was no longer subject to review by the 
statutory remedy of appeal, and a habeas cor 
pus proceeding which WOM proper I v before the 
Supreme Court on uppt nl held that defendant 
had l>een deprived of his constitutional right to 
an appeal, and the alleged error could not have 
lieen corrected on appeal and the defendant 
had taken the initiative to Meek an ap|>eal be 
foie the time for appeal had passed. Supreme 
Court exercised its discretion to issue the com 
mon law writ of certiorari to allow defendant a 
direct review in the Supreme Court of the al 
leged errors in his trial lloggess v Morns, 635 
P2d 39 (Utah 1981> 
Habeas corpus 
Matters which have been or could have been 
raised on appeal cannot be brought before the 
court by hat>ea* corpus Habeas corpus is a 
civil matter and the findings of the trial court 
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Art XIII, § 1 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
doeH not prevent the state from going into the 
liquor buHinesH Kiggimt v DiMtriU Court, H9 
Utah I HA, 51 P 2d «45 (1935) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah U w Review. Antitrust Sympo 
mum. 1969 Utah 1, Rev 617 
The Utah Antitrunt Act of 1979 < Jetting into 
the State Antitrunt Busineiut. 1980 Utah L 
Rev 7.1 
Journal of Energy l*aw and l*ohcy. An 
Economic AnutyHiM of Utility Coal Company 
RelationHhipH, 8 J Energy I. & Poly 27 < 1987) 
A.L.R. — Divestiture aa available relief un-
der § 16 of Clayton Act (15 USCS * 26) in ac-
tion by private parties, 77 A L R red 509 
Standing of private parly under <) 16 of 
Clayton Act 115 USCS * 26) to seek injunction 
to prevent merger or acquisition allegedly pro-
hibited under $ 7 ol the Act (15 USCS * 18), 
78 A L It red 159 
Am. Jur. 2d. 54 Am .lur 2d Monopolies 
Restraints of Trade, and Untuir Tiude l*rac 
tices i 44J et seq 
C.J.S. — 58 V J S Monopolies $ 27 
Key Numbers. Monopolies «-> 10 
ARTICLE XIII 
REVENUE AND TAXATION 
i 
2 
3 
Section 
1 | Fiscal year | 
ITangible property to be taxed Value as 
certained Exemption* Re-
mittance or abatement of laxes 
of poor — Intangible property 
- legislature to provide an 
nual (ax for stale I 
| Assessment and taxation of tangible prop 
erty — Livestock — I .and used 
for agricultural purposes | 
|Mines and claims to tie assessed Basis 
and multiple What to be as 
sessed as tangible property | 
IIJOCUI authorities to levy local taxes — 
Sharing tax and revenues by 
political subdivisions I 
I Annual statement to be published | 
j Repealed I 
I Officer not to make profit out of public 
moneys I 
Section 
9 (State expenditure to be kept within reve-
nues I 
10 |All property taxable where situated I 
11 |Creation of State Tax Commission — 
Memltership - (Jovernor to ap-
point Terms - Duties 
County iMtards Duties | 
12 |Stamp, income, occupation, license or 
franchise tax permissible -
Reference to United States laws 
in imposition of income taxes 
Income or intangible property 
taxes allocated to public school 
system | 
13 | Revenue from highway user and motor 
fuel taxes to l>e used for high 
way purposes 1 
14 ITangible personal property tax exemp-
tion | 
Section 1. 1 Fiscal year. I 
The fiscal year shall begin on the first day of January, unless changed by 
the Legislature 
History: Const. 1896. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1980, Senate 
Joint Resolution No 6, proposed to amend Ar 
tide XIII The proposed amendment was sub 
milted to the electors at the general election in 
1980 and failed to pass liecause it did not re 
ceive the necessary majority 
Cross-Reference*. Fiscal year of state to 
commence on first ot July, <J tiJ 1.1 1 
228 
REVENUE AND TAXATION Art XIII. § 2 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Bond issue. invalid an attempting to lix fiscal year other 
City ordinance authorizing bond issue for than that provided hy this section Fjeldsled v 
improvement of waterworks and specifying Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P 2d 144 (19331, 
that for purpose of servuiug l>onds fist uI year Wadsworlh v Saniaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 
should continue same as calendar year was not I' 2d lol (19 131 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 84 C J S Taxation * 357 
Key Numbers . luxation «-• 318 
Sec. 2. ITangible property to be taxed — Value ascer-
tained — Exemptions — Remittance or abate-
ment of taxes of poor — Intangible property — 
Legislature to provide annual tax for state. | 
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the 
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and 
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law 
(2) The following are property tax exemptions. 
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and public libraries, 
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all 
other political subdivisions of the state, except that to the extent and in 
the manner provided by the Legislature the property of a county, city, 
town, special district or other political subdivision of the state located 
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to 
the ad valorem property tax, 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for 
religious, charitable or educational purposes, 
(d) Places of burial not held or used lor private or corporate benefit, and 
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by statute This 
exemption shall be implemented over a period of time as provided by 
statute 
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m , which is 
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside 
this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no 
situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be ex-
empted by law from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or pro-
duced or otherwise originating within or without the state 
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m , held for 
sale in the ordinary course of business and which constitutes the inventory of 
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may 
be deemed for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted 
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, 
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corpo-
rations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals or 
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxa-
tion to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes 
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for 
generating and delivering electrical power, a poition ot which is used for 
2 2 9 
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furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in the 
state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the extent that such property 
is used for such purposes These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the 
users of water so pumped under such regulations as the Legislature may 
prescribe. 
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in 
such manner as niM, ' '*>d by law. 
(8) The Legislature m . , le by law for the exemption from taxation: of 
not to exceed 45*2 of the fair market value of residential property as defined 
by law; and nil household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclu-
sively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for 
himself and family. 
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the mili-
tary service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried 
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while 
serving in the military service of the United States or the state of Utah were 
killed in action or died as a result of such service may be exempted as the 
legislature may provide. 
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as property or it 
may be taxed as property in such manner and to such extent as the Legisla-
ture may provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also 
be taxed Provided that if intangible property is taxed as property the rate 
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation 
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with 
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the 
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any there 
be, the legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay 
the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, within twenty years 
from the final passage of the law creating the debt. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1930 (Spec. Seas.), County service area property exempt. 
w 8.J R. 2; 1946, H JR. 3; 1957. H JR. 7; 1961, ft 17A-2 429 
I S.J R. 6; 1963, SJ.R. 5; 1967. S.J.R. I; 1982, Disabled veterans exemption, ftft 59 2 1104. 
( j ! S.J.R. 3; 1986, H.J.R. 18.
 5 9 . 2 n 0 5 
Compiler's Notes. - UWB 1959. Senate Exemptions generally, ft 59 2 1101 et seq . 
Joint Resolution No 5 proponed a constitu- Chapter 23 of Title 78 
tional amendment to be voted or U the elec
 I f u J t abatement o, deferral of 
tor* at the general election u. . . .» I he pro-
 U j | e 8 „ ftQ 2 . | | 0 7 5 9 2 
posed amendment failed to pass because it did . . . •
 r • * J i 
. . .
 K
 Industrial facilities development property 
not receive the necessary majority . . . . . . . r r r J 
The 1979 proponed amendments to this sec- e**mP l- * " l » ' l 0 
tion by House Joint Resolutions Nos 23 and 25
 L
M , n e a n d m m m
«
 c , a , m
 ""Pavements, ma-
were repealed and withdrawn by Senate Joint «""»«* « r structures not exempt, ft 59 5 64 
Resolution No 6. Laws 1**80 Privilege tax on possession and use of tax-
Law* 1986, Senate Joint R«n Lit ion No 4, «**mP* properties, ft 51 4-101 
proposed to smend Subsection <V . » of this sec- Property of higher education institutions ex 
tion The proposed amendment was submitted e m P l . • 63B-20 106 
to the electors st the general election in 1986 Property tax relief, ft 59 2 1201 et seq 
and failed to pass because it did not receive the Rate of assessment of property, ft 59-2 103 
necessary majority School property exempt from taxation, 
Cross-References. — Armories exempt ft 53A-3-408 
from taxation, ft 39 2 1 Tangible personal property held for sale on 
Civil Air Patrol equipment exempt, ft 2 1 41 January 1 exempt, ft 59 2 1114 
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NOTKS TO DECISIONS 
A N A I YRIR 
In general 
Banks 
Boundaries of taxing districts 
Charitable organization's property 
Charitable purpose 
Charitable use exemption 
— Government subsidies 
Hospital under construction 
— Material reciprocity lest 
— Operating expenses 
Church property 
City property 
Co operative corporation property 
Corporations for irrigating land 
County improvement district contingent tax 
Disparity in slate and county assessment 
Excess revenue refunds 
tabor union property 
Mining claims 
Property of United States or its instrumental 
ity 
Remission of taxes of indigent or insane per 
sons 
Roll back of assessed value 
Scientific research institute 
Sewer chaiges ngauist city s< hool lioard prop 
erty 
Special assessments 
State colleges 
State property 
Transfer of property to tax exempt corporation 
True market value 
— Intentional discrimination 
Utah State Retirement Fund property 
Value determination by classification 
Cited 
In general. 
State's power of taxation is not within appli 
cation of. and is not limited bv. Art I Sec 22. 
providing that private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation Kimball v Orantsville ( itv, 19 
Utah 368. 57 P 1. 45 Lit A b28 HH«»«)i 
Unless tax laws <onf)ict will, Home constitu 
tional provision, either exprenMly or by implica 
tion, courts have no authority to prevent their 
execution Kimball v Orantsville City. 19 
Utah 368. 57 P I. 45 I, R A 628 <I8«I9> 
Banks. 
All nonexempt local property of national 
bank located in state IH within states power 
of taxation Common ml Natl Hank v ('ham 
hers, 21 Utah 324 61 P 560. 56 LRA 14b 
(1900), afTd. 182 U S 556. 21 S CI 8b 1 15 L 
Kd 1227 <190D 
Boundaries of taxing districts 
Fixing of boundaries of taxing district and 
its area is wholly matter of legislative discre-
tion, and exercise of such discretion is not sub-
ject of judicial investigation or revision 
Kimball v C.rantsville City. 19 Utah 368. 57 P 
1. 45 LRA 628 (1899> 
Charitable organization's property. 
Housing facility operated by nonprofit corpo-
ration was not exempt from taxation as a char-
ity where senior citizen residents were paying 
lor all the services thev received and rental of 
apartments was determined not by need but by 
what was required to pay mortgage and opera 
tional ex|N>nses rnendship Manor Corp v 
Tax Commri. 26 Utah 2d 227. 487 P 2d 1272 
(197 It 
If charitable organization does not use its 
real property and building thereon exclusively 
for charitable purposes such property is not ex-
empt lad that oigamzation is exempt from 
federal taxation is not determinative, nonprofit 
character of organization is essential hut not 
determinative Friendship Manor Corp v Tax 
Commn. 26 Utah 2d 227. 487 P 2d 1272 
i1971i 
Where plaintiff applied for exemption from 
ad \ulortiii taxation as a nonpiofit organizn 
lion with iharitahle piir|H>Ne and where plain 
till <aiiie<| on various charitable activities 
Isith in building and a way from premises for 
which exemption was sought 'exclusive use" 
o( lot with building thereon did not require all 
chanlahle activity take place in that building, 
and lax Commission's refusal of exemption 
was reversed Benevolent & Protective Order 
of Klks No 85 v Tax Commn. 536 P 2d 1214 
(Utah 19751 
Fraternal organization's lot and the lodge 
building thereon were not entitled to a tax ex-
emption on the basis of charitable use where 
the activities conducted in the lodge consisted 
chiefly o( drinking < aid playing dancing and 
other social rather than fraternal functions, 
and t be or^ani/at ion M expenditures on charita 
hie objeds amounted to only slightly more 
than 2'« ol total expenditures Maker v One 
Piece of Improved Real Property 570 1* 2d 
1021 (Utah 1977) 
It is the use to which the real property is put, 
not the natuie of the owning organization, 
which is determinative of whether or not the 
pro|M»rty is exempt as being used exclusively 
for (h.intable purposes Ynrgasnri v County 
lid of rquali/alion. 71 t P 2d br> I (Utah 1986) 
An apart m< nl building for needy elderly and 
handicapped families and individuals is ex 
euipt from real property tax where it is used 
exclusively for charitable purposes Yorgason 
v County Bd of Fajuali/ation. 714 P 2d 653 
(Utah I48b> 
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Art XIII, ft 2 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sc ient i f i c r e s e a r c h ins t i tu te . 
Exemption it* the exception to the rule, and 
properly owner hat* burden of demonstrating 
clearly and unequivocally that he lal ls within 
the exemption, scientific research institute 
failed to meet this burden where evidence was 
that almost half of its efforts were expended fur 
the U S Defense Department, its efforts were 
tinuiiiHi ritx'd by individual employment con-
tracts, and it occasionally restricted disclosure 
of its findings at request of a non governmen-
tal client, all of which combined to indicate 
that the inst itute was benefit ing the public 
only incidentally and wan therefore not a char-
itable institution K y n n g Research Inst , Inc 
v Tax Comm'n, 698 P 2d 1348 (Utah 19791 
S e w e r c h a r g e s a g a i n s t c i ty s c h o o l b o a r d 
p r o p e r t y . 
( 'ha iges by city levied against board of edu-
cation for connections to city sewer system and 
services thereof were mere payments lor ser-
vices enjoyed by the boaid and were not 
"taxes" or "assessments" from which board of 
education was exempt and a result ing lien 
from del inquent payment of such charges was 
not an exercise of the city taxing power Mur-
ray City v Hoard of Kduc . 16 Utah 2d 115, 396 
P 2 d 628 <I9H4> 
S p e c i a l a s s e s s m e n t s . 
Provision of this section that all property not 
exempt under laws of United S ta te s or under 
fcrj state Constitution shall be taxed refers to gen 
I eral taxes and not to special assessments , and 
Ot hence does not invalidate a statutory provt 
sion, which provides that property held by 
Imard of education shall Ite exempt from local 
assessments Wey v Salt Lake i ' l ty , 35 Utah 
504, lOl P 381 (19091 
This section does not apply to special assess 
ments State ex rel Lundberg v Green River 
Irrigation Dist , 40 Utah 83 , 119 P 1039 
(1911) 
S t a t e c o l l e g e s . 
A bond issue by tx>ard of trustees of state 
agricultural college in accordance with legists 
l ive enactment for purpose of financing con 
struction of s tudent union bui lding would not 
violate this section by creating debt against 
state, where bonds showed on their face that 
they were special obligations payable solely 
from revenue to l>e derived from operation of 
union, including proceeds of s tudent fee, and 
not obligations of the s ta le Spence v Utah 
State Agi l College, 119 Utah 104, 225 P 2d 18 
(1950) 
"Property of" a s late university means prop 
erty owned by it, where university possessed 
equipment leased from corporation which re 
tamed title to it. the equipment was not ex 
empl from county property taxation, and under 
the terms of the lease, university was l>ouiid to 
pay taxes due University of Utah v Salt Lake 
County, 547 P 2d 207 (Utah I97bi 
S t a t e proper ty . 
Where the stale holds title to land in its gov-
ernmental capacity, the property is exempt 
from taxation under the constitutional man 
date Duchesne County v Sta le Tax Commit , 
104 Utah 365, 140 P 2d 335 (I943> 
Under this section lands, title to which is 
acquired by the s ta le by foreclosure of mort-
gage or conveyance for the ext inguishment of a 
debt for money loaned from the s ta le school 
fund, are exempt from taxation This is parity 
due to the reason thai the property is owned by 
the state in its governmental capacity, but ac-
cording to some of the judges is due solely lo 
the fact that such lands come within the mean-
ing of the term "property" in constitutional 
provision Duchesne County v State Tax 
Comm'n. 104 Utah 305, 140 P 2d 335 (19431 
T r a n s f e r o f p r o p e r t y t o t a x - e x e m p t c o r p o -
rat ion . 
Where a private corporation conveyed prop-
erty to a tax exempt municipal corporation 
prior to assessment and levy of taxes, the ad 
valorem tax on the property was erroneously 
and illegally levied and collected by the county 
even though the corporation owned the prop-
erty on January 1 when the lien for lax at-
tached, and the corporation's application for a 
refund was proper Utah Parks Co v Iron 
County. 14 Utah 2d 178. 380 P 2d 924 < 19631 
T r u e m a r k e t va lue . 
— I n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 
A federal district court is precluded from 
probing into the assessment process lo deter 
mine whether the state has accurately deter-
mined the "true market value" of a railroad's 
property absent a strong showing by the rail-
road that the state has purposefully overval-
ued its property with discriminatory intent 
Union Pac R R v State Tax Comm'ii, 635 V 
Supp 1060 (D Utah 1986) 
To the extent that railroads al lege thai the 
s late has intentionally discriminated against 
them, they may introduce evidence of their 
true market value, a s well as other probative 
evidence, lo establish their prima facie case of 
intentional discrimination Union Pac R R v 
Sta le Tax Comm'n, 635 r Supp 1060 (1) Utah 
1986) 
U t a h S t a t e R e t i r e m e n t F u n d p r o p e r t y . 
Real properly of the Utah Sta le Retirement 
Fund was "properly of Ihe state" within the 
meaning of this section, and was therefore tax 
exempt Utah Stale Retirement Office v Salt 
Lake County, 780 P 2d HI i (Utah 1989) 
V a l u e d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
County l»oard of equalization was not autho-
rized to determine value by classification of 
234 
R E V E N U E A N D TAXATION A r t X I I I , & 3 
property and assessment based thereon was in (Utah 1989), Salt U k e County ex rel County 
violation of this section Harmer v Sta le Tax Bd of Equalization v S ta le Tax Comm'n ex 
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 324, 452 P 2d 87b (1969) rel Kennecott Corp , 779 P 2d 1131 (Utah 
C i t e d in Sai l Lake County v Tax Comm'n 
ex rel Utah Transit Auth , 780 P 2d 1231 
1989) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
U t a h L a w R e v i e w . — Note. Financing A.L.R. Oil and gas royalty as real or per 
Modernized and Unmodernized Local Govern sonal property, 5b A L R 4th 539 
ment in ihe Age of Aquarius, 1971 Utah L Properly tax effect of tax exempt lessor's re 
HeV 30 versionary interest on valuation of nonexempt 
Housing in Salt Lake Counly — A Place to lessee's interest, 57 A L R 4th 950 
Live for the Poor?, 1972 Utah L Rev 193 Exemption from real property Luxation of 
B r i g h a m Y o u n g L a w R e v i e w . — A Mumc residential facilities maintained by hospital for 
ipality's Interest in an Electrical Power Oener-
 p t t t i enta , stall, or others, 61 A L R 4th 1105 
at ing Facility Some Tax Considerations, 1979 p r o p n e t y of federal court's ordering s late or 
B Y U L Rev 125
 | o c a | l t t K , n c r e t t H e to eftecluale civil rights de 
A m . J u r . 2d - 71 Am Jur 2d State and ^
 ? b A , K F e d ft04 
Local Taxation »ft 194 e l seq . 307 et seq ; N u m b e r s . Taxation ~ 49. 57 et seq , 
C . J . 8 . - 84 C J S Taxation ft* 52 . 57 et ^ ^ 
seq , 215 et seq 
Sec. 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property — 
Livestock — Land used for agricultural pur-
poses.] 
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assess-
ment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money, 
except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article The legislature shall 
prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation 
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the 
legislature may determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock 
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the legislature prescribes, 
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the 
value it may have for other purposes 
H i s t o r y : C o n s t . 1896; N o v . 6, 1900; N o v . 8, olution No 23 was repealed and withdrawn by 
1906; L. 1930 ( S S . ) , S .J .R. 2; 1946 (1st S.S.) , Senate Joint Resolution No 6, l>aws 1980 
H J . R . 2; 1967, S .J .R. 2; 1982, S .J .R. 3 . C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Uniform School 
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — The 1979 proposed Fund, taxes allocated to, S 53A 16 101 
amendment of this section by House Joint Res 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Occupation and license taxes 
Remission of taxes of indigent or insane per-
In general **>"» 
"According to value in money" construed Road poll taxes 
Charitable association Roll back of assessed value 
Co operative corporation property Special assessments 
County clerk's probate fees State property 
County improvement district contingent tax Telephone license tax 
Disparity in state and county assessment Uniformity and equality 
Double taxation Utility rates 
Drainage assessments Cited 
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Sec. 4. [Mines and claims to be assessed — Basis and mul-
tiple — What to bv assessed as tangible property.] 
All metalliferous mines or mining claims, both placer and rock in place, 
shall he assessed as the Legislature shall provide; but the basis and mult iple 
now used in de termining the value of metalliferous mines for taxation pur-
poses and the additional . < ssed value of $5 00 per acre thereof shall not be 
changed before J a n u a r y I, 1935, nor thereafter until otherwise provided by 
law All other mines or mining claims and other valuable mineral deposits, 
including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons and all machinery used in 
mining and all property or surface improvements upon or appur tenan t to 
mines or mining claims, and the value of any surface use made of mining 
claims, or mining property for other than mining purposes, shall be assessed 
as other tangible property. 
History: Const. 1896; Nov. 8, 1908; L. 1930 
tS.S.I, S J R . 5; 1982. S.J.R. 3. 
Cross-References. 
ft 59 2 201. 
Statutory provisions. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
I 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and operation of HI ilion. 
Drain tunnels 
Notice 
Unpatented mining claims 
Water rights 
Construction and operation of section. 
Classification under this section as it for-
merly read was not intended to limit phrase 
"or other valuable mineral deposits," hut em-
braced all mineral deposits including gypsum, 
and net annual profits from products manufac-
tured therefrom were taxable Nephi Plaster & 
Mfg Co v Juab County, 3.'l Utah 114. 93 P. 
53, 14 I R A U I N I 1043 <I907> 
Under this section as it once n-.td. ;i blanket 
assessment of all coal lands in county could not 
he made at a flat or uniform rate Ririe v Ran-
dolph, 51 Utah 274. 169 P 941 (1917) 
Under this section as it formerly read, it was 
held that for purpose of taxing net proceeds of 
mines, the cost of mining incurred in any one 
year must be considered independently from 
the cost incurred in any other year, and only 
auch costs as were incurred during year in 
which net proceeds were obtained could l>e con-
sidered Mammoth Mining Co v Juab Comity. 
51 Utah 316, 170 l» 78 (1918). 
Drain tunnels. 
Under this section, drain tunnels, used to 
drain a mine, may not be separately taxed 
where it appears that they have no separate 
and independent value, but are inseparably 
connected with the operation of the mine. 
Ontario Silver Mining Co v llixon. 49 Utah 
359. 164 l» 498 U917> 
Notice. 
Assessment of 'mines was not defective 
where notice described property with reason-
able certainty as to locality and identity Con-
solidated Uranium Mines. Inc v. MofTitt, 257 
F2d 396 (10th Cir. 1958) 
Unpatented mining claims. 
A tax imposed under state law upon the pos-
sessory right to explore and develop mines lo-
cated upon unpatented claims located upon 
land belonging to the unappropriated public 
domain of the United States is not open to chal-
lenge upon the ground that it constitutes a tax 
against property belonging to the United 
States Consolidated Vranium Mines. Inc. v 
MofTitt, 257 F2d 396 (10th Cir 1958) 
Water rights. 
Water rights are taxable whether considered 
appurtenant to mine or independent property. 
Utah Metal & Tunnel Co v Oroeslieck, 62 
Utah 251, 219 P. 248 (1923). 
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Sec. 5. [Local authorities to levy local taxes — Sharing tax 
and revenues by political subdivisions.! 
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, 
town or other municipal corporation, hut may, by law, vest in the corporate 
authori t ies thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all 
purposes of such corporation. Notwithstanding anyth ing to the contrary con-
tained in this Constitution, political subdivisions may sha re their tax and 
other revenues with other political subdivisions as provided by s ta tu te . 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1982, S.J.R. 3. 
Cross-References. — Appropriations and 
tax limitation, § 59 17a-101 et seq 
City taxing power, Utah Const. Art XI, sec 
5. 
ANALYSIS 
Agricultural extension work 
Allocation of future tax 
"Corporate authorities" construed. 
Court fees 
Dependent mot hem 
Discriminatory tax 
Excess revenue refunds 
License fees 
Purpose of taxation 
Utah Neight>orhood Development Act 
Water diHtrict 
Agricultural extension work. 
Statute (Comp Laws 1917, § 52921 authoriz-
ing contracts between trustees of stair agricul-
tural college and county commissioners with 
respect to agricultural extension woik, and au 
thnrizing commissioners to provide funds nec-
essary for the work in their respective coun 
ties, was not invalid as imposing a tax for 
county purposes by the legislature liailey v 
Van Dyke, 06 Utah 184, 240 l» 454 H925> 
Allocation of future tax. 
The law is well settled that in exert iHing the 
powers of the stale, the legislature may require 
the revenue of a municipality to l»e applied to 
uses other than thai for which the taxes were 
levied, thus there was no constitutional trans-
gression in I he allocation of certain expected 
tax increments (generated by new const ruction 
in an area of urban blight I for repayment of 
Redevelopment Agency bonds Tnlie v Sail 
take City Corp. 540 P 2d 45*9 (Utah I97f» 
County taxing power, § 17-4-3. 
Revenue sharing between political subdivi-
sions. <) II i;i 10 5 
"Corpora te au thor i t i es" const rued. 
"Corporate authorities." as used in this sec-
tion, aie lho.se municipal officers who either 
are directly elected by municipality's inhabit-
ants or are appointed in some mode to which 
such inhabitants have given their assent State 
ex rel Wright v Standford. 24 Utah 148, 06 l» 
1001 i1901» 
Court fees. 
The provisions of this section were contra-
vened by statute which attempted to fix sched-
ule of county clerks' fees for services in probate 
mailers based on sliding scale where fees in-
creased as values of estates increased, since 
such attempt was an imposition of taxes with-
out uniformity for counties' use and benefit. 
Smith v Carlton Count v. 90 Utah 500. 03 P 2d 
259. I OH A L U 51.1 < i 9.10) 
Dependent mothers . 
The phrase "foi all purposes of such corpora-
tion." is synnnvmous with the phrase, "public 
pui|M».ses," and Chapter LI of Title 17 <Public 
Aid for l)c|>endcnt Molheisl would be upheld 
as "public purpose" Denver & R O R R v 
C.rand County. 51 Utah 294. 170 V 74. l\ 
A LR 1224 (19171 
Discriminatory tax. 
A citv licensing ordinance which was a reve 
nue raising mea^uie and put some of the husi 
nesses aflettcd on <i fl.it fee basts with only 
about one twelfth as muih lax as other busi 
nesses which p.ud on a sales tax basis was un 
tonstilulionnllv disci iminalory Orem City v 
I'yne, 10 Utah 2d 155. 401 l» 2d 1HJ Il905» 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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59-2-104 REVENUE A N D TAXATION 
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 59 2 104, e n a c t e d by L. 
1»87, c h . 4, ft 5 1 . 
Compiler'** N o t e s . - Former $ 59-4-1, aa 
last amended by Laws 19.15. ch Ml, ft I, con 
turned provisions similar to this section 
E f f e c t i v e D a t e s Laws I9H7. ch 4. $ .'MM 
makes the act effective on February <», I9M7. 
R e t r o s p e c t i v e O p e r a t i o n . - Laws 19H7, 
ch. 4, % 307 provides. "This act has retrospec-
tive operation lo January 1, 19H7, except for 
Sections 59 2 201, 59 2 205, and 59 2 207, 
which take effect January 1, 19HH." 
CroHH-KeferencoM. Properly taxable 
where situated. Utah Const Art XIII, $ 10 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Boundaries of taxing district. 
lx>cation of property. 
Property of foreign corporations. 
Rolling stock of railroads. 
Unity of use doctrine. 
Water rights. 
B o u n d a r i e s o f t a x i n g d i s t r i c t . 
Fixing of boundaries of taxing district and 
its area is wholly matter of legislative discre-
tion, and exercise of such discretion is not sub-
ject of judicial invest igation or revision. 
Kimball v. ( irantsv i l le City, 19 Utah 368, 57 IV 
1, 45 L R A. 6 2 8 (18991. 
I^ocation o f p r o p e r t y . 
Term "owned," a s used in Utah Const Art. 
XIII, $ 10, which provides that all persons in 
03 state shall he subject to taxation on real and 
I personal property "owned" or used by them 
0 0 within territorial l imits of authority levying 
tax, has reference to place where property is, 
and not to where owner may reside; therefore, 
sheep were not assessable in certain city where 
none of them had been within territorial l imits 
of city at any t ime during period for which 
taxes were assessed. Murdock v. Murdock, 38 
Utah 3 7 3 . 113 P 3 3 0 (19101 
With respect to personal property of a tangi-
ble and corporeal nature and capable of having 
a s i tus of its own, residence of owner is gener-
ally immaterial , and property is taxable where 
it is found. Hamilton & Oleason Co. v. Finery 
County. 75 Utah 40h\ 285 P. 1006 (1930) See 
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 18 
Utah 378, 55 P. 639, 48 L.R.A. 790 (1898), 
aird, 177 U.S. 149, 20 S Ct. 631 , 44 L Ed 708 
(1900) 
P r o p e r t y o f f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n s . 
Neither tangible nor intangible property 
owned and used by foreign corporation in 
s ta l e s other than Utah was taxable in Utah 
county tn which corporation's principal office 
was situated Utah Idaho Sugar Co. v Salt 
L.ike Count v. 6 0 Utah -191. 210 P MHi, 27 
A L.R 871 i 1922» 
Ro l l ing s t o c k o f r a i l r o a d s . 
As against contention of foreign corporation 
that taxation of its refrigerator cars in Utah 
was forbidden by U.S. Constitution because 
such cars had no s i tus in Utah for purpose of 
taxation and tax on them would impose burden 
on interstate commerce, held that cars were 
taxable in Utah on basis of average number 
thereof used and employed by their owner in 
Utah during year for which assessment was 
made. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. 
Lynch, 177 U.S. 149, 20 S Ct 631 , 44 L Ed 
708 ilfKMIt. 
Uni ty of u s e d o c t r i n e . 
The doctrine of unity of u«e for purpose of 
determining assessment for taxation cannot he 
applied to manufacturing or other s imilar 
plants or industries which may be under com-
mon ownership but used or o|>erated in differ-
ent states. Utah Idaho Sugar Co. v Sal t Lake 
County, 60 Utah 491 , 210 P 106, 27 A.L.R. 874 
(1922). 
Water r ights . 
Where flow of percolating waters was devel-
oped in process of mining operations, which 
water was piped and sold to another company 
which took such water in another county and 
through its own pipes conducted it so its own 
mine, water righlt* were properly assessed 
against mining company sel l ing such water in 
county in which it* o|M'rution* were conducted 
and in county where water was transferred and 
tax apportioned Itetween such counties. Utah 
Metal & Tunnel Co v. Croehheck, 62 Utah 251 , 
219 P. 248 11923». 
PROPERTY TAX ACT 59-2-201 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A m . J u r . 2d . — 71 Am Jur. 2d State and imposing income tax or l icense upon nonresi 
Local Taxation ftft 648 to 651 . dents employed in taxing jurisdiction (com-
C.J .S . — 84 C.J.S. Taxation ftft 113. 115 muter lax*. 48 A L R 3d 343 
A L U . Validity of municipal ordinance Key N u m b e r s . Taxat ion * - 9 8 
59-2-105. Situs of public utilities, bridges, ferries, and ca-
nals. 
Public utilities, and bridges and ferries not public utilities, when operated 
wholly in one county, and electric light lines and similar improvements, ca-
nals, ditches, and flumes when separately taxable, shall be listed and assessed 
in the county in which the property is located. 
H i s t o r y : C. 1963, 59-2-106, e n a c t e d by L. R e t r o s p e c t i v e O p e r a t i o n . - Laws 1987, 
1987, c h . 4, S 62 . ch 4, § 307 provides: "This act has retrospec-
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — Former § 59-4-2, as l ive operation to January I. 1987, except for 
last amended by U w e 1931, ch 53, § I, con Sections 59 2 201, 59 2-205, and 59 2 207, 
tamed provisions similar to this section which take effect January I, 1 9 8 8 " 
E f f e c t i v e D a t e s . — Laws 1987, ch 4, § 308 C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Property taxable 
makes the act effective on February 6, 1987 where situated, Utah Const Art XIII, 8 10 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
R a i l r o a d r o l l i n g s t o c k . taxable in Utah on basis of average number 
As against contention of foreign corporation thereof used and employed by their owner in 
that taxation of its refrigerator cars in Utah Utah during year for which assessment was 
was forbidden by U S Constitution because made Union Refrigerator Transit Co v 
such cars had no situs in Utah for purpose of Lynch. 177 U S 149, 20 S Cl. 6 3 1 , 44 L Ed 
taxation and tax on them would impose burden 7Qg
 (liHNM 
on interstate commerce, held that cars were 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A m . J u r . 2d . — 71 Am Jur 2d State and C.J .S . — 84 C.J.S. Taxat ion H 339 to 348 
Local Taxation $ 652. Key N u m b e r s . - Taxat ion •-» 98. 
PART 2 
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY 
58-2-201. Assessment by commission — Determination of 
value of mining property — Notification of as-
sessment — Property assessed by the unitary 
method which is locally assessed. 
(1) By May 1 the following property shall be assessed by the commission at 
100% of fair market value, as valued on January I, in accordance with this 
chapter: 
(a) all property which operates as a unit across county lines, if the 
values must be apportioned among more than one county or state; 
(b) all property of public utilities; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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59-2-201 RKVENUE AND TAXATION 
(c) all mines and mining claims and other valuable mineral deposits; 
(d) all machinery used in mining, all property or surface improvements 
upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims, and the value of any 
surface use made of mining claims or mining property for other than 
mining purposes For the purposes of assessment and taxation, all pro-
cessing pi ' i ills, red in tion works, and smelters which are primarily 
used by IL» or of a t"><> or mining claim for processing, reducing, or 
smelting minerals taken l> t.« a mine or mining claim, shall be considered 
appurtenant to that mine or mining claim, regardless of actual location; 
and 
(e) in all cases where the surface of lands is owned by one person and 
the mineral underlying those lands is owned hy another, the property 
rights shall be separately assessed to the respective owners. If the surface 
is used for other than mining purposes, the value of the surface shall be 
assessed by the assessor of the county in which the property is located. 
(2) The method for determining the fair market value of productive mining 
property is the capitalized net revenue method or any other valuation method 
the commission believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission's 
satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of the fair market value of the 
mining property. The rate of capitalization applicable to mines shall be deter-
mined by the commission, consistent with a fair rate of return expected by an 
investor in light of that industry's current market, financial, and economic 
conditions In no event may the fair market value of the mining property be 
less than the fair market value of the land, improvements, and tangible per-
sonal property upon or appurtenant to the mining property. 
(3) Immediately following the assessment, the owner or operator of the 
assessed property shall be notified of the assessment. The assessor of the 
county in which the property is located shall also be immediately notified of 
the assessment. 
(4) Property assessed by the unitary method, which is not necessary to the 
W conduct and does not contribute to the income of the business as determined 
^ by I he commission, shall IH» assessed separately by the local county assessor. 
HiHtory: O 1853, 59 2 201. enacted by L. Retrospective Operation. Laws 1987, 
1987, rh 4. ft 53. ch 4, ft 307 provides "Thin act has retrospec-
Compiler's Notes. — Former ft 59 2 52, as live operation to January I, 1987, except for 
amended hy Lawn 1983, ch 76. ft I. contained Sections 59-2-201. 59 2 205, and 59 2 207, 
provisions similar to thie section which take effect January 1, 1988" 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch 4. ft 308 Cross-References. — Taxation of mines, 
make* the act effective on February 6, 1987 Utah Const Art XIII. ft 4 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Challenging assessment 
Hv county 
Intentional discrimination 
COM I landH 
Date of assessment 
Life tenant and remainderman. 
I<ocation of property 
Mineral land 
"Mines " 
VD 
54 
PROPERTY 
Notice of assessment 
Public utilities 
Separate assessment 
Challenging assessment. 
—By county. 
Since underassessment of mining property 
can cause a distinct and palpable iniuiy to a 
county by limiting its lax base, a county has 
standing to sue the tax commiHsion on the 
ground that NIKII property was underassessed 
Kennecott Corp v Salt Lake County. 702 P 2d 
451 (Utah 1985» 
—Intentional discrimination. 
A federal district court is precluded from 
probing into the assessment process to deter 
mine whether the state has accurately deter-
mined the "true market value" of a railroad's 
property absent a strong showing by the rail-
road that the state has purposefully overval 
ued its property with discriminatory intent 
Union Pat RH v State Tax Coinm'n, 635 F 
Supp 1060 (I) Utah 19H6) 
Coal lands. 
A blanket assessment of all coal lands in 
county could not he made at a flat or uniform 
rate Rine v Randolph. 51 Utah 274. 169 P 
941 (1917) 
Date of assessment. 
Property not within city on January 1st is 
not liable for payment of city taxes for those 
years Plutus Mining Co v Orme, 76 Utah 
286. 289 P 132 (I930» 
Life tenant and remainderman. 
A life tenant should be assessed as owner 
during the continuume of the life estate 
Sheppuk v Sheppuk. 44 Utah III l.iH |» 
1169 (1914) 
Location of property. 
Property of electric company operating in 
only one county was assessable in county in 
which properly was located although electric 
company was owned hy company operating in 
several counties Telluride Power Co v dates, 
61 Utah 337, 211 P 175 (1923) 
Mineral land. 
Until there is proof that land has Inst its 
character as mineral or mining property, it is 
assessable by State Tax Commission Crystal 
Lime & Cement Co v Hohhins, 116 Utah 314. 
209 P2d 739 tPMMi 
Where title to land is derived from federal 
government through isHiionie of a patent as 
mining prnfierty there is a piesuinplion that it 
is pro|M>rty of that < haunter Until it is pioved 
otherwise Crystal I line A Cement Co v Koh 
bins, 116 Utah 314. 209 P 2d 739 (IM49» 
"Mines." 
The terms "mines' and "mineral are not 
TAX ACT 59-2-201 
limited to mere subterranean excavations or 
wot kings or to the metals or metalliferous de-
posits whether contained in veins that have 
well defined walls or in beds or deposits that 
are irregular and are found at or near the sur-
face or otherwise Nephi (Master & Mfg Co v 
Juab County, 3 1 Utah 114. 93 P 53, 14 L R A 
(n s » 104 1 <14<i7l 
Notice of assessment. 
Ass< sHrnent of mines was not defective 
where notice described property with reason 
able certainty as to locality and identity Con-
solidated Uranium Mines. Inc v Moffitt, 257 
F2d 396 (10th O r 1958) 
Public utilities. 
This section confers no authority upon tax 
commission to assess car companies which are 
not public utilities Crystal Car Line v State 
Tax Coinm'n, 110 Utah 426. 174 P 2d 984 
(19461 
Separate assessment. 
A person in adverse possession of the surface 
ground of a mining claim, who has been as-
sessed with su< h surface area and has paid 
taxes thereon, may claim adverse possession to 
such surface, although owner of mining claim 
has paid the taxes thereon Utah Copper Co v 
Kckman. 47 Utah 165, 152 P 178 (1915) 
Where there is common ownership of both 
the surface and mineral rights in land used for 
mining purposes, and no request is made that 
the surface be taxed on its valuation separately 
from (be mines mid mineral rights it IH pro|M*r 
foi tbeioiinly otln nils to nggn gale the valua 
(ions of both surface and mineral rights in up 
plving the tax levy and in all proceedings sub-
sequent thereto Telonis v Staley, 104 Utah 
517. 144 P2d 513 (194J) 
When the surface and mineral estates of a 
mining claim are owned by the same person, 
only one tax is assessed on the claim This is 
because the statute provides for separate as-
sessment of the surface only when the surface 
and mineral estates are owned by different 
owners The statute makes no otbei provision 
for separate assessment of the two estates 
Therefore, separate taxation of surface and 
miner.ii interests does not constitute double 
taxation because the separate taxes would he 
on diflennt property interests United Park 
O l v M i m s C n v rsliiii'iif O i g g . 7 17 P2d 173 
(Ui.ih I^H/. 
I In assessment of the value of tin* surface 
iisi ol piopeitv us* d for mining is in addition to 
th< pir acre assessment of the mining claim, 
and the additional assessment is required 
whether the surface is owned by the same 
?>?> 
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59-2-304 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. 
|)llli«t.H III' HNHfMHOr i l l ld t a X p l i y i ' l S . 
E l l e c t o f 4TIOIU-OHM USHeHSUM'Ilt 
Natui<* of lax dtlil 
Nonresident's property. 
Owner's obligation to pay tax 
Transfer ol property to tax-exempt cor|M»rution. 
Constitutionality. 
Section ia not HO vague and uncertain as to 
be unconstitutional. Norville v. Stale Tax 
Cumin.. 98 Utah 170, 97 IV2d 937, 126 A L R 
1318 (1940) 
Dutiea of assessor and taxpayers. 
It ia duty of assessor to assess all properly at 
its value, and it ia likewise duty of every per-
son and corporation having taxable pro|a*rly to 
list same for taxation Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. 
Salt l.ake County. tiO Utah 491. 210 IV HNi. 27 
A L It. H74 119221 
Effect of erroneous asNCNMment. 
Failure to assess taxes to owner did not in 
validate assessment. Jonea v. Hox Elder 
County, 52 F 2d 340 (10th Cir 19311. cert iivn 
285 U S . 555. 52 S Ct 45«i. 76 L Kd. 944 
119321 
Where property is not assessed lo the real 
owner, and it IM siild under such assessment, a 
tax deed iaaued in purauance thereof has no 
binding effect as againat real owner Salt Lake 
lnv Co. v. Oregon Short Line It It , 46 Utah 
203. 148 IV 4.19 (1915). a (I'd. 246 U S 446. .18 
S Ct 348, 62 L. Ed 823 (1918) 
Nature of tax debt. 
Thia aection aeemn to make the tax a debt 
aganiMl the individual owning the pro|ieily 
and a lien on bin property, rather than a 
charge againat the pm|ieily alone llayea v. 
Oihhs, 110 Utah 54. Mill IV2d 781, I6H A L It 
513 (1946) 
Nonresident's property. 
Property brought into this Htate by a nonres-
ident company and uae«l in construction work 
for an indefinite period is auhject to taxation in 
county where uwd, under Utah Const Art. 
XIII. $ 10 Hamilton & Uh-ason Co v. Emery 
County. 75 Utah 406. 285 IV 1006 (193(0 
Owner'a obligation to pay tax. 
Net ord owners of real |»IO|M-I ty on January I, 
1964, were ohllguled to pay Ihe 1964 property 
tax; if .lanuary I record owner transfers Ins 
interest in the property and does not want to be 
held liable for the tax, it is his obligation to 
make arrungemenls for payment by his trans-
feree. Dillnian v rosier. 656 I* 2d 974 (Utah 
I982» 
Transfer of property to tax-exempt corpo-
ration. 
Where a private corporation conveyed prop-
erty to a tax-exempt municipal corporation 
prior lo assessment and levy of taxes under 
thia section, the ad valorem lax on the property 
was erroneously and illegally levied and col-
lected by the county Utah Parks Co. v. Iron 
County. 14 Utah 2d I7H, 380 IV2d 924 (1963) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. - Personal Obligation 
to Pay Real Property Taxes in Utah: Dillman 
v hosier, 1983 Utah L Rev H45 
C.J.S. 84 C.J.S. Tuxutioii ft 376 
Key Numbera. Taxation «-• 310 el seq 
59-2-304. Recognition of expenses in using comparable 
sales or cost appraisal method — Implementation 
of new program. 
(1) If the county assessor uses the comparable sales or cost appraisal 
method in valuing taxable properly for assessment purposes, the assessor is 
required to recognize tha t various fees, services, closing costs, and other ex-
penses related to the transaction lessen the actual amount that may he re-
ceived in the transaction The county assessor shall, therefore, take HiV'A of the 
<)8 
PROPERTY TAX ACT 59-2-305 
value based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the property for purposes 
of assessment under Subsection 59-2-103(1). 
(2) (a) Prior to J a n u a r y 1, 1989, the commission shall develop and imple-
ment comparable sales or cost appraisal methods in valuing taxable prop-
erty for assessment purposes which provide t ha t the var ious fees, ser-
vices, closing costs, and other expenses related to the sales t ransact ion 
and other intangible values are not included as part of the fair marke t 
value for purposes of taxation. 
(b) Beginning J a n u a r y 1, 1989, the provisions of Subsection (1) do not 
apply. Beginning Janua ry 1, 1989, the commission shal l , by rule , order 
county assessors to use the comparable sales or cost appra isa l methods 
which are required to be developed and implemented in Subsection (2)(a) 
in place of the requirement of Subsection (1). 
History: C. 1953, 50 2 304, enacted by L. 
1087, ch. 4, ft 72; 1087, ch. 160, ft I. 
Amendment Note*. — The 1987 amend-
ment by Chapter 150, effective April 27, 1987, 
substituted "1989" lor "1988" in Subsections 
(2><a> and (2Kb! 
Compiler's Notes. Former ft 59-5-4 5, as 
amended by Laws 1986, ch 115, ft 1, contained 
proviaiona similar lo this aection. 
Constitutionality. 
The provision that reduces by 20'% the value 
of county assessed property by comparable 
sales or cost materials is constitutional under 
Article Xlll of the Utah Constitution and does 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law, 1985 Utah L Rev 131, 207 
History: C. 1953, 59-2-905. enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 4. ft 73. 
Compiler's No tea. Former ft 59-5 5. as 
amended by Laws 1982, ch 71, ft 23, contained 
provisions similar lo this section 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1987, ch 4. ft 308 
makes the act effective on February 6. 1987 
Effective Dates. Laws 1987, ch 4, ft 308 
makes the act effective on February 6, 1987. 
Retrospective Opera t ion . — Laws 1987, 
ch. 4, ft 307 provides: "This act has retrospec-
tive operation to January 1, 1987, except for 
Sections 59 2 201, 59 2 205, and 59 2 207, 
which take effect January 1, 1988." 
not violate the equal protection provisions of 
the Utah or United Slates Constitutions Rio 
Algom Corp v San Juan County, 681 I' 2d 184 
(Utah 1984) 
Retrospective Operat ion. - Laws 1987, 
ch 4, ft 307 provides: "This act haa retrospec-
tive operation to Junuary 1, 1987, except for 
Sections 59 2 201, 59-2-205, and 59 2 207, 
which lake effect January 1, 1988." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
59-2-305. Listing property in taxing districts. 
The county assessor shall list all property in each taxing district in the 
county by identifier and value. The commission may prescribe procedures and 
formats, after consultation with affected s ta te agencies and county assessors, 
which will provide reasonable uniformity and reduced costs in listing prop-
erty. 
69 
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6 3 - 4 6 b - 1 6 STATE AFFAIRS IN (iENEKAL 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by 1* according to the standards of Subsection 
1987, ch. 101, $ 271; 1988, ch. 72, $ 25. 6.1 4*il> Mi.4> at tbe end in Subsection diiui 
Amendment Notes. —• Tbe 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic changes 
ment, effective April 25. 1988. deleted "except Effective Dates. Laws 1987. ch 161, 
that final agency action from informal adjudi- g :i|ft makes tbe mt i-IUtlive on .lanuary I, 
cative proceedings based on a record shall lie |U88 
reviewed by tbe district courts on the record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. the district court will no longer function as in 
Section 63-46b-)6(l> provides that all final termediate appellate court except lo review m-
agency decisions through formal adjudicative formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-
proceedings will Ite reviewed by tbe Utab Su- ant to Subsection (I Ma) of this section In re 
pieme Court or Court of Appeals Therefore, Topik, 7fil I'2d .12 (Utah Ct App 1988) 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
<b) The appellate rules ol the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
i'.\) The contents, I . ittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adju<l.< a- proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c> the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring tesolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(el the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
736 
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(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63 46b 16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (21(a), and nub 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, ii 26. stituted "app< Hate rulea of the appropriate ap-
Amendment Notea. — The I9H8 amend- pellale couit" (or "Utah Rules ol Appellate Pro-
inent, effective April 25, 1988, auhslituted "Aa icdure" in Subsections <2>«a» and t2Nbl 
provided by htalulr. the Supreme Court or tbe Effective Datea. Lawa 1987, cb 161, 
Court of Appeals" for The Supieme Court or $
 ; n f t m ak e H t | l e ttCl eflective on January 1, 
other appellate court designated by statute" in |O,HM 
Subsection (1), inserted "with the appropriate 
NOTKS TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. trict court will no lunger function as intermedi-
Subsection (I) provides that all final agency ale appellate court except to review informal 
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed- adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to 
ings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme & 63-46b I5< lHai In re Topik, 761 P 2d 32 
Court or Court of Appeals Therefore, the dia- (Utab Ct App 1988> 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by I,. $ 315 makeb tbe act effective on January I, 
1987, ch. 161, $ 273. I9H8 
Effective Oaten. Laws 1987, cb 161. 
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78-2-1.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
History: L. 1951, ch. 60, I I; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104 2 1; L. IM9. ch. 247, ft I; 1986, ch. 
47, I 40; 1988, ch. 348, ft 4; 1990. ch. 80. ft 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988. in Subsection 
(2>, rewrote the second sentence which read 
'Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the 
Supreme Court is ten years and until his suc-
cessor is appointed and approved in accordance 
with Section 20 1-7T* and. in Subsection (6), 
substituted "determines" for "decides" at the 
end of the fourth sentence 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23. 
1990. deleted "next" affer ".January" and made 
punctuation changes in Subjection (2>; deleted 
"not" following "chief justice may" in the third 
sentence of Subsection (3); deleted additional" 
before "duties" in Subsection (5); deleted 
"where not inconsistent with the law" follow-
ing "chief justice** and added "as consistent 
with the law" at the end of Subsection <6). 
Cross*References. — Chief justice. Utah 
Const. Art VIII. Sec 2. 
Disqualification in particular case. Utah 
Const. Art VIII, Sec 2. 
Judicial nomination and selection, 
ft 20-1-7 1 et seq. 
Membership on state law library board, 
ft 371-1. 
Proceedings unaffected by vacancy. 
ft 78-7-21. 
Qualifications of justices. Utah Const., Art. 
VIII, Sec 7. 
Retirement, Utah Const., Art VIII, Sec. 15; 
ft 49-6-101 et seq.. ftft 78 7 29, 78 7-30. 
Salary. Utah Const, Art VIII. Sec. 14. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts 
Sft 67. 68 
C.J 8. 21 C J S Courts ft 111 et seq ; 48A 
( M S Judges ftft 3. 7. 8, 21 to 25, 85. 
Key 
Jud 
Numbers. — Courts 
• - I. 7 to 12. 
101 248: 
78 2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
Hepeals - Section 78 2 1.5 (L 1969. ch. 
225. ft 21. relating to salaries of Supreme Court 
justices, WAS repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182, 
ft 4 
Section 78 2 I 6<L 1979, ch 134. ft 1; 1981. 
ch. 156, ft 1), relating to salaries of justices, 
was repealed by Laws 1981. ch 267. ft 2, effec-
tive July 1. 1982. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
< I) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
<bl cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
<c> discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(hi) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) (he Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(0 final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
8 
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(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(0 taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (0. 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78 2-2, enacted by L. 
1986. ch. 47, ft 41; 1987, ch. 161. ft 30.1; 1988, 
ch. 248. ft 5; 1989, ch. 67, ft I. 
Repeal* and Keenactmenta. UWH 1986, 
rh 47. ft 41 repeals former ft 78-2-2. as enacted 
by Laws 1951. ch f>8. ft I, relating to original 
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and 
enac(8 the above section 
Amendment Note*. -- The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "for-
mal adjudicative proceedings" for "canes" in 
Subsection <3»(e); added Suhsection <3l<0; re-
designated former Subsections t.'lMf) to (3MH ac-
cordingly; substituted "<i»" for "lhi" at the end 
of Subsection <4Mgl; and made minor stylistic 
changes 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24. 
1989. added "and Forestry" at the end of Sub-
section (.iHeHiu), rewrote Subsection (4Ma) 
which read "first degree and capital felony con-
vict ions", substituted "<f»" for "i\\" at the end of 
Subsection (4><g); and made minor stylistic 
changes 
Cross-References. Appeals from juve 
mle courts, ft 78 3a-51 
Appeals in criminal cases, U R Cr I' 26. 
Chief justice to preside over impeuchment of 
governor, & 77-5 2 
Klectioit contest appeals. ft<i 20-3-35, 
20-15-14 
ICxtraordmary writs, Utah Const Art VIII, 
Sec 3. U K C P 65B 
Industrial commission orders, review of. 
ft 35 I 36 
Jurisdiction. Utah Const , Art VIII. Sec 3 
State bar, promulgation of rules, review of 
disciplinary orders, ftft 78 51 14. 78 51 19 
Unemployment compensation decisions, le-
view of, ft 35 4 10 
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oi an oraer 01 occupancy or me execution of a right 
of entry agreement, bears to the taxable year mi 
Article 2. Assessment by County Assessor 
59-5-4. General duties of covnty assessor - Assessing 
interstate earners. 
59-5-4.5. Recognition of expenses in using comparable 
sales or cost appraisal method. 
59-5-5. Listing properly ia cities, towns, school districts 
and special taxing 6lstrk\s. 
59-5-6. Repon of valuation of properly <o coantv 
auditor « Transmittal by auditor to governing bodies • 
Certified tax rate. 
59-5-7 Listing property brought into county after 
January I • Duties of assessor. 
59-5-7 1. Transitory personal property brought from 
outside state • Assessment • Proration of tas -
Properly tax in another state • Claims for rebates and 
adjust menu. 
59-5-4. Statements by taxpayers. 
59-5-9. Power of assessors respecting statements • 
Oetkt of taxpayer • Penalty. 
59-5-10. Assessor to estimate value where taxpayer 
refuses to give statement. 
59-5-11. Assessor to report information gained to other 
counties. 
59-5-12. In name of owner, mandatory, if known • I f 
unknown. 
59-5-13. Assessment in name of representative -
Designation. 
59-5-14. Assessment of property of decedents. 
59-5-15. Assessment of property in litigation. 
59-5-16. Assessment of concealed property - Penally. 
59-5-17. Properly escaping assessment • Five-year 
limitation period on assessment • Duties of assessor. 
59-5- I t . Assessment in name of claimant as well as 
owner. 
59-5-4. General duties of county assessor -
Assessing interstate earners. 
The county assessor shall, before May 15 of each 
year, ascertain the names of all taxable inhabitants 
and ail property in the county subject to taxation 
except that assessed by the State Tax Commission 
and shall assess the property to the person by whom 
it was owned or claimed, or in whose possession or 
control it was, at 12 o'clock m. of January 1 next 
preceding, and at its value on that date, unless a 
subsequent conveyance of ownership of the real 
property has been duly recorded in the office of the 
county recorder more than 14 calendar days before 
the date of mailing of the tax notice, in which case 
the tax notice may be mailed to the new owner. No 
mistake in the name of the owner or supposed 
owner of property renders the assessment invalid. 
Assessors shall become fully acquainted with all 
property in their respective counties, and, either in 
person or by deputy, shall annually visit each sepa-
rate distnet and establish the values of the property 
they are required to assess. When assessing contract, 
private, and exempt earners covenng interstate 
routes, the county assessor shall apportion the ass-
essment for the rolling stock used in interstate 
commerce at the same percentage ratio that has been 
filed with the Prorate Department of the Motor 
Vehicle Division of the tax commission for determ-
ining the proration of registration fees. in* 
59-5-4.5. Recognition of expenses In using 
comparable sales or cost appraisal method. 
(1) When the county assessor uses the comparable 
sales or cost appraisal method in valuing taxable 
property for assessment purposes, the assessor is 
required to recognize that various fees, services, 
closing costs, and other expenses related to the tra-
nsaction lessen the actual amount that may be rec-
eived m the transaction. The county assessor shall, 
therefore, take 80**i of the value based on compar-
able sales or cost appraisal of the propeny as its 
reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assess-
ment. 
(2Ma) Prior to January I, 1988. the State Tax 
Commission shall develop and implement compar-
able sales or cost appraisal methods in valuing 
taxable propeny for assessment purposes which 
provide that the various fees, services, closing costs, 
and other expenses related to the sales transaction 
and other intangible values are not included as part 
of the reasonable fair cash value for purposes of 
assessment. 
(b) Beginning January 1, 1988, the provisions 
of Subsection (U do not apply to county assessors 
using the sales or cost appraisal method in valuing 
taxable propeny for assessment purposes. For ass-
essments beginning January 1, 1988, the State Tax 
Commission shall by rule order county assessors to 
use the comparable sales or cost appraisal methods 
which are required to be developed and implemented 
in Subsection (2Xa) in place of the requirement of 
Subsection (1). its* 
59-5*5. Listing property in cities, towns, school 
districts and special taxing districts 
The list of the propeny in each city, town, school 
distnet, and special taxing district in his county, arid 
the valuation thereof, shall be so made by the 
county assessor that the propeny in each and the 
valuation thereof can be separately shown. \m 
59-5-6. Report of valuation of property to county 
auditor • Transmittal by auditor to governing 
bodies - Certified tax rate. 
[\) Before June \ of each year, the county asse-
ssor of each county shall deliver to the county 
auditor a statement showing the aggregate valuation 
of all taxable propeny in each taxing district, toge-
ther with a statement showing the assessed valuation 
of any additional personal propeny estimated by the 
county assessor to be subject to taxation in the 
cunent tax year. The county auditor shall, on or 
before June I, transmit this statement together with 
the certified tax rate and all forms necessary to 
submit a tax levy request, to the governing body of 
each taxing district. 
(2Xa) The 'certified tax rate" means a tax rate 
that will provide the same ad valorem propeny tax 
revenue for each taxing distnet as was charged for 
the pnor year by that taxing entity, except in the 
case of the minimum school levy established under 
Section 53-7-18 and any debt service voted on by 
the public under Section 53-7-8.1, in which case 
the certified tax rate shall be the actual levy imposed 
by those sections. The certified tax rate shall be 
established in accordance with Section 59-9-8. 
For new taxing districts, the certified tax rate shall 
be zero. 
(b) For the purpose of calculating the certified 
tax rate the county auditor shall use the taxable roll, 
exclusive of new growth. New growth is the increase 
in value of the taxing district from the previous 
calendar year to the current year less the amount oi 
increase to locally assessed real propeny values res-
ulting from factoring, reappraisal, or any othei 
adjustments. 
(c) As used in this chapter, 'taxing distnet" 
means any county, city, town, school distnet, 
special taxing distnet, or any other political subdi-
vision of the state with the authonty to levy a tax 
on propeny. 
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chapter" arc omitted a* unnecessary in "shall be brought In Issue" for clarity 
view of the restatement. The words "in The words "made or imposed by" arc 
the enforcement or administration of omitted as surplus. The words "dispot-
any provision of this chapter" in ing oT are substituted for "proceeding to 
49:305(f) are omitted at unnecessary in hear and dispose oT for clarity and at 
view of the restatement The words being more inclusive, 
"and safety" in 49:303(0 are omitted as 
being transferred 10 the Secretary of In subsection (c). the words "subchap-
Transportation. ter I I I of chapter 105" are used to 
In subsection (b). the words "When an •»•*« , h * •ubsecilon apply to water 
investigation under this subtitle" are sub- carriers since the words "under the pro-
stituted for "Whenever In any Investlga visions of this section" require thai re 
tlon under the provisions of this chapter. auh In view of 4V.I30) The words "in 
or in any investigation Instituted upon cases pending before the Commission* 
petition oT for clarity. The words "pro- are omitted m» unnecessary In view of 
viding transportation or service subject the restatement. The words "may be 
to the jurisdiction of the Commission given" are substituted for "shall receive" 
under subchapter I or IV of chapter 105 for clarity The words "may determine" 
of this title" are Inserted for clarity. The are substituted for "shall provide" for 
words "Is about a" are etabetituted for clarity 
§ 1 1 5 0 3 . T a x d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t r a i l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n prop-
e r t y 
(a) In this section— 
(1) "assessment" means valuation for a property lax levied by 
a taxing district. 
(2) "assessment jurisdiction" means a geographical area in a 
State used in determining the assessed value of property for ad 
valorem taxation. 
(J) Mrail transportation property" means property, as defined 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, owned or used by a 
rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Commission under subchapter 1 of chapter 105 of this 
title. \ 
(4) "commercial and industrial property" means property, 
other than transportation property and land used primarily for 
agricultural purposes or limber growing, devoted to a commer-
cial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy. 
(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or 
authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any 
of them: 
(1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a 
higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation 
property than the ratio that the assessed value of other com-
mercial and industrial property in the same assessment juris-
diction has to the true market value of the other commercial 
and industrial property. 
(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be 
made under clause (1) of this subsection. 
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(3) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail trans-
portation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate 
applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same 
assessment jurisdiction. 
(4) impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carri-
er providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission under subchapter 1 of chapter 105 of this title. 
(c) Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28 and without regard to 
the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, a district 
court of the United States has jurisdiction, concurrent with other 
jurisdiction of courts of the United States and the States, to prevent 
a violation of subsection (b) of this section. Relief may be granted 
under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true 
market value of rail transportation property exceeds by at least 5 
percent, the ratio of assessed value to true market value of other 
commercial and industrial property in the same assessment juris-
diction. The burden of proof in determining assessed value and 
true market value is governed by State law. If the ratio of the 
assessed value of other commercial and industrial propeity in the 
assessment jurisdiction to the true market value of all other com-
mercial and industrial property cannot be determined to the satis-
faction of the district court through the random sampling method 
known as a sales assessment ratio study (to be carried out under 
statistical principles applicable to such a study), the court shall find, 
as a violation of this section— 
(1) an assessment of the rail transpoi tation property at a 
value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail 
transportation property than the assessed value of all other 
property subject to a property tax levy in the assessment juris-
diction has to the true market value of all other commercial 
and industrial property; and 
(2) the collection of an ad valotcin property tax on the rail 
transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the lax ratio 
rate applicable to taxable property in the taxing district. 
(Pub L. 95-^73, Oct. 17. 1978. 92 Stat 1445 ) 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Revised Section Source (U.S.Code) Source (Statutes at Large) 
11503 49.26c l-cb 4, 1887. ch 104. 24 Slat 379. 
$ 28. added Feb 5. 1976. 
Pub I 94-210. § 306. 90 Stat 
54. Oct 19. 1976. Pub L 
94-555. % 220(o). 90 Stat 2630 
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7 Motor vehicle salesman: 
(a) application for license; 
(b) salesman bond as prescribed m Utah Code 
\nn. Section 41-3-17; 
(c) picture of the applicant; and 
(d) the fee required by law. 
3 Distributor factory branch, distributor branch 
representative: 
<tf / iwUcattoa for license; ia4 
(b) the fee required by law. 
9 New applicants may also be required to attend 
in orientation class on motor vehicle laws and mocor 
vehicle business laws before their license is issued. 
l * r 41-1-4. 41-3-5. 41-3-Q, 41.3-27. 41-3-21. 41-3-
J . 41-34, 41-3-4. 41-3-12 
R884. Property Tax 
RSS4-24. Property Tat 
R884-24. Property Tax 
RSS4-24-5P. Abatement or Deferral of Property Tait* 
of ladigeat Persoat Parsaaat to Utah Code Aaa. 
Sectlooj 59-2-1107 through 59-2-1109 
R8S4-24-7P. Assessneat of Miaiag Propertka Pursuit 
to Utah Code A M . Sectioa 59-2-201 
RSS4-24-SP. Property Tax Withholding For Uraaiaai 
aod Vtaadiuai Mlaes Parsaaat to Utah Code Aaa. 
Sectioa 59-2-210 tad 59-2-211 
RSS4-24-10P. Tixatioa of Uadergroaad RJfbts la La** 
That Coataias Deposits of Oil or Gas Parsaaat to Utah 
CAO> A»B. Setitom S*2-2*h 59-2-2)1 MM* $*-
2-211 
RSS4-24-14P. Historic Pmerratioa Easeneats Parsaatj 
to Utab Code Aaa. Sectfoas 63-UA-l throagb * 
Rgg4-24-16P. AssessoKat of Interlocal Cooperadoa A « 
Proiect Eatity Properties Pamaat to Utah Code A** . 
Sectioa 11-13-25(4) 
RSS4.24-17P. Reappraisal of Real Property by Coaaty 
Assessors Parsaaat to Utah Coastitutioa, Ankle Xlrj, 
Sabseetioas 2 too 11, tad t u b Code Aaa. Sectioa* 59-
2-lt3, 59-2-302, aad 59-2-704. 
RS04-24-19P. Appraiser CeriifkatkNi Profraai Pars*a«t 
to t u b Code Aaa. SecHoas 59-2-701 aad 59-2-702 
RSS4-24-20P. CoastracHoa Work ia Progress Parsaaat 
to Utah Coast. Ait. XUI. Sectioa 2; Utah Code Aa%. 
Sectioa 59-1-1; tad Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-5-
1. 
RtS4-U.24P. For* for Notice of Property Valaadoa 
aad Tax Caaagrs Pirsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 
59-2-919 
RSS4-24.25P. Procedure for Abeyaacc of 190* Property 
Tax Excaipdoa fleariafs For Noaproflt Hospitals a** 
Nanlaf HOOKS Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Scctio* 
59-l-21t 
RtS4-24-2oT. Reqairtaeats of tbc Fanaiaad AssessBMat 
Act of 19#9 Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Seetloas So. 
2-5*1 throagb 59-2-515 
RU4-24-27P. Staadards for Assesssaeat Level 
Perfonaaace Parsaaat to t u b Code Aaa. Sectioa So, 
RH4-24-2SP. Reportlat Reqaireaeatt For Leased or 
Reated Persoaal Property, Parsaaat to Utab Code \ « m # 
Sectioa 59-1.219 
RSS4-24-29P. Taxable HoaatboM Faraishiags Parsaaat 
to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-103 
RgS4-24-32P. Leasehold (Teaaat) Isaproveacats 
Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-102 
Rg*4-24-33P. Persoaal Properly Valnatloa Galdes aad 
Schedules Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59*1. 
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RIS4-24-34P. Use of Appraisal lafortaadoa Gathered \m 
Coa|aactioa With Assessmeat/SaJes Rado Studies 
Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-704 
Cooc* Co 
Provo. Uu* 
RSS4-24-SP. Abaumeat or Deferral of Property 
Taxes of ladigeat Persoea Purssmat to Utah Code 
A M . SecrJoas 59-2-1107 through 59-2-1109 
A. All sources of cash income shall be included in 
arnvuif at annual gross income, including net rents, 
interest, retirement income, welfare, social security, 
etc. 
B. Absence from the residence due to vacation, 
/ confinement to hespttii, or other juni/ar temporary 
situation shall not be deducted from the time requi-
rement of ten-month's residency. 
C. Written notification %h^il be given to any app-
licant whose application for abatement or deferral is 
denied. 
RSS4-24-7P. Assessment of Vflniag Properties 
Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-201 
A. Definitions. 
1. 'Mining property' means afl taxable interests in 
real property, improvements, and tangible persoaal 
property owned or used in mining, processing, or 
transportation of the product to the customary point 
of sak or to the implied point of sale in the case of a 
self-consumed mineral for both metalliferous and 
nonmetalliferous mines. 
2. 'Gross income' means actual receipts, plus the 
fair value of self-consumed minerals. 
a. The fair value of self-consumed mmer^is is 
determined annually by the Property Tax Division to 
be either: 
(1) allowable costs, plus an amount equal to allo-
wable costs times the capitalization rate. Where the 
taxpayer has outside sales and self-consumed, 
minerals, the allowable costs shall be allocated 
I between the two on the basts of the respective units 
of measure in each category; or 
J2) value based upon representative sales price per 
ton or other standard unit of measure of a like 
mineral. 
b. The method approved cannot be changed from 
year to year uniess approved by the Tax Commis-
sion. 
3. "Allowable costs" means costs deductible in the 
respective year, limited to the following: 
a. management salaries; 
b. labor; 
c. payroll taxes and benefits; 
d. workers' compensation insurance; 
e. general insurance; 
f. taxes; 
g. supplies and tods; 
h. power; 
i. maintenance and repairs; 
j . office and accounting; 
k. engineering; 
1. sampling and assaying; 
m. treatment; 
n. legal fees; 
o. royalties; 
p. development expense; 
q. tnospotwum; 
r. miscellaneous; and 
s. capital expenditures. 
(I) No deduction is allowed for interest or mine 
exploration costs. 
4. "Net revenue* means gross income minus allo-
wable costs. 
5. "Capital expenditure' means the total cost of 
purchasing an asset used in the mining operation and 
includes: 
a. purchase price, 
b. transportation costs. 
799 
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c transportation costs, 
d. installation charges, and 
c sales tax 
6 "Nonproducing mine" means a mine that has 
been ciosed for a continuous 12-month period, or 
land held in reserve under a mineral lease not reaso-
nably necessary, indispensable, or needed tn the 
actual mining and extraction process in the current 
tax year 
B The capitalization rate shall be determined by 
the Tax Commission using methods such as: 
1 the summation method; 
2 the weighted cost of capital 
a The cost of debt should consider current market 
yields. 
b The cost of equity shall be determined by the 
capital asset pricing model, nsk premium model, 
discounted cash flow, or a combination thereof or 
any other accepted methodology. 
C. The income indicator of value shall be comp-
uted as follows: 
1. annual net revenue, both net losses and net 
gams, from the mining property for each of the 
immediate past Ave yean (or years in operation if 
less than five years), shall be adjusted by an appro-
priate index of inflation; 
2. average annual net revenue is the sum of the 
values obtained above divided by the number of 
yean; i.e., five or less; 
3. the average annual net revenue is divided by the 
capitalization rate. 
D. Reporting shall be on a calendar or fiscal year 
basis consistently followed, with Tax Commission 
approval. 
RSS4-244P. Property Tax Withholding For 
Uranium and Vanadium Mines Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ana. Section 59-2-210 and 5*-2-211 
A. A list of mine owners and operaton who have 
made lump sum security deposits with the Tax 
Commission wii) be furnished annually by the Com-
mission to any person, mill, buying station, or other 
legal entity receiving uranium or vanadium ore 
mined, produced, or received from within Utah. 
B. If not on the Tax Commission's original, or 
subsequently updated list, the security deposit shall 
be obtained through withholding as provided below: 
1. Any person, mill, buying station, or other legal 
entity receiving uranium or vanadium ore mined, 
produced, or received from within Utah shall with-
held 4 percent (or such higher amount as determined 
by the Tax Commission) of the gross proceeds due to 
the mine operaton or owners. 
2. All amounts withheld shall be remitted to the 
Tax Commission by the last days of April, July, 
October, and January for the immediately preceding 
calendar quarter, on forms and in a manner as set 
forth by the Tax Commission. 
3. Not later than the last day of February, the 
ownen or operaton of each uranium and vanadium 
mine shall be provided with a statement from the 
Tax Commission showing all security deposit 
amounts withheld from their gross proceeds during 
the previous calendar year. 
4. The Tax Commission shall provide the county 
treasurers with a list of all uranium and vanadium 
producers who have had security deposit amounts 
withheld. The county treasurers shall then forward to 
the Tax Commission an accounting of the amount of 
taxes due from each taxpayer on the Tax Commis-
sion's list. 
5. Once all county treasuren have responded, the 
800 
Tax Commission shall forward to each county trea-
surer the taxes due, or the pro rata portion thereof, 
to the extent said taxes have been withheld and 
remitted to the Tax Commission 
a Any amount withheld in excess of the total taxes 
due to all counties shall be refunded to the approp-
riate producer by the Tax Commission. 
b If the amount withheld is not sufficient to pav 
the full amount of taxes due, the county treasurers 
shall collect the balance of said taxes directly from 
the producers 
RSS4-24-10P. Taxation of Underground Rights In 
Land That Contains Deposits of Oil or Gas 
Punuant to t u b Code \an. Sections 59-2-201, 
59-2-210, aad 59-2-211 
A. Definitions. 
1. 'Person* as defined in Utah Code Ann. Section 
6&-3-12. 
2. 'Unit' as defined in Utah Code Ann. Section 59* 
2-2KX3XF). 
3. "Working interest owner' as defined in Utah 
Code Ann. Section 59-2-210. 
4. "Unit operator' means a person who operates 
all of the producing wells in a unit. 
5 "Independent operator* means a person opera-
ting an oil or gas producing property not in a unit. 
6 One person can, at the same tune, be a unit 
operator, a working interest owner, and an indepe-
ndent operator and must comply with all requirem-
ents of this rule based upon his status in the various 
situations. 
B. Assessment Procedures. 
1. Underground rights in lands containing deposits 
of oil or gas and tangible property used in the oper-
ation of such rights, are subject to assessment by the 
Tax Commission. S 
2. These rights and the tangible property used 
therewith shall be assessed in the name of the unit 
operator, the independent operator or other person 
as the facts may warrant. 
3. The taxable value of the underground oil rights 
shall be 400 percent of the proceeds from the sale of 
od production from each such property during the 
calendar year prior to the date of assessment, less 
applicable exempt federal, state, Indian royalties, and 
windfall profits tax. 
4. The taxable value of the underground gas rights 
shall be 400 percent of the proceeds from the sale of 
gas production from each such property during the 
calendar year pnor to the date of assessment, less 
applicable exempt federal, state, and Indian royalties. 
5. The reasonable taxable value of productive 
underground oil and gas rights shall be determined 
by the method described in Subsections B.l. or B.2. 
of this rule or such other valuation method that the 
Tax Commission believes to be reasonably determi-
native of the property's fair market value. 
6. All other tangible property shall be valued at 
fair market value as determined by the Tax Commi-
ssion. 
C. Assessment Credits Greater Aitamont/Bluebell 
Field 
1. Oil properties in the Greater Aitamont/Bluebell 
field shall receive a credit of 20 percent. All qualified 
property shall therefore be valued at 80 percent of 
the taxable value. This credit does not apply to gas 
production. 
2. The Greater Altamont/Bluebefl field is actually 
comprised of three separate fields. These include 
Aitamont field. Bluebell field, and Cedar Rim field 
as recorded by the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and 
CoofCo 
Pr*vo tuft 
B-16 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TabC 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C. DETERMINATIVE COURT CASES 
Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Utah 
State Tax Commission D 
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. 
Utah State Tax Commission E 
Rio Algom Corporation v, San Juan County F 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State G 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company v, 
Webster County H 
Northern Natural Gas Company v. State 
Board of Equalization I 
C-l Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TabD 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 2 5 6 Utah 7 9 6 PACIFIC REPORTER. 2d SKKIKS 
AMAX MAGNESIUM 
CORPORATION. Petitioner. 
v. 
UTAH STATK TAX 
COMMISSION. Respondent. 
No. 880251. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
July 18, 1990 
Taxpayer sought review of decision of 
the Tax Commission The Supreme Court, 
Hall, C J , held that (1) taxpayer's plant at 
which magnesium was extracted from 
brine waters of the Great Salt l*ake was 
subject to assessment by the state, rather 
than county, as a facility appurtenant to a 
mining operation, but (2) it was not consti 
tutionally permissible for state to assess 
property of HM>7< of its value while county 
assessed property at 80/# of the value 
Reversed and remanded 
Stewart, J , filed an opinion concurring 
in the result in which Howe, Associate C J , 
concurred 
I Taxation «=M93.8 
When reviewing final decisions of the 
Tux (Commission, Supreme (Court shows no 
deference to the Commission's conclusions 
as to the legality or constitutionality of tax 
statutes, as those are conclusions of law 
2. Constitutional Law *»48<4> 
In any challenge to the constitutional! 
ty of a tax statute, petitioner bears the 
burden of demonstrating its unconstitution 
ality 
3. Statutes <*=»205 
Principal rule of statutory construction 
is that the terms of a statute should not be 
interpreted in a piecemeal fashion, but as a 
u hole 
4 Statute* e=>189 
Statute must be read according to its 
literal wording, unless it would be unrea 
sonahly confusing or inoperable 
5. Statutes «=2I2 
It is presumed that a statute is valid 
and that words and phrases were chosen 
carefully and advisedly 
6. Taxation «=>I58 
Taxpayer's plant which extracted mag 
neaium from brine waters in evaporation 
ponds owned by the state and the federal 
government fell within the category of "all 
pro|ierty or surface improvements upon or 
appurtenant to mines or mining claims," 
for purposes of statute subjecting mines 
and appurtenant property to property taxa 
tton by the state rather than the county 
Const Art 13, § 4 , U ( 'A 1953, 59-5-3 
(Repealed) 
7. Taxation «=»347 
Property must be assessed at its just 
value and owners of property must bear an 
equal proportion of the tax burden in pro 
portion to the amount of property owned 
8. Taxation *=»4<M8) 
If both just value and equal propor 
tionality cannot be obtained because some 
assessments are made at a fixed percent 
age of true value, equality must prevail so 
that fixed percentage of true value is uni 
formly applied 
9. Taxation «=»4u<8) 
Assuming that legislature was correct 
in determining that market value appraisal 
method overvalues property by 20'^, it 
would be unconstitutional to apply statute 
reducing overall assessment by 20VG to 
properties which were assessed by counties 
but not to properties assessed by the state 
U C A 1 9 5 3 , 59-5-4 5 (Repealed), Const 
Art 13, §$ 2, 3 
10 Constitutional Law <£=>209 
Constitutional provision requiring that 
all laws of a general nature have uniform 
operation is Utah's equal protection clause 
Const Art 1, § 24 
11 Constitutional Law e»!6<l> 
If challenged statute cannot withstand 
attack under State Constitution, there is no 
reason to reach federal equal protection 
question 
AMAX MAGNLSIUM 
Clle • • 79* P 2d 
12 Taxation <s=*40<8) 
Assuming that legislatively created 
classifications of state assessed property 
and county assessed property are legit 
imate with regard to county properties as 
sessed bv, comparable sales or cost apprais 
al methods and state properties assessed 
by other methods, classifications would not 
be valid where the state and counties prop 
erties are both assessed by the comparable 
sales or cost appraisal met hod, but count \ 
values are reduced by 20'/. U C A 1953, 
59-5-4 5 (Repealed), Const Art 1. § 24 
Mark K Buchi, David K Detton, Richard 
G Wilkins, Salt I>ake City, for petitioner 
R Paul Van ham, Stephen G Schwendi 
man, LA Dever, Salt I,ake City, and Ron 
aid L Klton, Tooele, for respondent 
James R l*e , Kent W Winterholler, Salt 
I>ake City, for amicus Utah Mm Ass'n 
Bill Thomas Peters, Harriet E Styler, 
Salt l<ake City, for amicus Utah Ass'n of 
Counties 
HALL, Chief Justice 
This case is before the court on a writ of 
review from a Utah State Tax Commission 
("Tax Commission") decision determining 
the 1986 assessed value of petitioner Amax 
Magnesium Corporation's ("Amax") real 
and |iersonal property located in Tooele 
County, Utah 
The Tax Commission originally assessed 
the value of Amax's property as of January 
1, 1986, at $84,332,150 After an informal 
hearing held on August 25, 1986, the Tax 
Commission reduced the assessed value of 
Amax's property to $78,312,895 
The Tax Commission thereafter held a 
plenary formal hearing to determine the 
fair market cash value of Amax's property 
Amax sought a 20 percent redu( lion of the 
assessed fair market cash value of its prop 
erties pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
§ 59-5- 1 5 (1953 & Supp 1986) On Decern 
ber 21, 1987, the Tax Commission issued a 
final decision further reducing the assessed 
value of Amax's property by approximately 
$6,000,000 based upon the Commission s 
finding that dike maintenance should have 
CORP. v TAX COM'N Utah 1 2 5 7 
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been expensed rather than included as a 
capital investment The Tax Commission 
confirmed all other aspects of the property 
tax division's assessment and refused to 
appl> section 59 5-4 5 to reduce Amax's 
assessment by 20 percent Amax filed a 
petition for reconsideration, which the Tax 
Commission denied by order dated May 31, 
1988 Amax then filed a petition for a writ 
of review with this court on June 29, 1988 
Amax is a company the mam function of 
which is to extract magnesium from the 
brine waters of the Great Salt l^ake 
Amax is the fee owner of approximately 
seven square miles of land in Tooele Coun 
ty, Utah, and maintains improvements on 
the real property in the form of various 
buildings and facilities (collectively re 
ferred to as the "plant") designed to aid m 
the extraction of magnesium from the 
brine 
Amax obtains its concentrated brine solu 
tion principally from a series of evapo 
ration ponds located along the shores of 
the Great Salt I^ake and close to the plant 
Although Amax owns the plant, the evapo 
ration ponds are located on land owned by 
the state of Utah and the federal govern 
ment Amax pays a royalty to the state of 
Utah for the nonexclusive right to extract 
minerals from the Great Salt l^ake 
The Tax Commission assessed Amax as a 
mining operation pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann §& 59-5-3 and 59-5^-1 (1953 & Supp 
1986) at 100 percent of its fair market cash 
value On appeal, Amax asserts that (1) it 
is not a mine and therefore not subject to 
assessment by the stale pursuant to sec 
Hon 59 5-3, (2) it should be assessed by 
Tooele County and receive a 20 percent 
reduction in the assessment for fair market 
cash value pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
§ 59-5 4 5 (1986), and (3) even if Amax is 
assessed by the state and not Tooele Coun 
ty, it would violate the equal protection 
guarantees of the Utah Constitution and 
the United States Constitution for the state 
not to apply section 59 5-4 5 to Amax's 
assessment in the same manner as if Amax 
were assessed bv, 'looele County 
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11,2) When reviewing the final decision 
>f the Tax Commission, this court shows no 
leference to the Tax Commission's conelu-
lion as to the legality or constitutionality 
>f tax statutes because they are conclu-
lions of law ' In any challenge to the 
onstitutinnality of a tax statute, the peti-
loner has the hunlen of demonstrating its 
jnconst itutionality } 
1 TAX ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY 
Anmx's first contention is that it is net-
her a mine nor a mining operation and its 
aeilitics should not he "deemed appurte-
lant" to a mining operation, subjecting it 
o assessment hy the Tax Commission3 
pursuant to section 59-5-3. Section 59-5-3 
cads in pertinent part: 
|A|I1 other mines and mining claims and 
other valuable deposits, . nil machin-
ery used in mining and all pro|M»rty or 
surface improvements upon or appurte-
nant to mines or mining claims . . . must 
he assessed by the State Tax Commis-
sion For the purposes of taxation 
all mills, reduction works, and smelters 
used exclusively for the pnipo •• of re-
ducing or smelting the ores from a mine 
or mining claim hy the owner thereof 
shall lie deemed to lie appurtenant to 
such mine or mining claim though the 
same is not upon such mine or mining 
claim 
Amax argues that it is neither a mine nor 
a mining claim as defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-;t-l(K) (Supp. 198ft), which states: 
" 'Mine' means a natural deposit of either 
1. County Bd of Equalization of Salt Iake County 
i Nupeao AWK*, 77« P 2d 11*8. 1139 (Utah 
l*>8<>). Hurley v. Hoard of Review of the Indus. 
Cormn'n. 767 l» 2d *24. S27 (Utah 1988). Kenne 
ton Corp v Salt lake County. 702 V 2d 4SI, 4SS 
(lliah IQ8S) 
2. Rio Algom Corp v San Juan County. 681 I* 2d 
184. 191 (Ulah 1984). 
3. I h r Utah Const Million lequires all mine* lo be 
assessed b\ i he Male At licit* XIII vet mm II 
Males ' l i t e Slale lax Commission shall atlitiin 
isiei and stqieivise l In- lax laws ol I he Slale ll 
shall assess mines and public utilities and atlpist 
and equalize the valuation and assessment of 
pi open v among the several counties" 
4. Utah (ode Ann § S9-S-1 (Stipp 1986) 
metalliferous or nonmetalliferous valuable 
mineral." Although the Tax Commission 
found that Amax, by its processes, "is ob-
taining metal products from the brine and, 
therefore, is effectively 'mining,'" the 
Commission focused its conclusion of law 
on the determination that Amax's plant 
should he "deemed appurtenant" to a min-
ing operation pursuant to section 59-5-3. 
The issue here is not whether the Amax 
plant is a mine or mining operation, hut 
rather whether it is "deemed appurtenant 
to such mine or mining claim. " ' 
|31 A principal rule of statutory con-
struction is that the terms of a statute 
should not be interpreted in a piecemeal 
fashion, but as a whole.'* The plant and the 
evaporation ponds function as a unit, and 
the plant is generally dependent upon the 
ponds for the magnesium it produces.* 
| 4 , 5 | A second rule of statutory con-
struction mandates that a statute be read 
according to its literal wording unless it 
would be unreasonably confusing or inoper-
able.7 It is presumed that a statute is valid 
and that the words and phrases used were 
chosen carefully and advisedly." 
( 6 | The integration of the plant and the 
eva|M>ration |K>nds (mine) in the magnesium 
extracting process and the practical inter-
pretation and literal wording of the statute 
make it clear that the Amax plant falls 
under the category of "all proj>erty or sur-
face improvements upon or appurtenant to 
mines or mining claims" Hecause the 
Amax plant is property or a surface im-
5. Peav r Hoard of Education of Provo City 
S<hcH>h, 377 P.2d 490, 492 (1962). 
6. The record reflet Is I hat bet a use of the 1983 
flood waters and I he lising level of l he (ileal 
Sail Lake for subsequent vcais. Amax was re-
quired lo puichase a portion of Us hi me fiom 
outside suppliers. 
7. Home v Home, 1M P 2d 244. 247 (Utah 1987); 
anord (lord v Sail Isike Cm: 434 V 2d 449. 4S| 
(lliah 1967) 
8. Mest lordon v Morrison, 6S6 P 2i\ 44S. 446 
(Ulah 1982). see genet ally Mills MUSH, hu v. 
Snyder, 469 U S I S3. I0S S O 638, %\ L bd.2d 
SS6 (I98S) 
Cite a» 746 P 2d 
provement upon or appurtenant to the mine 
or mining operation, Amax is properly as-
sessed hy the Tax Commission pursuant to 
the Utah Constitution article XIII, § 4 and 
Utah Code Ann § 59 5-.1 
II. MEASUREMENT OE TAXABLE 
CASH VALUE OE PROPERTY 
Amax also contends that even if it should 
be centrally assessed by the Tax Commis-
sion, it should be assessed at the same 
taxable cash value at which Tooele County 
would assess Section 59-5-4 5 allows 
county assessors to assess property at NO 
percent of its reasonable fair cash value 9 
Even though section 59-5-4 5 allows coun-
ty-assessed property to be assessed at HO 
percent of its reasonable fair cash value, 
section 59-5-1 requires that all centrally 
assessed or state assessed property be as 
sessed at KM) percent of its reasonable fair 
cash value '• 
Specifically, Amax argues that by requir-
ing the state to assess property at KM) 
percent of value ami the county to assess 
property at 80 percent of value, tin* legisla 
lure has created a law that violates sec-
tions 2 and II of article XIII of the Utah 
Constitution, which require equality and 
uniformity in assessing all real and person-
al property in the state '• Amax also ar-
gues that the apparently unequal state and 
county assessments violate the equal pro-
9. Set lion S9 S-4 S< I) (Stipp 1986) leads m peili 
nenl pan 
When lite connl\ assessor uses the tompaia 
hie sales 01 t osi appiaisal method in valuing 
taxable propcitv lot assessment pui poses, the 
assessor is requited lo t e iogm/e ilia! vanous 
fees. se i \Kes. t losing <os|s. and oilier ex 
penses iflated lo the It ansae lion lessen the 
a« lual amount that ma\ be teieived in I he 
l iausatliou I he oninlv assessoi shall, theic 
foie. take 80° •» til the value based on compaia 
hie sales 01 cost appiaisal of the piopeilv as 
Us reasonable Ian i ash value lot pui poses ol 
assessment 
10. Ulah ( o d e Ann § S9 S- | ( l ) (a) (Simp 1986) 
Males "All lax.idle piojieilv. extept as ollu i 
wise piovided l>v law. shall h« assess* <| .it 100" «• 
o( its teasou.ihlc lau * ash value 
11. Utah Constitution a i lu le XIII. seiiiou 2(1) 
(as amended 1982) teads "All tangible piopeits 
in I he stale, nol exempt undei the laws ol ihe 
United Slates, oi nuclei this Constitution, shall 
l2Vt (Utah IW0) 
tectum of the laws as guaranteed hy the 
Utah ('onstitution u 
A Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 
Amax's first contention is that the appli-
cation of section 59-5-4.5 to county as-
sessed properties hut not to Amax's proper-
ty is a violation of article XIII, sections 2 
and A of the Utah Constitution In Rw 
Alyom, we upheld section 59-5-4.5 against 
a challenge that it violated the tax uniform-
ity requirement of article XIII, section 3 of 
the Utah ('onstitution. The plaintiffs in 
Rio Alyom claimed that since section 59-5-
4 5 reduced the tax assessment to county 
properties by 20 percent, it caused state-as-
sessed properties to bear the burden of 
greater taxes to compensate for the re-
duced taxes paid by county assessed prop-
erty owners We held that absent a show-
ing by the plaintiffs (I) that their own 
properties were assessed at market value, 
(2) that they bear a tax burden greater 
than their pro rata share of the property 
taxes in the county, and (A) that the "de-
duction of transaction costs' from compa-
rable sales figures or estimates of cost as 
permitted b> section 59-5 4 5 defeats the 
constitutional objective of establishing 'a 
valuation (that is J fair and equitable in 
comparison with and commensurate with 
the valuation of other kinds of property,' " 
the constitutionality of the statute will be 
upheld" 
be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in propor 
turn to its \aiue. lo he asceilamed as piovided 
bv lavs " (I inphasis added ) Ulah Constitution 
a i lu le XIII. seition 3(1) (as amended 1982) 
leads in peitinenl pai t 
Ihe legislature shall provide hv law a uni 
form and equal rale of assessment on all tangi-
ble property in the state, at toiding lo its value 
in money, exit pi .is otherwise piovided in 
Set lion 2 ol this Ailule the I egislaluie 
shall p iestnbe h\ law such piovisioiis as shall 
Miiiic a jusl valuation loi taxation of such 
piopeilv. so lhal eveiv person and torpoia 
lion shall pav a lax m piopoition to the value 
ol his. hei. oi its tangible piopeilv 
(I inphasis .uld<d ) 
12. A i l I. <* ? l 
Is. Rut Alcorn. 681 P 2d at 192 (quoting United 
Slates Smelting. Refining A Mining Co v 
Havnes. I l l Ulah 172. 181. 176 P 2d 622. 627 
(|sM7)) 
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The present case is distinguishable from 
Rio Alyom because it involves similar valu 
ation processes used by the state and conn 
ty assessors and yet results in different 
out(OIIM'S and bc»ause Amax is not dial 
lenguig the facial validity of the statute, 
but only its validity as applied to Amax In 
Rio Alyom, the county assessor used the 
"comparable sales" method of valuation 
that is very sensitive to inflation, while the 
Tax Commission used income or other valu-
ation methods that gave very little effect to 
the impact of inflation " 
An additional distinguishing factor is 
that the premise of section 59-5-4 5, that 
state assessments and county assessments 
are not uniform, was not attacked in Rio 
Algom iS The very essence of Amax's ar 
gument is that the nonuniformity between 
similarly assessed state and county pro|>er 
ties engendered by section 59-5-4 5 vio 
lates the uniformity clauses of article XIJ I, 
sections 2 and .'t of the Utah Constitution 
Y One of the pur|M>ses for section 59-5-4 5 
f^j was a legislative determination that certain 
transactional costs actually lessen the 
amount received by a seller under the mar 
ket value evaluation and, therefore, the 
true value of the property to the seller is 
less than the assessment '* Another pur 
pose for section 59-5-4 5 was a legislative 
attempt to equalize the tax burden between 
state and county assessments Section 59-
5-4 5 was initially passed because inflation 
caused county assessed properties to tie as 
sessed significantly higher than state prop 
erties " The remedy contained in section 
59-5-4 5 was to reduce the overall county 
assessment by 20 percent 
| 7 . 8 | Two principles govern the law of 
taxation (1) that property be assessed at 
its just value, and (2) that the owners of 
14 Rio Ai/iom 681 I* 2d al 189 90 
15 Id .n I'M 
16 Section S9 S 4 S ( | ) SLC> alu, Ku> AlK„n, 681 
l'2d .H 193 
17 Rio Aluotn 681 V 2d M 193 
18 Id al 194 kitteiy lieu I ight ( a t Assessors 
of the losxtt of Kittery. 219 A 2d 728 734 (Me 
1966) 
property bear an equal portion of the tax 
burden in proportion to the amount of prop 
ertv owned ,K If both just value and equal 
proportionality cannot be olitaimd because 
some assessments are made at a fixed \n r 
centage of true value, then equality must 
prevail so that the fixed percentage of true 
value must be uniformly applud'* 
In the present case, the record reflects 
that the Tax Commission admits that it 
assessed Amax at 100 percent of the cur 
rent fair cash value and that its assessor 
used the same market value method of 
assessment used by county assessors The 
only reason Amax's property is assessed at 
100 percent of value rather than at K0 
percent is that Amax's pro|>erty is required 
by the Utah Constitution ** and by stat 
ute *' to be taxed as state assessed proper 
ty 
19J It strains reason to assert that if 
assessors using the cost and market ap 
praisal methods overvalue county pro|>er 
ties, the same overvaluation would not oc 
cur with state pro|>erties appraised by the 
same methods Assuming that the legisla 
ture was correct in determining that the 
market value appraisal method overvalues 
proj>erty by 20 percent, it would be uncon 
stitutional to apply section 59-5-4 5 to 
county assessed pro|>erties and not to state 
assessed properties Applying section 59-
5-4 5 to the facts of this case, we hold that 
it would be in violation of the constitutional 
mandate of article XIII, sections 2 and 3 
that all property be taxed in a uniform and 
equal manner if section 59-5-4 5 is not 
applied to Amax's property 
B Kqual Protection 
110) Our holding that section 59-5-4 5 
is unconstitutional as applied to Amax need 
19 Hto Almoin 681 I'2d al 194 Kiliery UeU 
liKhl to 219 A 2d al 714 
20 Ail XII I * I I 
21 Illali Code Aim I) S4 S \ (IVS) & Supp 
1986) 
AMAX MACNESUIM 
t i l e »• 796 F 2d 
not be based solely upon a violation of 
article XIII, sections 2 and 'A of the Utah 
Constitution, but may also be based upon a 
violation of equal protection In Hlue 
( MISS ami Him Shu hi i Statt l~ wt held 
that in order to establish a violation of the 
equal protection component of the Utah 
Constitution iJ with regard to taxation, a 
party must demonstrate that a law creates 
certain classes of persons and that the law 
is applied differently to each classification 
without a reasonably related legitimate 
government purpose l% 
( III Also in Hlue Cross, we concluded 
that the principles and concepts embodied 
in the federal equal protection clause " and 
the state uniform operation of the laws 
provision are substantially similar, but as 
we stated in Hlue (Voss 
[Ojur examination into the reasonable 
ness of economic legislation under article 
I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
[the uniform operation of the laws provi 
sionj is at least as vigorous as that re 
quired bv the federal equal protection 
clause, ami piobahly more so There 
fore, if the statutes under attack can 
withstand scrutiny under article 1, sec 
tion 24, they will not be found to violate 
the federal equal protection clause '* 
(Citations omitted, emphasis added ) Con 
versely, if the challenged statute cannot 
withstand attack under the state constitu 
tion, there is no reason to reach the federal 
question Such appears to be the case 
here, hence, we do not reach the federal 
question 
(121 Assuming that the legislatively 
created classifications of state assessed 
property and county assessed property are 
legitimate with regard to county properties 
22 779 P2d 634 (Utah 1989) 
23. Utah Constitution aiticle I section 24 slates 
'All laws ol a general nalttic shall havt uniloim 
opcialion I Ins section ai ls as tltalis equal 
piolcctmn clause See Hlue ( M>\\ utul Hlue 
Siueld i N/ait 779 |» 2d 634 (Utah 1989) AUnoi 
tarn tuel Suppls i o i Salt lake Cil\ ( orp 7S2 
I'2d 884 (Utah 1988) lhompu>n i Salt Ijike 
Lav Li>rp 724 I* 2d 9S8 (Utah 1986). Malatt i 
Unt* 693 I'2d 661 (Utah 1984) Johnston i 
Stoker 68S »» 2d 539 (Utah 1984) Huker » 
Maihaon 607 l» 2d 233 (Utah 1979) 
CORP. v. TAX ( O W N Utah 1 2 6 1 
I2M ( l imh IWO) 
assessed by the comparable sales or cost 
appraisal methods and state properties as 
sessed by other methods, the classifications 
would not be valid where the state and 
tount\ prop* i ties .ire both assessed b\ the 
(omparahh sail s or cost appraisal ineth 
otls Tin state assessor testified that he 
used the cost appraisal method of evalua 
tion for Amax's personal property and that 
it did not differ in basic theory from the 
cost appraisal method used by county as 
sessors 
The very purpose of section 59-5-4 5 was 
to allow a 20 percent reduction where the 
comparable bales or cost appraisal methods 
of evaluation were used because the legis 
lature found that those methods typically 
overvalued property by not taking into ac 
count transaction costs and other intangi 
bles If county properties assessed by the 
cost appraisal method receive a 20 percent 
reduction and state properties assessed by 
the same method receive no reduc Hon, then 
section 59-5-4 5 has created two classes of 
properties assessed by the cost appraisal 
method and arbitrarily discriminated 
against one class merely because It is a 
state assessed property Thi& disparity 
does not pass the constitutional muster set 
out in Hlue (*ro$s Indeed, there is no 
reasonable basis for the classification of 
county properties assessed by the cost ap 
praisal method versus state assessed prop 
erties assessed by similar methods The 
objectives of section 59-5-4 5 are not met 
when the same method is used for both 
state and county assessments 
Finally, there is no reasonable relation 
ship between the classification and the pur 
pose of the statute, which is to equalize the 
tax burdens In fact, when the same as 
24 Blue C ross and Hlue Shield, 779 P 2d al 637 
25 Amendment XIV section 1 stales 
No stale shall make 01 cnfoicc any taw whlih 
sha l l ahi lil(*e the p i i v l l c g c s 01 in i l i iun l lH s of 
«. I(I/I ns ol the United Slate* noi shall au\ 
Stale tic pi i ve an> (Rison ol hlc hbeilN or 
piopeilv without the due pun ess ol la* noi 
deny to any pcison within its |uiisdielioii the 
equal piolection ol the laws 
26 Hlue Cross and Hlue Shield. 779 I* 2d al 637 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sessnient method is used by the s ta te as is 
used by the county, section 59-5-4.5 mere-
ly aggrava tes the taxing disparity unless 
the 20 percent reduction is applied to all 
s ta te properties assessed by the compara 
hie sales or cost appraisal methods. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Amax itself might not be 
deemed a mine or a mining o|»cration, its 
property and facilities a re properly 
"deemed appur tenan t" to a mine or mining 
o|»eration under Amax's contn ! making 
Amax subject to central a s s e s ; <i by the 
Tax Commission 
As applied to Amax, section 59-5-4.5 is 
not only an unconstitutional violation of 
article XIII, sections 2 and tt, but also a 
violation of article I, section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution. We reverse and remand to 
the Tax Commission for the purpose of 
calculating the reasonable fair cash value 
of Amax's real and personal property pur-
suant to the formula set out in Utah Cx>de 
Ann. § 59-5-4.5. 
HOWE, Associate C.I., and DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, .I.J , concur. 
STEWART. Justice, concurring in the 
0 result. 
Pfc Rio A/go HI Cor/i. r Son Juan County, 
f>Kl I '2d I HI (Utah 1984). held that 
§ 59-5-4.5, as applied to county assessed 
properties, was constitutional, even though 
that section provides for a va* , , i a t is 
20 |>ercent less than the " g v market 
value of a property. The constitutionality 
of that s ta tu te rested on the premise that 
the reduction in the assessment ra te of 
county-assessed property was necessary to 
effectuate tax uniformity between inflated 
county assessed properties and s ta te as-
sessed properties. The basic cause of the 
disparity was that s ta te assessments were 
made on the basis of formulae that were 
less responsive to inflation than the formu-
lae used by county assessors. 
The Amax proj>erties in the instant case 
are state -assessed; however, they are not 
assessed on the basis of the net proceeds 
formula used to assess mines, but on the 
basis of a formula typically used by county 
assessors. As stated, the crux of Rio Al-
gom was the fact that s ta te assessed prop-
erties did not shoulder a fair share of the 
tax burden vis-a-vis the county assessed 
properties. That may or may not continue 
to be the case. Suffice it to say that the 
fort ies have not addressed the issue. 
Nevertheless, I agree that whether an as-
sessment is made by a s ta te assessor in-
stead of a county assessor cannot by itself 
justify a different assessment. Since the 
disparity between state-assessed and coun-
ty assessed properties arose because of the 
different formulae used by s ta te assessors 
for mines, utilities, railroads, etc., and per 
haps t>eeause of administrative and en-
forcement reasons, it cannot now !>e dem-
onstrated that the value of the petitioner's 
parcels should be assessed at a higher rate 
than county assessed parcels when they 
are valued on a market or cost-of replace-
ment method For that reason, I concur in 
the result reached by the majority. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in the 
concurring opinion of STEWART, J. 
(o f If V NUMMC mi!M> 
11 *> wasn.zu IUUO 
Chr is D E M O P O L I S , Pet i t ioner , 
v. 
Dale CALVIN, Trustee , et al , 
Respondents . 
No. 57128-7. 
Supreme Court of Washington. 
July 2. 1990. 
Prior Report: 57 Wash App 47, 7Ko P.2d 
804. 
ORDER C.RANTINO MOTION FOR EX 
TENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETI 
TION FOR REVIEW AND DENYING 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
This mat ter came before Department I of 
the Court on its July 2, 1990, Motion Calen-
dar on Petitioner's Motion for Extension of 
Time to File Petition for Review. Depart-
ment I having considered the motion and 
the files herein; 
Now, therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED: 
That Petitioner's Motion for Extension of 
Time to File Petition for Review is granted 
and the Petition for Review is denied on 
the merits. 
115 Wash 2d 211 
j £ „ W A R R E N . LITTLE & LUND. INC., 
a Washington corpora t ion . 
Respondent , 
v. 
MAX J. KUNEY COMPANY, a 
Washington corpora t ion . 
Petitioner. 
No. 568HMV. 
Supreme Court of Washington, 
En Ranc. 
Sept i:», 1990. 
Reconsideration Denied Nov. 5, 1990 
Subcontractor brought suit to recover 
retainage withheld by general contractor. 
ijeuerai coiiuaciwi i-uunu-n.iau.iv.. »^. 
breach of contract and claimed the with-
held retainage as a setoff. The Superior 
Court, Spokane County, Harold D. Clarke, 
.1., granted summary judgment to subcon-
tractor and dismissed contrac tor ' s counter 
claim without prejudice. Contractor ap 
pealed The Court of Appeals, 5tJ Wash. 
App. 74, 782 P.2d 222, affirmed, ami con 
tractor 's petition review was granted . The 
Supreme Court, Dolliver, J., held that con-
tingent unliquidated counterclaim may be 
pleaded as a setoff unless plaintiff can 
show prejudice or court finds counterclaim 
would make proceedings unwieldy. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Cour t s <S=>97( I > 
Where s tate and federal rules are the 
same and there is little or no authoritative 
guidance for s ta te rule, cour ts may look to 
decisions and analysis under federal rule. 
2. Set-Off and Coun te r c l a im <3=\%r»< 1), 37 
Contingent unliquidated counterclaim 
may be pleaded as a setoff unless plaintiff 
can show prejudice or court finds counter 
claim would make proceedings unwieldy. 
CR i:«h). 
IJJ-jWinston <Sr Cashatt , Carl E. Huel»er, 
Lynden O. Rasmussen, Spokane, for peti-
tioner 
Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, 
P.S., l^eslie R. Weatherhead, Spokane, for 
respondent. 
DOLLIVER, Justice 
This case arises from the construction of 
two county jails, one in Yakima County and 
one in Spokane County. Max J Kuney 
Company (Kuney) was the general contrac-
tor for both jails; Warren, Little & Lund, 
Inc. (WLL) was the mechanical subcontrac-
tor. 
The parties contracted for the construe 
tion of the Yakima County jail in October 
1981. After completion, and despite some 
problems with the jail, the Hoard of Yaki 
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conflicting affidavits are to be construed in 
ICA's favor Behagen v Amateur Basket 
ball Association of the United States, 744 
F 2d 731, 733 (10th Cir 1984). cert denied, 
471 US 1010, 105 SCt 1879, 85 L Ed 2d 
171 (1985) 
In determining personal jurisdiction 
questions in diversity cases, a two-step 
analysis is applied The court must decide 
whether the defendants have sufficient 
contacts with the forum state so that the 
exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with 
the constitutional requirements of due pro-
cess See Keeton v Hustler Magazine, 
Inc, 465 US 770, 104 SCt 1473, 79 
LEd2d 790 (1984) (the minimum contacts 
requirement extends to federal courts sit 
ting with diversity jurisdiction) Addition 
ally, we must determine whether the law of 
the forum state authorizes the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the defendants See Yar 
brough v Elmer Bunker & Associates, 
669 F2d 614. 616 (10th ( ir 1982). see also 
Hoffman, 575 FSupp at 1469 (stating that 
tr) the constitutional minimum contacts test 
I and the state's jurisdictional statute must 
^ be satisfied) 
Initially, we focus on the law of Kansas 
ICA asserts that jurisdiction in this case is 
proper under subsection 5 of the Kansas 
long arm statute, K S A 60-308(b) The 
long arm statute provides as follows 
(b) Any person, whether or not a citizen 
or resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent or instrumentality does 
any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, 
thereby submits the person and, if an 
individual, the individual's personal rep 
resentative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any cause of 
action arising from the doing of any of 
these acts 
(5) entering into an express or im 
plied contract, by mail or otherwise, 
with a resident of this state to be per 
formed in whole or in part by either 
party in this state 
KSA 60-308(bM5) 
In the instant action, the requirements of 
K S A b0-308(bM5) are met ICA and the 
defendants entered into a contract for the 
installation of an insulation system Under 
the contract, ICA installed in the defen 
dants' New Jersey sports facility an insula 
tion system which was designed, fabricat-
ed, and partially assembled in Kansas 
Thus, the contract was performed in part 
by ICA in Kansas, and the conditions of the 
long arm statute are satisfied 
Next, we address the constitutional re-
quirement of due process The Tenth Cir 
cult has endorsed a three prong analysis 
for use when considenng due process in 
the context of personal jurisdiction See 
Rambo v American Southern Insurance 
Co, 839 F 2d 1415, 1419 n 6 (10th Cir 1988) 
(adopting the three-stage analysis set forth 
by the Ninth Circuit in Data Disc, Inc v 
Systems Technology Associates, Inc, 557 
F 2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir 1977)) As indi 
cated in the discussion below, clear bound 
aries do not separate the three prongs 
First, the defendants must have mini 
mum contacts with the forum state In 
International Shoe Co v Washington, 
326 US 310, 66 SCt 154, 90 L Ed 95 
(1945), and its progeny, the Supreme Court 
set forth the minimum contacts test, which 
requires that defendants in a state court 
action have sufficient contacts with the fo-
rum state such that the suit "does not 
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice "' World-Wide Volks 
wagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 
293, 100 SCt 659, 565, 62 L Ed 2d 490 
(1980) (quoting International Shoe, 326 
U S at 316, 66 S Ct at 158 (quoting Milhk 
en v Meyer, 311 U S 457, 463, 61 S Ct 339, 
343, 85 L Ed 278 (1940))) 
Second, the defendants must "purpose 
fully [avail themselves] of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum 
State " Hanson v Denckla, 357 U S 235, 
253, 78 SCt 1228, 1240, 2 L Ed 2d 1283 
(1958) The purposeful availment require-
ment "ensures that [defendants] will not be 
haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 
'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' con 
tacts or of the 'unilateral activity of anoth 
er party or a third person ' " Burger King 
Corp v Rudzeuncz, 471 US 462, 474-75, 
105 S Ct 2174, 2183, 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985) 
Third, the exercise of jurisdiction over 
the defendants must be reasonable It 
must be ' reasonable, in the context of our 
federal system of government to require 
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the [defendants] to defend the particular 
[diversity] suit which is brought [in the 
federal district court of the forum state]" 
International Shoe, 326 US at 317, 66 
S Ct at 158 In making the reasonableness 
inquiry, the court must consider several 
facto re, including 
the burden on the defendants], the inter 
ests of the forum state, and the plain 
tiff's interest in obtaining relief It must 
also weigh in its determination "the in 
terstate judicial system's interest in ob 
taming the most efficient resolution of 
controversies, and the shared interest of 
the several States in furthering funda 
mental substantive social policies ' 
Asaht Metal Industry Co v Superior 
Court, 480 US 102, 113, 107 SCt 1026, 
1034, 94 L Ed 2d 92 (1987) (quoting World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U S at 292, 100 
S Ct at 564) The court must examine the 
quality and the nature of the defendants' 
contacts with the forum state to determine 
if it is reasonable to hale the defendants 
into court in the forum state Kulko v 
Superior Court of California, 436 U S 84, 
92, 98 SCt 1690, 1696, 56 L Ed 2d 132 
(1978) 
In the instant action, the defendants en 
tered into a contract with ICA, a Kansas 
corporation In connection with the con 
tract, the defendants made telephone calls 
to ICA in Kansas Although they assert 
that they did not know the destination of 
their calls to the toll free, "1-300" number, 
the assertion is not plausible in light of the 
fact that they had received literature with 
numerous indications that ICA was a Kan 
sas corporation Moreover, Kessler told 
the defendants that ICA was located in 
Kansas Additionally, at least part of the 
contract (ICA's design, fabrication, and 
partial assembly of the insulation system) 
was to be performed in Kansas Again, 
the defendants should have been aware 
that the contract would be partially per 
formed in Kansas because of Kessler's 
statements and the literature that they re 
ceived Given these facts, we find that 
asserting jurisdiction over the defendants 
is consistent with the principles of four 
tee nth amendment due process They had 
minimum contacts with the state of Kan 
sas, and these contacts were the result of 
and pursuant to their decision to enter into 
a contract with a Kansas corporation to be 
partially performed in Kansas As the 
Tenth Circuit recognized in Continental 
American Corp v Camera Controls 
C orp, 692 r 2d 1309 (10th Cir 1982), "mod 
ern commercial transactions often involve 
little contact with the forum beyond that of 
mail and telephone communications, and 
defending a suit in a foreign jurtsdic 
tion is not as burdensome as in the past" 
Id at U14 (citation omitted) Thus, this 
court's assertion of jurisdiction does not 
offend due process standards 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the 
motion of the defendants Sportsplex, Inc , 
and Sportsplex Associates to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction is denied 
(o f «IVNUNM*lttTIM> 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPA-
NY, a Utah corporation, and the Den-
ver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
v 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
and State of Utah, Defendants, 
and 
Salt Lake County, et a l , Defendants 
in Intervention 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTA-
TION COMPANY. Plaintiff, 
v 
STATE OF UTAH, et a l , Defendants, 
and 
Salt Lake ( ounty, et al , Defendants 
in Intervention 
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Railroads brought action challenging 
ad valorem property tax assessments by 
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Utah on grounds that assessmenU discrimi-
nated against them in violation of Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act 
The District Court, Jenkins, Chief Judge, 
held that Utah discriminated against rail 
roads in ita assessments of their ad valo-
rem property tax for two years 
Judgment for plaintiff 
1 Taxation <s»39<M2) 
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory 
Reform Act does not require district court 
to make state apply a particular evaluation 
methodology in determining whether ad va-
lorem property tax assessments discnmi 
nate against railroads 49 U S C A 
§ 11503 
2 Taxation «=»39<X2) 
Evidence established that Utah's use 
of stock and debt approach to valuing rail-
roads' property, for purposes of ad valorem 
taxation, had a rational basis and was not 
chosen for discriminatory purpose, there-
fore, district court would not second guess 
state's choice of method in determining 
whether ad valorem property tax assess 
ments discriminated against railroads in vi 
olation of Railroad Revitalization and Reg 
ulatory Reform Act 49 U S C A § 11503 
3. Taxation *»390<2) 
As long as state's methodology for va 
luing railroad's property, for purposes of 
ad valorem taxation, has a rational basis 
and was not chosen for a discriminatory 
purpose, district court will not disturb that 
choice in determining whether property tax 
assessment discriminated against railroad 
in violation of Railroad Revitalization and 
Regulatory Reform Act 49 U S C A 
§ 11503 
4 Taxation «=»39<M2) 
Utah's application of its valuation 
methods, for purposes of valuing railroads' 
property for ad valorem taxation, was not 
improper, it could not be said that rail 
roads Utah chose to compare with com 
plaining railroads were not comparable and 
any mismatch Utah created by using cur 
rent earnings price ratio and applying it to 
projected earnings was insignificant 
5. Taxation <*=>390(2) 
Application to railroad property of 
Utah statute, which discounts assessed val-
ue of real property an additional 20%, dis-
criminated against railroads under Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act 
with respect to property values for pur 
poses of ad valorem taxation by artificially 
increasing ratio for other commercial and 
industrial property 49 U S C A § 11503, 
U C A 1958, 59-5-4 5 
t . Taxation *»390<2) 
In determining whether Utah's ad valo-
rem property tax assessments for railroads 
discriminates against railroads in violation 
of Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory 
Reform Act, district court must consider 
value of locally assessed real property be-
fore Utah statute discounting assessed val 
ue of real property in state an additional 
20% is applied 49 U S C A § 11503, 
U C A 1953, 59-5-4 5 
7. Taxation *»39(H2) 
Utah discriminated against railroads in 
ad valorem property tax assessments in 
that it assessed railroad property at higher 
rate than it assessed all other commercial 
and industrial property within state for 
same period 49 U S C A * 11503 
Leonard J Lewis, Robert A Peterson 
and Eric C Olson, VanCott, Bagley, Corn-
wall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah, for 
Union Pacific R Co 
L Ridd Larson and William A Marshal, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and Wm E Saul, San 
Francisco, Cal, for Southern Pacific 
Transp 
Stephen G Schwendiman and Maxwell A 
Miller, Asst Attys Gen, Bill Thomas Pe 
ters and Gary Thorup, Sp Asst Atty Gen, 
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, for defendants 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER 
JENKINS, Chief Judge 
The plaintiff railroads—Union Pacific 
(UP), the Denver & Rio Grande Western (D 
& RG) and Southern Pacific (SP)—brought 
these consolidated actions to challenge 
their ad valorem property tax assessments 
for 1984 and 1985 on the grounds that the 
assessments discriminated against them in 
violation of section 306 of the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act 
of 1976 (the 4R Act), Pub L No 94-210, 
ft 306, 90 Stat 31 54 (1976) The cases 
were tried to the court beginning on Febru 
ary 9, 1988, and ending on March 17, 1988, 
with some brief respites in between The 
court heard closing arguments on March 
30, 1988 Robert A Peterson and Eric C 
Olson represented the plaintiffs UP and D 
& RG L Ridd Larson and William A 
Marshall represented plaintiff SP Rex E 
Madsen, Reed L Martineau and Maxwell 
A Miller represented the defendants, and 
Bill Thomas Peters represented the defen 
dants in intervention, some twenty Utah 
counties * There were 788 exhibits, some 
of great complexity After digesting the 
evidence and the arguments of counsel, the 
court now enters this memorandum opinion 
and order, which, under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(a), shall constitute the 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law 
I 
THE STATUTE 
In 1976, in part to "restore the financial 
stability of the railway system of the Unit 
ed States," Pub L No 94-210, § 101(a), 90 
1 The intervening counties are Box Flder 
Cache Carbon Davis Emerv Grand Iron 
Juab Millard Morgan Piute Salt l-ake San 
pete, Sevier Summit Tooele Utah Wasatch 
Washington and Weber 
2. The wording and structure of section 306 were 
changed when the section was recodified as part 
of the revised Inteistate Commerce Act See Act 
Assessed value of rail transpoitaiion 
property
 ? 
True market value of rati iranspor 
tatton property 
SUt 31, 33 (1976), Congress passed me *n 
Act Section 306 of the act, codified at 49 
U S C § 11603, prohibits states and local 
taxing authorities from discriminating 
against railroad property That section 
makes it unlawful for a state to assess 
railroad 
transportation property at a value which 
bears a higher ratio to the true market 
value of such trans|>ortation property 
than the ratio which the assessed value 
of all other commercial and industrial 
property in the same assessment junsdic 
tion bears to the true market value of all 
such other commercial and industrial 
property 
Id § 306(1 )(a), 90 Stat at 54 f A railroad 
that thinks it has been treated unfairly 
may bring an action in federal district court 
for injunctive and declaratory relief Id 
§ 306(2) The court is then required to 
compare two ratios the ratio of the as 
sessed value of rail transportation property 
to its true market value, and the ratio of 
the assessed value of all other commercial 
and industrial property in the same assess 
ment jurisdiction to its true market value 
The court may grant relief to the railroad 
only if the ratio of assessed value to true 
market value for rail transportation proper 
ty "exceeds by at least 5 per centum the 
ratio of assessed value to true market val 
ue, with respect to all other commercial 
and industrial property in the same assess 
ment jurisdiction" (in this case, the state of 
Utah) Id § 306(2Kc)s 
of Oct 17 1978 Pub I No 9S-473 § 11503 92 
Slat 1337 1445-46 Because the recodification 
was not mr ml to change the substantive law 
see id § 3(a) 92 Stat at 1466 this court will use 
the original language of section 306 for conve 
nience and clarity 
3 The court s analysis can be expressed by a 
simple equation 
Assessed value of all other commer 
cial and industrial property 
y 105 
True market value of all other com 
rnerual and industrial property 
At the time of the assessments at issue in this tion be assessed at 20% of its reasonable fair 
case Utah law required that all taxable property cash value See Utah Code Ann § 59-5-1 
in the state not specifically exempt fiom taxa (Supp 1985) see also infra note 6 ( reasonable 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
546 716 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
The plaintiff railroads claimed that Utah 
had discriminated against them in two 
ways by overvaluing their property and 
by denying them a twenty percent discount 
in their assessed value that was available 
to locally assessed commercial and industri-
al real property under Utah law, Utah Code 
Ann § 59-5-4 5 (Supp 1986) Plaintiff SP 
settled its valuation claim with the state 
before trial At the trial, the parties 
presented the court with a stipulation set 
ting forth two alternatives for the ratio of 
assessed value to true market value for all 
other commercial and industrial pro|>erty in 
Utah—one ratio if the court upholds the 
twenty percent discount statute and auoth 
er if the court strikes down the twenty per 
cent discount statute * Because the rail 
roads' assessed value is given, see infra 
note 48 and accompanying text, the only 
issues for the court to decide are the true 
market value of the UP and D & RG as of 
the assessment dates (January 1, 1984, and 
January 1, 1985) and the allegedly discrimi 
natory effect of the twenty percent dis 
count statute The court will consider 
these issues in order 
II 
THE PLAINTIFFS' 
VALUATION CLAIMS 
Plaintiffs UP and D & RG claim that 
Utah has discriminated against them by 
fair cash value" is synonymous with true mar 
ket value ) Thus, the ratio for both rail trans 
port at ion property and all other commercial 
and industrial property for the years in question 
should be 20 
In 1985 the statute was amended to make the 
assessed value the same as "reasonable fair cash 
value However, the statute did not take effect 
until January 1, 1986 See 1985 Utah Laws ch 
165. § 64 
4 In other words the parties have stipulated to 
the right half of the equation set forth in foot 
note 3 supra Which stipulated value the court 
will ultimately apply depends on the courts 
holding on the plaintiffs claim of de jure dis 
crimination under the equalization aspect of 
this case See infra pan 111 
3 Originally UP took the position that it was 
foreclosed from challenging the stale s valuation 
of its property by the Tenth Circuit s decision in 
Burlmgton Northern Railroad Company v l^en 
nen 715 F 2d 494 (10th Cir 1983) cert denied, 
467 U S 1230 104 SCt 2690 81 I Ed 2d 884 
(1984) See Union Pac R Co v State Tax 
overvaluing their rail transportation prop-
erty for the assessment years 1984 and 
1985§ To determine whether that is so, 
the court must determine the plaintiffs' 
true market value and then compare that 
figure to the state's assessed value, which 
was baaed on the state's determination of 
the plaintiffs' true market value* Under 
Utah law, the plaintiffs' assessed value for 
assessment years 1984 and 1985 should 
be 20 of their true market value See 
supra note 3 If it is greater, then the 
state has overvalued the railroads, regard 
less of any equalisation cluim they may 
have 
The court's task is complicated by the 
fact that the defendants concede that the 
plaintiffs' initial assessed values for 1984 
and 1985 were not based on their true 
market value In May 1984 the state as-
sessed UP based on a true market value of 
$3,875,000,000 On June 4, 1984, the state 
issued a revised assessment for UP based 
on a true market value of $3,600,000,000 
The state has since become convinced that 
the methods it used to arrive at those fig 
ures were wrong and has abandoned those 
appraisals See Transcript [hereinafter 
T r ] at 341, 345-46, 350-51 For trial the 
state relies on a new appraisal for UP 
based on a different approach, which places 
Commn. 635 FSupp 1060. 1063 (D Utah 1986) 
However, the Supreme Court opened the door 
for UP to assert its valuation claims in this case 
by its decision in Burlington Northern Railroad 
Company v Oklahoma Tax Commission. 481 
U S 454 107 SCt 1855. 95 1 bd 2d 404 (1987) 
Ironically SP, which had asserted that Lennen 
did not preclude it from challenging the state s 
valuation, see 635 FSupp at 1065-66. is no 
longer asserting a valuation claim, it having 
settled its valuation dispute with the state 
6 Utah law requires that taxable property within 
the state be assessed on the basis of its "reason 
able fair cash value" See Utah Code Ann 
§ 59-5-1, see also supra note 3 Reasonable 
fair cash value is equivalent to "market value " 
Kennecott Copper Corp v Salt Lake County 122 
Utah 431 250 P 2d 938 939-40 (1952) For 
simplicity unless otherwise indicated the court 
shall use the terms value and true market 
value to refer to both "reasonable fair cash 
value and true market value 
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the value of UP for assessment year 1984 
at $3,700,000,000 The state followed a 
similar approach for UP for assessment 
year 1985 and for the I) & RG for 1984 and 
1985, with similar results7 Thus, the de 
fendants concede that the plaintiffs were 
assessed at rates that were not based on 
their true market value for assessment 
years 1984 and 1985 To determine how 
much the plaintiffs' newly determined val 
ues differ from their "true market value," 
if at all, the court must still determine their 
true market value as of January 1, 1984, 
and January 1, 1985 
hi deciding the valuation question, the 
court has the advantage of expert help 
The plaintiffs have presented the apprais 
als of their expert witness, Dr Arthur 
Schoenwald, a financial consultant special 
izing in railroad and utility ratemaking and 
valuation See common exhibits 30 & 33, 
36 & 39 The defendants rely on the newly 
prepared appraisals of Mr Ekhardt Praw 
ltt, the utility and railroad valuation man 
ager for the Property Tax Division of the 
Utah State Tax Commission See common 
exhibits 32, 35, 38 & 41 However, to 
bolster Mr Prawitt's appraisals, the defen 
dants also offered appraisals prepared 
jointly by Mr Michael Goodwin, an inde 
pendent appraiser specializing in the valua 
tion of public utilities, railroads and other 
multistate corporations, and Dr James If 
flander, an assistant professor of finance 
at Arizona State University See common 
exhibits 31, 34, 37 & 40 The plaintiffs and 
intervenors also offered the testimony of 
various experts retained to critique or com 
ment on the competing appraisals 
Unfortunately, all these expert opinions 
may only verify George Bernard Shaw's 
observation that, "[i]f all economists were 
7 The slate s original assessment for UP for as 
scssment year 198S was based on a true market 
value of $4 billion In this proceeding the state 
relies on a new appraisal which places the 
value of UP for 1985 at $3 4 billion 
The state initially valued the D & K O based on 
a true market value of $370 million for assess 
ment year 1984 In June 1984 it revised its 
valuation based on a value of $340 million In 
this proceeding u relics on a new appraisal 
placing the true market value of the D & RG at 
$320 million Similarly it initially valued the D 
& RG for 1985 at $375 million and now iclies 
laid end to end, they would not reach a 
conclusion " The operative word here is 
a", for, after listening to seventeen full 
days of expert testimony spread over six 
weeks, the court suffers from no lack of 
conclusions The problem is that the prof 
fered expert conclusions differ from one 
another by over a billion dollars in the case 
of UP and by a like order of magnitude in 
the case of the D & RG • Fortunately, the 
parties do agree on some things To that 
extent the court can begin on common 
ground 
The parties agree, for example, that the 
proper approuch for valuing a rutlroad for 
taxution purposes is the so called unitary 
approach Under that approach, the state 
determines the value of the entire railroad 
as a unit, even though its assets may be 
located in several states, and then allocates 
a portion of that total value to the taxing 
state (in this case, Utah) based on such 
factors as the percentage of the railroad's 
total trackage that runs through the taxing 
state The parties also agree on the per* 
centage of the total value of each railroad's 
property that should be allocated to Utah 
See infra note 47 and accompanying text, 
lr at 13-14 Finally, the parties agree in 
principle on the three standard methods for 
valuing a railroad the cost approach, the 
income approach and the stock and debt 
approach It is in applying the three Stan 
dard approaches to reach a conclusion as to 
true market value that the parties part 
ways 
A Overview of Valuation Approaches 
At the risk of oversimplification,* the 
court can summarize the three basic ap-
proaches as follows 
on a new appraisal placing the true market 
value at $320 million 
8 The results of the various appraisals are sum 
marued in appendix A 
9 Cf Louis L Jaffe Was Brandos an Activist? 
The Search for Intermediate Premises 80 Harv 
I Rev 986 991 (1967) ( It is of course one of 
the risks of subjecting complex controversies to 
judicial determination that the rules evolved 
compel arbitrary simplification ) 
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The Cost Approach. The coat approach 
values a railroad based on historical 
costa—that is, how much it actually coat to 
produce the assets initially. From histori-
cal cost is deducted accumulated deprecia-
tion to get net book value. Then, from net 
book value an amount is de<' t to reflect 
obsolescence The final figure is the cost 
indicator of value. All the parties agree 
that the cost indicator is the least accurate 
indicator of true market value.19 
The Stork and Debt Approach. The 
stock and debt approach is a substitute 
market approach. Because of the infre-
quent sales of railroad properties, the ab-
sence of an organized market for such 
properties and the lack of accurate, current 
information about sales of railroad proper-
ties as such, appraisers must look to a 
substitute source for accurate information. 
There is an organized market for the pur-
chase and sale of fractional ownership in-
terests in railroad properties; shares or 
ownership interests in debt, bonds and such 
are bought and sold with some regularity. 
A specialist in dealing with such shares on 
an organized exchange "makes a market" 
for them. He offers to buy. He offers to 
|-rj sell He can thus respond to offers to buy 
I and sell. An appraiser uses such market 
**" information as some indication of value. 
Those who use such data assume that 
the "market" has depth as of a particular 
moment in time and that multiplying the 
market value of the fractional share by the 
number of outstanding shares will produce 
a figure equal to the whole market value, 
which, when added to outstanding debt, 
will produce an approximation of true mar-
ket value of company assets subject to ad 
valorem taxation. The argument is that 
the whole is equal to the sum of its parts, a 
conservative position, one could argue, in 
today's era of leveraged buyouts. It does 
not factor in the element of control or the 
break-up value frequently perceived by 
some to be hidden in the assets of a target 
company 
10. Although he calculates a cost indicator of 
value, Dr Schoenwald gives it no weight in 
determining the final value of the railroads 
Often the outstanding shares of a rail-
road ar*» held in their entirety by a holding 
complin) The organized market to which 
an appraiser looks for data ia in the shares 
of the holding company—not in the shares 
of the railroad. Thus, the data to which 
the appraiser looks for an indication of 
value is two steps removed from the actual 
assets appraised. The appraiser must de-
termine in some appropriate fashion what 
fraction of the market value attributed to 
the shares of the holding company is repre-
sented by the holding company's owner-
ship, through its railroad subsidiary, of 
railroad assets. 
In applying the stock-and debt approach, 
there is relatively little disagreement 
among the parties as to the value of the 
plaintiff companies' debt. See, e.g., Tr. at 
1243. The main disagreement is over the 
companies' equity value and specifically 
over how to determine what portion of the 
holding company's gross equity is attribut-
able to railroad property. 
The state of Utah uses basically two 
approaches for attributing a portion of the 
holding company's equity to the railroad. 
Both use various multipliers. In the first 
approach, the state compares the subject 
railroad to other railroads in the industry. 
It calculates an industry multiplier based 
on the ratio of various railroads' stock 
prices to their cash flows and earnings. It 
then applies those price/cash flow and 
price/earnings ratios or multipliers to the 
subject railroad's cash flow and earnings to 
get estimates of the value of the railroad's 
stock. In its second approach, the state 
compares the subject railroad to its holding 
company. The state calculates multipliers 
based on the ratio of the railroad's net 
profit, revenues, income and assets to the 
holding company's net profit, revenues, in-
come and assets and applies the multipliers 
to the company's total equity value to de-
termine the equity value of the railroad 
See, e.g., common ex 32 at S/2. 
On the other hand, Dr. Schoenwald, the 
railroads' expert, calculates the equity val-
Thc other appraisers give it some weight but 
less than they give the other indicators of value 
ue of each of the nonrail assets of the 
holding company and deducts those values 
from the holding company's total equity 
value. What's left over, he concludes, is 
the equity value of the railroad. 
The Income Approach. The theory be-
hind the income approach is that anyone 
who buys a railroad buys it only for the 
income the railroad will generate The ba 
sic principle is that the present value of a 
company is equal to the value of all future 
benefits to be derived from ownership of 
the company, discounted to their present 
value (expressed in dollars) Since the fu 
ture benefits to be derived from ownership 
of a company are simply the income one 
can expect to receive from the company, 
the income approach tries to project the 
income from the railroad's operations over 
a period of time and then places a present 
value on that income n The present value 
of future income is expressed by the fol 
lowing formula: 
v
° - (i / D1 + (l »2 v * 4 n~rV 
where V0 is the value at time zero, I) is the 
income for year 1, and i is an interest rate 
or discount rate. 
Obviously, this basic valuation formula is 
almost impossible to apply accurately be-
cause one can't know precisely the value of 
all the variables It is impossible to predict 
11. The court uses the term "income" loosely 
More precisely, what the appraiser tries to value 
is net cash flow, which Dr Schoenwald defined 
as net operating income plus depreciation and 
deferred income taxes (where applicable) less 
capital expenditures See pltffs' ex 73 Be 
cause capital expenditures for railroads in re 
cent years have generally exceeded depreciation 
and deferred taxes, Dr Schoenwald has used 
net railroad operating income (NROI)—which 
he characterizes as a "generous" measure of net 
cash flows—as his income stream to capitalize 
12. All of the experts also basically agree on 
another variation of the basic model, the divi 
dend model See, eg, pltffs' ex 54, Tr at 
108S-69 The dividend model uses dividends 
paid out in year 1 as the income to be capital 
ized and is expressed by the following equation 
accurately the income for each future year 
for the life of the railroad, to know how 
long the railroad will continue to produce 
income and to predict the appropriate inter-
est rate for future years. Thus, each of 
the appraisers in this case simplifies the 
basic formula based on certain assump-
tions 
All the experts essentially agree on at 
least one simplification of the basic formu-
la, namely, 
V - S & 
where CF| represents the net cash flow in 
period 1, k represents the cost of capital, 
and g represents the growth rate See 
pltffs' ex 358 (Dr Schoenwald), Tr at 
1088 (Dr Ifflander) & 1455 (Dr Pettit) " 
This approach to income valuation, which 
tries to estimate future cash flows over a 
period of time and discount them to their 
present value, is called yield capitalization 
or a "discounted cash flow" (DCF) model 
and is widely used (in one form or another) 
by appraisers and financial analysts to val-
ue income-producing property. See, eg., 
Tr at 1348-49 (testimony of Dr Ifflander), 
1491 (testimony of Dr Pettit), 1728 (testi-
mony of Mr Van Drimmelen, a real estate 
appraiser), 2077 (testimony of Mr Fitzger-
ald) »» 
where Dj is the dividends at year 1 and g is the 
growth rate 
The basic formula was also sometimes recast 
to include another variable, b, which represents 
the percentage of the firm's earnings that it 
retains to reinvest 
Vn -
 E|(»-b> 
<> - k-t 
where E{ is the earnings in period I SeeTr at 
I4S5, intervenors' ex 6 
13 Mr Goodwin and Dr Ifflander used (or mis 
used, from the plaintiffs' perspective) a standard 
yield capitalization or DCF model for their ap-
praisal of UP for 1984, in which they projected 
the railroad s cash flows for the next five years, 
discounted them to present value and added a 
terminal value, representing the present value 
of all the cash flows after the five year period 
See common ex 31 at 76-102 For all of the 
years in question, they also use a direct capitali 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
550 716 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
The standard simplifications of the basic 
formula used in a yield capitalization model 
assume that k, g and b (the retention rate, 
see supra note 12) are constant and are all 
equally influenced by inflation They also 
assume that the growth rate, g, is equal to 
b times r, the marginal rate of return on 
new investment See Tr at 1455 
The plaintiffs' appraiser, Or Schoen 
wald on the other hand, starts from the 
basic formula but makes a different as 
sumption, namely, that r (the rate of return 
on new investment) equals k (the cost of 
capital) Using this assumption, he simpli 
fies the basic formula to 
where NCF, is the net cash flow for year 
1 u In essence, he has eliminated growth 
from the equation He is able to do this 
because, given his assumption that r equals 
k, any growth in the company's future 
earnings is merely expansion growth and 
not real growth, thus, according to the 
witness it does not add anything to present 
value " Hence, Or Ifflander has called 
l)r Schoenwald s income valuation model 
an expansion model, a term the court will 
use at times to distinguish it from the 
standard yield capitalization model AI 
though Dr Schoenwald's model is in theory 
zalion method simitar lo the stale* See infra 
p 550 
14 Di Schoenwald further assumes thai net rail 
road operating income (NROl) is a generous 
estimate of net cash flow, see supra note II, so 
he substitutes NROl for NCI- in the equation 
For his projected net railroad operating income 
for year 1 he uses an average of the railroads 
NROl for the five previous years 
15 According to Dr Schoenwald a company 
may grow through new additional investment 
but if the returns on new investment are not 
greater than the cost of capital—that is, if the 
cost of the growth offsets any gain from the new 
investment—then there is no actual or net 
growth Net growth occurs when the company 
earns nioic than the cost of its additional capi 
tal and only net growth—as opposed to gross or 
expansion giowlli—increases net present value 
A company that only c a m s its cost ol capital 
may grow and that growth may make the com 
pany worth more five years down the road but 
that futuie growth adds nothing to the compa 
a yield capitalization model, it proceeds 
from a very different assumption than the 
standard yield capitalization models de-
scribed by the other experts •• 
The state uses another method to value 
the railroads based on their projected in 
come, called direct capitalization In the 
direct capitalization method, the appraiser 
determines a company's value by multiply 
ing its accounting earnings by a price/earn 
ings ratio or by dividing the earnings by 
the earnings/price ratio The ratios are 
derived from stock market data for compa 
rable companies 
Under the state's direct capitalization 
method, value at time zero (V0) is equal to 
earnings for time 1 (E,) divided by the 
earnings pnee ratio (E/P), or, expressing 
the relationship algebraically, 
V
°
 = E 7 t 
Although not directly derived from the 
basic valuation formula,17 the direct capital 
ization method proceeds from the assump-
tion that the price of a company's stock will 
represent the consensus of investors' opin 
ions about a company s future cash flows, 
cost of capital and growth prospects In 
other words, it uses the stock market as 
the best evidence of willing buyers' and 
sellers' opinions of value, which presum 
ny s value today because it will cost the compa 
ny as much as it will add lo its value in the 
future See Tr at 33-39. pltffs ex 54 
16 The court has spared the reader the mathe 
malical manipulations by which one gets f iom 
one formula to another Suffice it to say that 
the various formulae appear to be mathematt 
cally correct and internally consistent if one 
accepts the underlying assumptions It is a sim 
pic matter of applying mathematical principles 
to the basic formula In making that applica 
lion however one should bear in mind Robert 
l lei lbroners observation that (m]alhematics 
has given economics rigor but alas also mor 
lis The simplified formulae are no better than 
the basic formula and the experts assumptions 
17 While recognizing that ditect capitalization is 
not merely a variation of the yield capitalization 
model by making certain assumptions Dr if 
llander showed how one might conclude that 
Dr Schoenwald s expansion model also uses an 
earnings/price ratio for us capitalization rate 
(k) See Tr at 1107-09 
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ibly are based on their own yield capitaliza 
Lion analyses 
For its earnings figure, the state uses a 
five year weighted average of the rail 
road's net operating income, adjusted for 
inflation, in which income for more recent 
years is weighted more heavily than income 
for earlier years 
Obviously, the two basic questions in ap-
plying the income approach are, How do 
you define the income stream to be capital 
ized7 and What capitalization rate do you 
use7 Although the parties disagree some-
what about what constitutes the proper 
income stream to capitalize, their most fun 
damental disagreement is over the capitali 
zation rate As one can see from the basic 
valuation formulae, since the capitalization 
rate is a fraction that appears in the de-
nominator, a small change in the capitaliza 
tion rate can produce a big difference in 
computed value '• 
The plaintiffs argue that the state's capi 
tahzation rates, which vary from 8 28 to 
11 98 percent, see appendix A, are clearly 
wrong since all the experts agreed that the 
driving force behind the capitalization rate, 
however expressed, namely, the cost of 
capital (debt and equity), was no less than 
13 percent and closer to 15 percent during 
the relevant periods See, e g, intervenors' 
exs la through Id at 2 However, that 
argument overlooks the fundamental dif 
ferences between yield capitalization and 
direct capitalization The capitalization 
rate for yield capitalization is based direct-
ly on k, the cost of capital, and therefore 
should be on the order of 15 percent The 
capitalization rate for direct capitalization, 
on the other hand, is based on price-earn 
ings ratios taken from stock market data 
It is not based directly on the cost of capi 
tal Because there is no direct relationship 
18. For example Dr Schoenwald calculated an 
income indicator of value for UP for 1984 of 
$2 198 981 000 based on earnings of $338 643 
000 and a capitalization rate of 15 4H See 
common ex 30 & 33 al 89 Lowering the capi 
talization rate just 1%, to 14 4% increases the 
value of UP by almost 7H to $2 351 687 500 
19 Were the court to undertake its own indc 
pendent appraisal its choice of methods would 
enjoy undue sanction and the application of its 
between the cost of capital and P/E or E/P 
ratios, the fact that a direct cap rate or 
E/P ratio may be less than the coat of 
capital (k) is of no moment Although 
there was wide disagreement among the 
experts about the price-earnings ratios to 
be used and their importance in the pro-
cess the evidence suggested that the state 
values were well within the very broad 
range of possible ratios Thus, the plain 
tiffs' argument has merit only if the state 
was required to use a yield capitalization 
method as opposed to a direct capitalization 
method in arriving at an approximation of 
value 
B Choice of Method 
The parties do not disagree so much over 
the proper application of each other's meth 
odology as they do over the choice of meth 
od in the first place 
Technically, methodology is not the issue 
in this case—discrimination is But die 
crimination under the 4R Act must be mea 
sured in terms of "true market value"—the 
congressionally mandated measure—and 
one's conclusion as to true market value 
depends on the path one takes to reach the 
conclusion 
One problem with subjecting complex is 
sues like valuation to judicial determination 
is that the court generally must choose 
among the competing claims of experts 
Unless the court performs its own apprais 
al—a task it is not inclined to under-
take lf—the court must hold either for the 
plaintiff or the defendant, when often the 
truth—or at least a more exact picture of 
reality—lies somewhere in between The 
court, of course, may adjust an expert's 
appraisal up or down baaed on other ex 
perts' critiques of the appraisal," but the 
starting point for judicial determination is 
methods would be subject to many of the same 
types of criticisms that the parties appraisals 
are subject to but without the same opportunity 
the parties have had to critique each others 
appraisals 
20 The courts task is complicated by the fact 
that often as here the experts themselves can 
not always agree whether the appraisals were 
properly performed or not 
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always one appraisal or another, and each 
appraisal is based on a particular method-
ology that, to a large extent, predetermines 
the result Thus, implicit in the court's 
holding is a decision as to method 
For example, if the court were to hold 
for the plaintiff and accept Dr Schoen-
wald's valuations, it would in effect be 
saying that Dr Schoenwald's methodology 
produces the correct result, and any meth 
odology that produces a different result 
must be wrong Given that hypothetical 
premise, it naturally follows that, if the 
state must tax the plaintiffs in proportion 
to their true market value, which it must 
under the 4R Act, then the state should 
apply Dr Schoenwald's methodology in va 
luing the railroads, since that is the only 
methodology that will consistently produce 
the right result31 
Thus, although the plaintiffs argue that 
the court need not dictate to the state a 
particular methodology, some choice of 
methodology is inescapable The court's 
decision on valuation must recognize (at 
least implicitly) one valuation method at the 
expense of other methods That in no 
sense determines that one is right and the 
others are wrong 
The defendants suggest that the court 
should simply defer to their current choice 
of methodology However, the plaintiffs 
were initially assessed based on a method-
ology that even the state now concedes was 
flawed The question, then, is whether the 
state's new appraisals, based on a new 
methodology, are entitled to the same def 
erence 
The plaintiffs argue that they are not ** 
They argue that the court should determine 
the valuation question based on which 
method it finds the most reasonable They 
further contend that Dr Schoenwald s val 
21 None of the experts in this case suggest that 
all roads lead to Rome Rather the testimony 
was that two different methods will pioduce the 
same result only by coincidence As one can 
see from appendix A the varying methods the 
three sets of appraisers used produced widely 
varying results 
22 The plaintiffs suggest that if anything the 
state should have the burden of proving the 
validity of its new appraisals See infra note 29 
uation method is more reasonable than the 
state's, best reflects reality and leads to 
the actual or correct true market value 
The evidence suggested that yield capi-
talization is generally preferred to direct 
capitalization because it is directly denved 
from basic value theory, is more sophis-
ticated than direct capitalization and gener-
ally produces a better result However, 
the evidence also showed that both ap-
proaches were widely used to value rail 
roads and other properties The question, 
then, 18 whether the state is free to choose 
among accepted valuation methods or 
whether the 4R Act compels the use of one 
particular method 
[1] In the Burlington Northern case 
the Supreme Court expressly left open the 
question "whether a railroad may, in an 
action under [the 4R Act], challenge in the 
district court the appropriateness of the 
accounting methods by which the State de 
termtned the railroad's value, or is instead 
restricted to challenging the factual deter 
minations to which the State's preferred 
accounting methods were applied " Bur-
lington N RR Co v Oklahoma Tax 
Comm'n, 481 U S 454, 107 S Ct 1855, 1861 
n 5, 95 L Ed 2d 404 (1987) Although the 
question may be an open one, this court 
has found nothing in the 4R Act itself or in 
its legislative history that requires this 
court to make the state apply a particular 
valuation methodology 
Indeed, the legislative history of the 4R 
Act suggests just the opposite The com 
mittee report on Senate Bill 927, one of 
several precursors to the 4R Act,1' stated 
that the bill 
does not suggest or require a State to 
change its assessment standards, assess 
ment practices, or the assessments them 
23 It n well settled that the legislative history of 
precursor* to a statute are relevant in constru 
ing the statute See Burlington Northern Rail 
road Company v Lennen 573 FSupp 1155. 
1160 n 5 (D Kan 1982), affd. 715 F 2d 494 497 
(10th Cir 1983). cert dented. 467 U S 1230-31. 
104 S Ct 2690 81 L Ed 2d 884 (1984). and cases 
cited therein 
UINIUIN f A l i r i l K I U V » 
Cite M 716 F Supp 
selves It merely provides a single stan 
dard against which all affected assess 
ments must be measured in order to de 
termine their relationship to each other 
It is not a standard for determining val 
ue, it is a standard to which values that 
have already been determined must be 
compared 
S Rep No 1483, 90th Cong , 2d Sess app 
B (1968), quoted m Burlington Northern 
Railroad Company v Lennen, 573 
FSupp 1155, 1161 (D Kan 1982) (emphasis 
omitted), affd, 715 F 2d 494 (10th Cir 1983), 
cert denied, 467 US 123a 31, 104 S Ct 
2690, 81 LEd2d 884 (1984)" 
In subsequent legislative proposals Con 
gress reaffirmed its position that it did not 
intend to dictate state valuation methods 
See Unnen, 573 FSupp at 1163-^4 For 
example, in hearings on House Bill 16245. 
another forerunner of the 4R Act, Philip M 
learner, a railroad representative, testified 
that the bill "would not deal with valuation 
being standard The standards and meth 
ods of valuation that any State wishes to 
use would be totally unaffected by this 
legislation " Hearing Before the Subcom 
mittee on Transportation and Aeronautics 
of the Committee on Interstate and For 
eign Commerce on H R 16245, 91st Cong , 
1st Sess 138 (1970), quoted in 573 FSupp 
at 1163 (emphasis omitted) Thus, the leg 
islative history suggests that the statute 
was not meant to dictate a state's choice of 
methodology, at least as long as the meth 
odology chosen had a rational basis and 
24 The quoted passage from appendix B to Sen 
ate Report 1483 appears to have been taken 
from the testimony of James N Ogden Vice-
President and General Counsel of the Gulf Mo-
bile and Ohio Railioad Company during hear 
ings on Senate Rill 927 See Burlington North 
em, 573 FSupp at 1161-62 
29 To the extent lennen coin hided from the 
legislative history thai the whole valuation ques 
lion was essentially off limits to federal courts 
see 573 h Supp at 1164 ( the issue of the appro 
priate irue market value of a railroad is genrr 
ally not to be an issue in a Section 306 case ) it 
has since been overruled See Burlington N 
R R to v Oklahoma Tax Commn 481 U S 
454 107 SCt 1855 95 I Ed 2d 404 (1987) 
However this court agrees with Judge Rogers s 
conclusion that Congress did not intend for the 
federal couits to become involved in establish 
IAIIU I A A IUI*1 W U r L I A H Qftj 
S4J (D Uuh 1988) 
was not chosen for a discriminatory pur 
pose M 
The plaintiffs argue, however, that the 
statute itself requires this court to choose 
the correct valuation method from among 
the competing methods They argue that 
the statute requires the court to determine 
their "true market value" and that the only 
way the court can do that is by determining 
which method gives the "true" true market 
value That method is the one that is most 
reasonable and most accurate and hence 
arrives at the most correct result They 
further argue that Dr Schoenwald's meth-
odology and data are the most reasonable 
and most accurate and can be applied most 
consistently and hence give the best mdica 
tion of true market value See Tr at 1151-
52 
The court declines the plaintiffs' invita 
tion to adopt Dr Schoenwald's method 
ology as the only correct methodology for 
determining true market value 
Each expert asserts that his method 
ology results in a value that most closely 
corresponds to reality However, absent a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, there is 
no absolute way to test the assertions of 
competing valuations or competing claims 
of correspondence to "true market value," 
if such a thing exists in the order of things 
From the beginning of this case, the 
court was willing to assume that there was 
such a thing as "true market value" that 
could be determined objectively from evi 
dence much the same way a court can 
ing procedures for the stales in the valuing 
of railroads 573 F S u p p at 1164 It is one 
thing to say that the 4R Act allows federal 
courts to review railroads claims of overvalua 
tion It is quite another to say that the Act 
dictates a stale s choice of valuation methods 
The 4R Act may provide relief if a state over 
values a railroad by misapplying its chosen 
methodology or by using a methodology that 
has no rational basis or is chosen for the pur 
pose of overvaluing railroads See, eg Burling 
ton N 107 SCt at 1859 (the railroads only 
claim of discriminatory taxation was that the 
state had misapplied its own valuation method 
ology) But this court believes the Act does 
not necessarily provide relief just because the 
slate s chosen methodology results in higher val 
ues than some other method the state could 
have chosen 
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determine a wrongfully discharged employ- various estimates and calculations, small 
ee's back wages from evidence See Un- variations in any of which may lead to 
ton Pac R R Co v State Tax Cotnm 'n, large differences in value See, e g, supra 
686 F Supp 1060, 1067 at n 10 (D Utah note 18 Absent evidence of an actual sale, 
1986) Indeed, the approach of the 4R Act the term "true market value" is at best a 
presupposes that, like Plato's ideal, there is rational fiction Conclusions as to true 
in fact a "true market value," that it exists, market value are based on each appraiser's 
that it can be pointed to, pictured, recog- beat judgment, and each appraiser ap-
nized and can be used as the standard proaches the task of valuation a little dif-
against which valuation figures may be ferently, with his own assumptions and the-
compared Success in valuation would be ones as to what mythical buyers and sell-
indicated by the correspondence of the val- era consider (or should consider) in arriving 
uation figures with the ideal at an agreed-on price Perhaps Clifford 
From the six weeks of testimony in this FiUgerald, a corporate finance expert who 
case, however, certain things became ap- testified on behalf of the plaintiffs, said it 
parent First, valuation is an art, not a best "There is not one universal concept 
science It is a function of judgment, not of value " Tr at 2006 Nor is there "any 
of natural law Try as it might, even Con- one perfectly correct method " Id. at 
gress is incapable of enacting either a natu 2110-11 See also id at 1718 (testimony of 
ral law of the market or Plato's ideal Mr Voytko that there is no standard ap-
"True market value," then, must needs proach to value) 
mean something else Absent a miracle of Mr Goodwin described Dr Schoenwald's 
time, place and circumstance—willing buy methodology as "assumption driven " The 
er, willing seller, high noon, January 1, epithet was apparently meant disparaging 
1984, for example—true market value for | y a nd w a g contrasted with his own meth 
purposes of ad valorem taxation is always <,&*, which, he claimed, were "market dnv 
an estimate, always an expression of judg
 e n » | n t r u t h | however, each appraiser's 
ment, always a result built on a foundation methodology is assumption driven u The 
of suppositions about knowledgeable and assumption may be r equals k or that 
willing buyers and sellers endowed with
 K r o w t n m constant, or the assumption may 
money and desire, whose desires are said to ^
 t h | | t l n e p r l c e o f tt company's stock is 
converge in a dollar description of the as
 t h e ^ s t indicator of the value of IU asset* 
set All of this is simply a sophisticated (Pre8umably that is what Mr Goodwin 
effort at "let's pretend ' or "modeling," in
 m e a n t w h e n h e 8 a i d h | g m o d e | w a 8 - m a r ket 
modern jargon, and all of it involves judg
 d r | v e n »} T h e , a t t e r ^gumption, of course, 
ment Not natural law, not science-judg
 m a y oversimplify matters by not account 
m e n t
 ing for the effect of other variables on the 
The appraisals in this case generally ton stock market—economic and otherwise 
tain two or three estimates of value, which, (perhaps even including the conference of 
within the same appraisal, may vary by as the Super Bowl winner) See, e g, Tr at 
much as 100 percent or more See, eg, 1337-39, 1421 (testimony of Dr Ifflander 
common ex 30 & 34 at 75 & 83, see also that stock market prices do not always 
appendix A Thus, the same appraiser may accurately reflect value), id at 1607-10 
come to vastly different conclusions as to (Dr Pettit's attempt to explain the stock 
the value of the same railroad for the same market crash of 1987 based on various 
assessment date, depending on the method factors unrelated to a company s true mar 
he uses Moreover, each method requires ket value)" 
26 The court is reminded of the old story of the 
economist maiooncd with a companion on a 
deserl island A (an of food washed up on I he 
beach The economists starving companion 
asked him how they could open the can lo 
which the economist blithely replied Assume a 
can openei 
27 The vagai les of the stock market once 
prompted a member of the Council of kconom 
ic Advisors to suggest that maiket behavior 
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[2] From all the evidence presented it is 
clear that there is more than one way to 
value a railroad See, eg, Tr at 1718, 
2110-11 Each method may represent 
what some buyers and sellers actually do ** 
All the methods may be equally rational 
given their underlying assumptions And 
they are all irrational if pressed to ex 
tremes For example, using the income 
approach, one would be forced to conclude 
that a company with a net loss for the year 
or over a period of years actually had a 
negative value—a skewed and discordant 
picture of reality See, eg,Tr at 2201-03 
Or, using the stock and debt approach, one 
might be forced to conclude that over 20 
percent of the value of a company evapo-
rated in the few short hours between the 
opening and closing of the New York Stock 
Exchange on October 19, 1987, despite the 
fact that the company's functioning assets 
remained virtually unchanged over that pe 
nod Each method or theory depends on 
certain assumptions that cannot ultimately 
be proved or disproved by reason alone nor 
replicated in experience Thus, this court 
cannot say that any one method is neces 
sanly more rational than any other Nor 
can the court say that one method alone 
arrives at the railroad's "true market val 
ue" Rather, the evidence suggests that 
the term "true market value" "is a judg 
ment not subject to mathematical precision 
that is based on a wide variety of factors" 
and "is at best an approximation " Rio 
Algom Corp v San Juan County, 681 
could be explained not so much by market 
analysis but by psychoanalysis 
28. Indeed, perhaps the best evidence of the rail 
roads true market value is not any single ap-
praisal but assuming that each appraiser has 
performed his work accurately and in good 
faith the average of all the appraisers judg 
ments concerning true market value 
29 In a 4R Act case "the burden of proof with 
respect to the determination of assessed value 
and true market value shall be that declared by 
the applicable State law Pub 1 No 94-210 
| 306(2)(d) 90 Stat at 55 (1976) The plaintiffs 
argue that the burden of proof should be on the 
state to prove its assessment is correct They 
cite the court to no authority for this proposi 
tion Rather they argue that under Utah law 
once it is shown that a states assessment is 
wrong the burden shifts to the stale to prove 
P 2d 184, 192 (Utah 1984) From all the 
evidence in this case, the court cannot say 
that the state's judgment as to the plain-
tiffs' true market value is wrong" 
The state suggests that its methods have 
the advantage that they are used consist-
ently to value all centrally assessed proper-
ty, so if the method produces any error in 
valuations, the effect is not to discriminate 
against the railroad Presumably, if appli-
cation of the same method overvalues or 
undervalues all commercial and industrial 
property in the state equally, there is no 
discrimination against railroads However, 
the state concedes that it did not treat all 
centrally assessed property equally for the 
assessment years in question For 1984 
and 1985 it assessed all centrally assessed 
property using its discarded methodology 
If one of the 350 centrally assessed proper-
ty owners appealed, the state prepared a 
new assessment based on its new method 
ology, as it did in this case Thus, the state 
did not treat all centrally assessed property 
equally in 1984 and 1985 
Moreover, even if the state did treat all 
centrally assessed property equally (as it 
claims to do now), it may still have violated 
the 4R Act if its uniform method has the 
effect of overvaluing railroads It is no 
defense under the 4R Act "to say that the 
state may also be discriminating against 
other companies " Louisville St Nash-
ville RR Co v Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 
498 FSupp 418, 422 ( M D U 1980)M 
that its new assessment is correct and they 
note the slate has already admitted its original 
assessments were wrong But see Utah Power e\ 
Light Co v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 590 P 2d 
332 335 (Utah 1979) (if the taxpayer claims 
error in a proceeding before the lax commis-
sion "it has an obligation not only to show 
substantial error or impropiicty in the assess-
ment but also to provide a sound evidentiary 
basis upon which the Commission could adopt a 
tower valuation ) (citations omitted) Even as-
suming that the plaintiffs argument is correct, 
given the court s decision that the state was free 
to adopt the method of its choice the court 
concludes that the state has met the burden of 
proving the correctness of its new assessments 
by a preponderance of the evidence 
30 Although it may not be a defense to say that 
all centrally assessed properties are overvalued 
as a result of the states choice of methodology 
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Nevertheless, the state's argument may 
have some force If the court were to 
require the state to use Dr Schoenwald's 
valuation methods, the state would have to 
apply the methods to all centrally assessed 
property so that the discriminatory effect 
of the state's valuations could be properly 
measured The court has found no evi 
dence that Congress intended the 4R Act to 
dictate how a state must value non railroad 
property If, as it appears from the record, 
all centrally assessed properties are now 
appraised using the methods the state used 
in its current appraisals of the plaintiff 
railroads, that may be reason to give those 
appraisals greater weight 
But the court believes that it should not 
disturb the state's choice of methodology 
for other reasons as well Prom the testi-
mony of the state's witnesses, the court 
concludes that the state's appraisers sin 
cerely seek to arrive at what t*.ey consider 
to be the railroads' true market value and 
that, to that end, they constantly reevalu 
ate their methods and change them when 
they become convinced that they are 
wrong *' The state's witnesses also testi 
fied that appraisal methods and philosophy 
are continually changing, presumably for 
if in fact they are it is likely thai i»>geiher all the 
owners of centrally assessed properly will have 
sufficient political power to force the state to 
change its valuation methods After all it is not 
every property owner that can achieve benefi 
cial legislation such as the 4R Act As Auberon 
Herbert once observed "It is the small owner 
who offers the only really profitable and red 
able material for taxation He is made for 
taxation fHje has less skill and ingenuity 
as regards escape, and he still has a large sup-
ply of ignorant patience of taxation '" Quoted 
tn F Coffield A Popular History of Taxation, 
quoted m A Dictionary of ijegal Quotations 165 
(S James L C Stebbings comp 1987) The 
court however does not base its conclusions as 
to discrimination on the states relative treat 
ment of centrally assessed properties but on its 
conclusion as to the railroads true market val 
ue 
91 Indeed of all the appraisers in this case the 
court was most impressed with the credibility of 
the slate appraiser Mr Prawilt and of his su 
per visor Mr Monson Of all the appraisers 
Mr Piawttl seemed the only one who was not 
out to achieve a particular predetermined re 
suit Indeed he testified that he prepared his 
appraisals without even looking at the states 
the better, and that they try to keep cur-
rent on new developments in the field with-
out regard for the source, that is, whether 
the developments be from other state ap-
praisers or from industry experts Were 
this court to conclude that the 4R Act 
codified the Schoenwald method of valua 
tion, it would prevent states from critically 
examining their appraisal methods and 
would discourage them from adopting new 
and better methods as they become accept-
ed by the appraisal profession 
For all of these reasons, the court con 
eludes that the 4R Act no more enacts the 
Schoenwald method of valuation than the 
fourteenth amendment enacts Herbert 
Spencer's "Social Statics " Cf Lochner v 
New York, 198 U S 45, 75, 25 S Ct 539, 
546, 49 LEd 987 (1905) (Holmes, J , dis 
Renting) 
(3) All parties must remember that the 
purpose of producing a figure as to value, 
whether we label it "fair cash value" or 
"true market value," is to provide a figure 
against which one may then apply the tax 
percentage to arrive at what is due and 
owing by the taxpayer to the taxing unit 
If one has a choice of methods and chooses 
a method with a rational footing and is 
earlier appraisals so that the earlier appraisals 
would not affect his conclusions The other 
experts all had a theory to defend, which col 
ored their choice of data and methods Each 
appraisal required the appraisers to make nu 
merous judgments, but the other appraisers of 
ten seemed to base their judgments on the end 
result using a technique or methodology if it 
tended to support the desired result and chang 
ing it when convenient For example the plain 
tiffs criticized the states witnesses for using 
average P/Es , arguing that a mechanical com 
putation of averages ignored the factors that 
went into an informed judgment See, eg Tr 
at 1661-43 Yet they then turned around and 
argued that their true market value should be 
determined by mechanically computing the av 
erage of Dr Schoenwald s income and stock and 
debt indicators of value (ignoring the cost indi 
cator altogether) when the disparity between 
Dr Schoenwald s income and stock and-debt in 
dicators was so great as to make one or the 
other suspect without even comparing Dr Scho 
enwald s figures with the oilier appiaisers See 
eg Tr at !M1 None of the appraisers may 
have been perfectly consistent but Mr Prawiit 
seemed most concerned with discoveiing an ob 
jective value and least committed to a particular 
theory or methodology 
UNION P A t l r l t & t O. v. b 
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consistent and evenhanded in applying the 
method to all comparable properties, then 
conceptually the end result should be pay 
ment by taxpayers of a tax bill that is not 
disproportionate to the like payments of all 
other comparable taxpayers The court 
holds that, as long as the state's method 
ology has a rational basis and was not 
chosen for a discriminatory purpose, the 
court will not disturb that choice The 
court concludes from all the evidence that 
the state's methodology has a rational ba 
sis and was not chosen with the intent of 
overvaluing railroads Thus, it will not 
second guess the state's choice of method 
Even if the court were forced to choose 
among the competing methodologies, the 
court believes that the state's methodology 
has much to commend it Not only does 
the state consistently use essentially the 
same approach for all centrally assessed 
property, but also its approach is based on 
historical data and market data readily 
available both to investors and to the 
state " Moreover, it is easy to apply—an 
important consideration given the state's 
limited resources and the tremendous time 
pressures under which the state's apprais 
als must be prepared See, e g, Tr at 339 
& 402 For example, although a yield capi 
tahzation model is more elegant and might 
be preferred to a direct capitalization mod 
el, Mr Fitzgerald, one of the plaintiffs' 
experts, testified that it took him two and 
one-half years, working full time, to value 
seven railroads, an average of over four 
months for each See id at 2068 The 
state simply does not have that luxury 
Given its time constraints, it may legit 
imately choose an approach that is easier to 
apply than a more precise but more com 
plex model 
In many respects, the state's method 
ology is closer to Dr Schoenwald's than is 
32. For example unlike Messieurs Goodwin and 
Ifflander who place much weight—possibly too 
much—on the company • projections for (he 
coming year gleaned in part from internal com 
pany documents not available to the public gen 
erallv the stale uses the weighted average of (lie 
five previous years income to determine the 
railroads piojected income in its income ap 
proach 
! A » k IAA COi»lw Of U I A H ^ 
94J (D UCafc 19*8) 
Messieurs Goodwin and lfflander's For 
example, both the state and Dr Schoen 
wald use a five year average of NROI as 
the basis for their income calculations, 
whereas Mr Goodwin and Dr Ifflander 
use projections based on strategic plans 
known more for their inspirational value 
than for their prediction value and on a 
form of regression analysis discredited by 
the plaintiffs' Htatistical expert Both the 
state and Dr Schoenwald use the full debt 
rate in determining the cost of debt, where-
as Mr Goodwin and Dr Ifflander use what 
they call current yield Both the state and 
Dr Schoenwald treat current assets and 
current liabilities in their stock and debt ap-
proach, Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander 
do not Both the state and Dr Schoenwald 
allocate both debt and equity to the rail 
road Mr Goodwin and Dr Ifflander allo-
cate only equity And in the cost approach 
both the state and Dr Schoenwald purport 
to measure obsolescence based on the en 
tire railroad industry, the other appraisers 
do not See generally id at 1898-1913 
(Dr Schoenwald's summary of the basic 
differences among the three approaches) 
Even if the court were inclined to require 
the state to apply yield capitalization rather 
than direct capitalization, however, the 
court would not require it to apply the 
Schoenwald method of yield capitalization 
(that is, the expansion model) The Schoen 
wald method is based on a critical assump-
tion, namely, that r equals k The assump-
tion is problematic at best It was debated 
at length during the course of the trial 
Needless to say, there was no consensus 
among the experts (who included several 
Ph Ds in finance) about the reasonableness 
of the assumption The experts vigorously 
disputed the issue, predictably aligning 
themselves according to the party on 
whose behalf they were called to testify M 
33 The opinions of some of the experts as to 
whether or not r is greater than k appeared to 
depend to some extent on their opinion about 
the prospects of the railroad industry At times 
il seemed the experts were testifying about two 
different industries In Dr Schoenwald s view 
the railroads have been in decline sinte at least 
ihe 1920s and can never expect to earn a rate of 
return even equal to the cost of capital In fact 
it is a wonder that they are still in business On 
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Without deciding the reasonableness of the 
assumption, the court can at least say that 
the assumption would appear to be less 
than self-evident and not whole heartedly 
accepted in the finance community, judging 
from the expert testimony 
Dr Schoenwald attempted to prove the 
validity of his assumption by showing that 
historically the railroads have failed to earn 
a return commensurate with the cost of 
capital See pltffs' ex 95(a) (Said exhibit 
is annexed to this opinion as appendix B) 
In exhibit 95(a) Dr Schoenwald calculated 
a value for UP using his expansion model 
based on UP's average NROI for the pen 
od 1950-54 Using his expansion model, he 
valued the railroad at $581,514,000 He 
then did a more traditional yield capitaliza 
tion analysis for the period 1955-84, dis 
counting the actual net cash flows for 
those years based on the actual discount 
rates and adding a terminal value baaed on 
the average NROI for the period 1980-84, 
and concluded that the actual total market 
value of the railroad a net cash flows from 
1955 into perpetuity was only $247,504,000 
Thus he concluded, his model actually 
overvalued UP by more than double, show 
ing the r did not even equal k for UP over 
the last thirty years 
Mister Goodwin and Doctors Ifflander 
and Pettit criticized Dr Schoenwald for 
using actual, historical figures They ar-
gued that the value of the railroad as of 
the other hand in the opinion of Messieurs 
Goodwin and Ifflander the Staggers Act which 
was passed in 1980 ushered in a new Golden 
Age of railroading 
Perhaps there is more than one railroad in 
duscry At least the railroad industry of the late 
1800s was a far different industry from the 
railroad industry of the mid 1900s Thus Ches 
terton could write 
(Wjhcn I was a boy which was just before the 
motor-car burst upon the world 1 never 
dreamed of doubling thai the railway train 
dominated the whole future of the world It 
was the latest great locomotive that man had 
invented To talk as some people arc 
now talking of whether railways will become 
obsolete or whether steam can be superseded 
of whethei i ail way slock will always be as 
safe as it was—all this would have been lo me 
a ptophecy as unintelligible as some of those 
Old Testament visions thai seem a medley of 
wheels and wings and clouds Railways had 
been firmly established before I was born J 
January 1, 1955, depended on what inves 
tors would have been willing to pay for it, 
which in turn would have depended on their 
expectations They further argue that no 
one could have accurately predicted the 
actual numbers, which Dr Schoenwald 
uaes implicit in their argument is that 
investors are overly optimistic and would 
have projected much higher cash flows and 
lower discount rates than actually oc 
curred All Dr Schoenwald tried to show 
was that, had the investors had perfect 
foresight and applied his model, they still 
would have overvalued the railroad From 
this he concludes that his assumption that r 
equals k is a generous assumption 
Nevertheless, it appears to the court's 
untrained eye that exhibit 95(a) is flawed 
ft suffers from one of those classic "mis 
matches" that Dr Schoenwald is fond of 
talking about Dr Schoenwald's expansion 
value is based on a discounted average 
NKOI, yet the yield capitalization approach 
he compares it to is based on discounted 
net cash flows It is apparent from exhibit 
95(a) that NROI is substantially higher 
than net cash flows, especially for the early 
years of the study For example, for the 
period 1955-59, the first five-year period 
for which complete data are available, the 
average NROI is over four times greater 
than the average net cash flow Of course, 
under Dr Schoenwald's expansion model, a 
never dreamed of doubting that they would 
remain exactly the same after I died 
G K Chesterton Corns to Tktnk of h 16-17 
(1931) Yet the railroads did change Chester 
ton lived to see their economic power decline 
Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander would have 
the court believe that if Chesterton had lived 
another fifty years he would have seen the re 
birth of the railroad industry The railroads 
experts on the other hand talk as though the 
railroads will never recover But if thcyve 
changed once they may change again 
Theic was testimony that the railroad indus-
try is a cyclical industry According to Messl 
eurs Goodwin and Ifflander the industry has 
come full circle Perhaps only time will tell 
whether or not they are right In any event the 
court does not have to choose between the com 
peting prognostications The market makes its 
own choice And the state s valuation methods, 
based on the market as they are should reflect 
the market s outlook 
UNION PACIFIC It CO v STATE TAX COMN OF UTAH 5 5 9 
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higher NROI translates into a proportion 
ately higher final value Thus, by using 
NROI for the period 1950-54 to value the 
railroad, Dr Schoenwald arrives at a high 
er value than he would have reached had 
he used net cash flows for the same period 
In other words, Dr Schoenwald concludes 
that his model overvalues the railroad 
based on a comparison of an expansion 
value derived from high NROIs to a yield 
capitalization value derived from relatively 
low net cash flows 
Had Dr Schoenwald compared values 
that were both based on net cash flows or 
both based on NROI, he may have reached 
very different results For example, if one 
were to estimate the average net cash flow 
for the period 1950-64 by dividing NROI 
(Dr Schoenwald's capitalized income 
stream) by four, it would reduce his expan 
sion value accordingly and might turn out 
that his model actually undervalued the 
railroad significantly Unfortunately, ex 
hibit 95(a) omits all the data the court 
needs to make the proper comparison At 
best, however, the court concludes that ex 
hibit 95(a) only supports Dr Schoenwald s 
second assumption—that NROI is a gener 
ous estimate of net cash flow u—and not 
his pnmary assumption, namely that r is no 
greater than k 
Dr Schoenwald also tried to prove his 
assumption that r is no greater than k by 
calculating expected growth rates and com 
paring them to the expected growth that 
the investment publication Value Line, the 
defendants' Bible, projected for the same 
34 In fact exhibit 95(a) c^sls doubt on Dr Scho-
enwald s second assumption as well Dr Scho-
enwald justified his use of NROI as opposed to 
net cash flow on the grounds that NROI is a 
"generous" estimate of net cash flow However 
at least for the years from 1980 to 1984 the 
years that Dr Schoenwald averaged for his 1985 
income estimate net cash flow was greater than 
NROI for UP despite a negative net cash flow 
for 1980 
35 Even Dr Ifflander conceded that no matter 
how one compares projections with implied 
growth rales the D & RG was not expected to 
achieve even expansionary growth for 1984 So 
the assumption that r is no greater than k may 
have been true for the D 4b RG for 1984 
3 * The plaintiffs suggest that the stock market 
may not be the best indicator of a railroads 
time period Using the basic formula that 
growth (g) equals retained earnings (b) 
times the rate of return (r) and using the 
ICC s cost of capital for the rate of return 
(based on his assumption that r equals k), 
Dr Schoenwald concluded that not even 
Value Line expected the railroads to grow 
at even an expansionary growth rate See 
Tr at 2059-64, 2117-19, pltffs'exa 464 A 
465 However Dr Ifflander testified that 
the calculated growth rate (b X r) showed 
growth in earnings, and if one used return 
on equity (ROE) for r and compared the 
calculated growth rate with Value Ltne't 
projected growth rate for earnings, the 
railroads as a whole were projected to 
grow at a rate faster than Dr Schoen 
wald s expansionary model allows for** 
See Tr at 2230-32, defs' ex 236 
Rather than assuming that r equals k, 
the state lets the market decide the values 
of r and k Implicit m the market price of 
a security are the market participants' de-
terminations of the alphabet soup of eco-
nomic variables for the company—r k, g 
and b It appears that at least some inves 
tors believed that r would be greater than 
k for the plaintiff railroads during the as 
sessment years See, eg, Tr at 1504-06, 
interveners ex 8 Philip Anschutz bought 
the D & RG (or more precisely, its holding 
company, Rio Grande Industries) in 1984, 
one of the assessment years, and in fact 
paid a premium for the company's stock,** 
suggesting that he viewed the railroad as a 
good investment that could return a rate 
greater than the cost of capital" 
value Given that Dr Schoenwald s stock and 
debt approach consistently valued the plaintiffs 
higher than his income approach and that Mr 
Anschuu was willing to pay a premium ovet the 
company s stock market price the plaintiffs 
may be right The stock market may umicrval 
ue railroads 
37 The plaintiffs point out that both Union Pa 
cific and Southern Pacific also had the opportu 
nity to buy the D & RG but turned it down Of 
course the fact that some investors or potential 
buyers may see the value of a company differ 
ently than others does not necessarily mean that 
there is no market for the company or that it is 
overvalued In fact differences of opinion as to 
value are what make for a market In the first 
place 
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Assuming for the moment that Dr Scho-
enwald's conclusion as to historical facts is 
correct, that does not necessarily mean 
that his model correctly values the railroad 
Looking at history, the willing seller may 
conclude that r is no greater than k In 
deed, that may he why he wants to sell— 
because he cannot earn even his cost of 
capital Nevertheless, regardless of |>. i 
performance, it seems somewhat counterm 
tuitive to suggest that in valuing a prospec 
tive investment willing buyers assume that 
they will not be able to earn a return at 
least equal to their cost of capital Other-
wise, one would think that they would look 
elsewhere to invest their money Since the 
elusive true market value depends on both 
a willing buyer and a willing seller, the 
assumption that r is no greater than k may 
at best be half true, and, as Justice Frank-
furter used to observe, a half truth is often 
a whole lie See P Rlman, Response, 100 
Harv L Rev 1949, 1952 (1987) 
The court does not have to decide the 
reasonableness of the assumption, how 
ever, because the Schoenwald valuation 
method suffers from a more serious defect 
There is no evidence that those in the busi 
ness of valuing railroads for buyers and 
sellers actually use Dr Schoenwald's ex 
pansion model ** For example, when the 
board of directors of Rio Grande Industries 
(the holding company for D & RG) was 
deciding whether to accept Mr Anachutz's 
offer to buy the company it did not ask Dr 
Schoenwald to value the railroad Rather, 
it commissioned a study by the investment 
3ft Mr Fitzgerald of First Boston Corporation 
testified that in his yield capitalization method 
he uses a method similar to Dr Schoenwald s to 
arrive at a terminal value that is a value for the 
cash flows after the last year of his analysis 
However, his basic analysis is the traditional 
yield capitalization approach, similar to Messi 
curs Goodwin and If Pander s by which he fore 
casts future cash flows for a period of time—in 
his case over a ten year period The terminal 
value in such an approach is only a small frac 
lion of the total value 
39 Morgan Stanley concluded that the railroad s 
equity value was roughlv $280 million See 
defs ex 155 at ex I p I When the debt value 
is added to the equity value the value becomes 
appioximately $360 million see Tr at 1176 
compared to the stale * estimated value of about 
firm of Morgan Stanley, and Morgan Stan-
ley did not value the railroad using Dr 
Schoenwald's expansion model See Tr at 
1241, defs' ex 156 Its study used a dis-
counted cash flow model similar to the 
method Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander 
used in the 1984 appraisal of UP and also, 
as a check, applied various pnee multiples 
in a fashion similar to the state's appraisal 
and, incidentally, with results closer to the 
state's appraisal than to Dr Schoen 
wald's *• 
On the other hand, it is undisputed that 
the state's methods are used by other pro-
fessional appraisers and by market ana 
lysU See, eg, Tr at 1682 (testimony of 
Mr Voytko that P/E ratios are widely used 
by security analysts) Dr Schoenwald him 
self used price-earnings multiples to value 
the nonrailroad subsidiaries of the railroad 
holding companies in his stock and-debt ap-
proach ** The state's direct capitalization 
approach may not be the preferred ap-
proach of the more sophisticated analysts, 
but at least analysts generally use price 
earnings multiples as a check on their yield 
capitalization results Moreover, the ICC 
used a direct capitalization method in ana 
lyzing the offers of competing railroads' to 
buy the core lines of the Milwaukee Rail 
road and concluded that, of the three meth 
ods it used to evaluate the offers, "the 
price to-earmngs (P/E) ratio is a more reli 
able basis to make an evaluation, since it is 
less susceptible to outside influences or to 
speculative considerations ' Defs ex 17 
$389 million for the railroads stock and debt 
See common ex 41 at S-1 To the stock and 
debt value must be added another $6 million or 
so for operating leases to arrive at a total stock 
and debt indicator of value In comparison Dr 
Schoenwald's total value for the railroad for the 
same assessment year was less than S280 mil 
lion 
40 If the use of price earnings multiples in fact 
overvalues properties as Dr Schoenwald sug 
gested in critiquing the appraisals of Messieurs 
Goodwin lfflandet and Prawitt then Dr Scho 
enwald overvalued the holding companies non 
railroad subsidiaries and under his stock and 
debt methodology any ovei valuation of the 
nonrailroad subsidiaries attributable to Dr 
Schoenwald s use of price earnings ratios would 
produce a commensurate undervaluation of the 
railroad See tnfra p 561 
UNION PACIFIC R CO v STATE TAX COM N Ob UIArl 
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at 54, see also Tr at 560-63 The ICC also 
used a direct capitalization approach when 
it decided the question of compensation for 
the trackage rights the D & RG was 
awarded as a result of the Union Pacific-
Missouri Pacific merger See defs' ex 18 
at 4 Perhaps most telling, the D & RG 
itself argued that the interest rental por 
tion of the compensation should be calculat 
ed using a price earnings multiple, id at 7, 
and UP agreed, id at 8 Thus, the plain 
tiffs themselves have used a form of dire< t 
capitalization to determine value 
The plaintiffs argue that the state's ap 
praisals are flawed because the state looks 
to the stock market for both its income and 
its stock and debt approaches Because 
both approaches depend on the same 
source, they argue, they cannot produce 
independent and hence accurate results 
Dr Schoenwald s income approach has an 
advantage over the state's, they suggest, 
in that it does not depend on market data 
for its conclusions Thus, it provides an 
independent indicator to compare to the 
stock and debt indicator of value and is 
therefore the better method 
Of course, nothing in the 4R Act requires 
a state to use three separate and indepen 
dent indicators of value Dr Schoenwald 
himself uses at most only two indicators of 
value See supra note 10 4I The fact that 
the state looks to the stock market for the 
data for two of its approaches does not 
mean that its appraisals are flawed Rath 
er, it merely reflects the state s underlying 
assumption, namely, that the stock market 
is the best indicator of a company's value 
Given all the evidence, the court cannot say 
that that assumption is any less reasonable 
than Dr Schoenwald s—namely, that r 
equals k4* Consequently, the court be 
lieves that the state's income indicator of 
value is a proper estimate of true market 
value 
While the choice between the parties' 
income approaches may present a choice 
between equally reasonable alternatives, 
the court believes that the defendants' 
41 In fact for his I98S appraisal of D & RG Dr 
Schoenwald used only one indicator See ap 
pendix A p 67 n 2 
stock and debt approach is more reasonable 
than Dr Schoenwald's and arrives at a 
more accurate indicator of value Dr 
Schoenwald assumes that the value of the 
railroad is whatever is left over after valu 
ing the other components of the holding 
company While that assumption is theo-
retically sound, as the state's experts point 
ed out, it makes the railroad bear the bur 
den of any measurement errors A num 
ber of small errors valuing the other prop-
erties would create a large error in the 
value of the railroad For example, Dr 
Ifflander suggested that Dr Schoenwald 
may have overvalued Champhn Petroleum, 
a subsidiary of Union Pacific Corporation, 
the holding company, by as much as a 
billion dollars Using the Schoenwald 
method, that error alone would translate 
into a billion dollar error in the railroad's 
value The plaintiffs' own witness, Mr 
Fitzgerald, called Dr Schoenwald's stock 
and-debt method ' a discredited activity 
which I place very little judgment on," Tr 
at 2104, one which could result in "a cas 
cade of capricious error" in the railroad's 
value, id at 2106 The court believes that 
the state's allocation method arrives at a 
more accurate figure by allocating not only 
the stock price but also the risk of error 
In short the court concludes that the 
plaintiffs have not shown that Dr Schoen 
wald s methodology produces a better re-
sult There is thus no reason to disturb 
the state's choice of method 
C The State'* Valuation 
141 Ordinarily, the court's conclusion in 
part I-B that the state's valuation methods 
are reasonable and acceptable would end 
the dispute The railroads could appeal 
any alleged error in applying the state's 
methods to the state tax commission 
Once the tax commission (and the state 
courts if necessary) had corrected any er 
rors in applying the method, this court 
could then simply plug the state's final 
valuation figure into the equation and de 
42 The stale s assumption was even supported 
by one of the plaintiffs own witnesses See Tr 
at 1717 (testimony of James Voytko) 
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termine whether the 4R Act had been vio 
lated However, because the state in this 
case rehea on appraisals that were newly 
prepared for this proceeding, the plaintiffs 
have not had a chance to challenge the 
application of the state's chosen methods 
before the tax commission Therefore, the 
court will consider the plaintiffs' major 
claims of error in the state's application of 
its methods 
The plaintiffs first claim the state erred 
in applying its direct capitalization method 
under its income approach The state's 
direct capitalization rates or earnings price 
ratios are not simply the E/Ps for the 
subject companies but are composites for 
the railroad industry derived from com par 
ing the E/Ps and other financial data of a 
number of railroads Everyone agrees 
that, to be useful, the companies compared 
must in fact be comparable to the subject 
railroad The parties dispute which other 
railroads are truly comparable to UP and D 
& RG The plaintiffs claim that there are 
no true comparables That is just another 
way of arguing that the state should not 
have used a direct capitalization approach 
in valuing the railroads For the reasons 
discussed in part l-B, the court concludes 
that the state's approach is acceptable 
There may be no perfect comparable, but 
the evidence suggests that that fact does 
not prevent appraisers and other analysts 
from comparing railroads and valuing them 
based on their comparisons The state's 
43 Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander on the oth 
er hand use Value Ltne s "straddle P / b s The 
straddle P/fc is based on the last one or two 
quarteis actual earnings and two or three quar 
lers of projected earnings The court believes 
that the use of trailing ratios produces a more 
objective and hence better result 
44 The state s projections like Dr Schoenwald s 
are backwards looking in that they project fu 
lure income based on past performance The 
primary difference be I ween the two is that the 
state weights previous years NROI so as to put 
gi eater emphasis on more recent histoiy 
I lie state also adjusts pievious yeais figures 
for inflation so that all the figures are in cunenl 
dollars The plaintiffs argue thai such an ad 
justment is improper absent any evidence that 
inflation actually benefits rail assets and they 
claim it does not l lowevei the states infla 
tion adjustment is not meant to indicate the 
effect of inflation on the assets but merely to 
approach has an advantage over Mr Good 
win's and Dr If Dander's in that it at least 
tries to select the moat comparable compa 
nies and eliminates the so-called outliers 
The state has offered plausible reasons for 
its choice of comparables Moreover, at 
least in the case of the UP for assessment 
year 1984, the state's choice coincides with 
those companies Mr Voytko, the plaintiffs' 
witness, said he considered the most com 
parable Compare Tr at 1655-61 (Mr 
Voytko's testimony), with common ex 32 
at S/2 In the ultimate analysis, the choice 
of comparables is a judgment call by the 
particular appraiser This court cannot say 
that the railroads the state chose are not 
comparable or even that they are not the 
most comparable It therefore declines to 
disturb the state's choices 
The plaintiffs next argue that the state 
erred by applying its E/P ratios to the 
wrong earnings figure It claims that the 
state has created a mismatch by using a 
current E/P and applying it to projected 
earnings The court concludes that the 
mismatch, if any, is insignificant 
The state bases its E/Ps on Value 
Line's so-called trailing P/Es, which in 
turn relate a current pnce to the last 
twelve months' earnings See Tr at 956, 
clefs' ex 28 at B/2 Thus, trailing P/Es 
are based on historical data49 The state 
applies this trailing ratio to an earnings 
figure that, although a projection, is also 
based on historical data44 Although the 
enable the appraiser to look at history in terms 
of constant dollars It may be as Dr Schoen 
wald suggests that any adjustment for inflation 
is impiopcr since the question is not buying 
power but actual nonnali/xrd earnings The 
court cannot say from the evidence however 
that inflation has no positive effect on rail trans 
port at ton property and any error in the s ta les 
adjustment is partially offset by its weighting 
process in which revenues from the oldest 
years (those most inlluenccd by inflation) re 
ceive the least weight Had the slate based its 
projections on a straight five year average as 
Dr Schoenwald did instead of a weighted five 
yeai average adjusted for inflation its income 
figures would have been higher resulting in 
higher overall values Thus any eiror in the 
stales use of an inflation factor is more than 
offset by lis allegedly impiopcr use of a weight 
ed average 
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two historical periods do not correspond 
completely, because the state weights the 
earnings figures to arrive at its five-year 
average, the earnings for the last twelve 
months receive the greatest weight Be-
cause those earnings relate directly to the 
trailing ratio, there is a match, though per 
haps an imperfect match The price is at 
least roughly matched to the earnings that 
produced it 
The state's approach tries to establish a 
relationship between pnce and earnings 
based on so-called normalized data, that is, 
data that reflecte historical trends, at the 
same time minimizing the effect of anoma 
lous data It does this by a five year 
weighted average of earnings and by using 
an E/P derived from the industry and not 
merely from the subject railroad It is, in 
effect, not the E/P for any one railroad but 
for a hypothetical, composite railroad The 
court does not believe that Dr Schoen 
wald's proposed alternatives would neces 
aanly produce a better result For exam 
pie, to increase the E/P, as Dr Schoenwald 
does, Bee, eg, pltffs' ex 475, based on a 
projected 'increase" in earnings (which is 
really just a normalized earning figure) in 
effect begs the question by assuming what 
effect such an increase in earnings will 
have on price (namely, none) Similarly, to 
apply the trailing E/P to actual earnings 
for the year, as Dr Schoenwald also does, 
see, e g, pltffs' ex 476, does not establish 
the relationship between price and project 
ed income and may produce a skewed re 
suit if the earnings for that particular year 
were atypical for any reason, for example, 
because of unusual capital expenditures un 
dertaken during the year4* 
The plaintiffs next argue that the state 
appraisals err in their treatment of intra 
49 The plaintiffs might argue that if the earn 
ings for the year were atypical the price earn 
ings ratio should also be atypical and applying 
the actual P / b to the actual earnings will still 
produce a correct result l lowevei the h / P 
that the stale applies is not the h / P foi any 
particular company but supposedly an b P for 
the industry An atypical year lot one railioad 
may not have much effect on the industry E / P 
and applying that b / P to abnormal earnings 
may produce an abnormal result 
company debt in the stx>ck and-debt ap-
proach because the stock market does not 
look at intracompany debt in valuing % 
company However, Mr Prawitt testified 
that he prepared his stock and^iebt analy 
sis based on the railroad's balance sheet 
and that debts among the railroad and af 
filiated entities in effect offset each other 
on the balance sheet The court believes 
there was nothing improper about the 
state's treatment of intracompany debt 
The court has considered the plaintiffs' 
other criticisms of the state appraisals and 
has rejected t h e m u In short, the court 
accepts the state appraisals prepared by 
Mr Prawitt as the best evidence of the 
plaintiffs' true market value as of the as 
sessment dates 
D Conclusions 
The court holds that, for purposes of 
applying the 4R Act to the state's assess 
ments of the plaintiff railroads, the true 
market value of the plaintiffs for the as 
sessment years in question was as follows 
1984 1985 
UP $3 7 billion $3 4 billion 
D & RG $320 million $320 milium 
The court finds that the portion of the 
railroads true market value that should be 
allocated to Utah for the assessment years 
is as follows " 
1984 1986 
UP 4 99% 4 97% 
D & RG 28 39% 26 81% 
Thus, the true market value of the rail 
roads' rail transportation property in Utah 
for the assessment years was 
1984 1985 
UP $184,630,000 $168,980,000 
D & RG $90 848,000 $85,760,000 
46 The courts conclusion is not meant in any 
way to preclude the plaintiffs from challenging 
the slate s application of its chosen methodology 
for other assessment years through the appio-
priale state pioceduics 
47 The panics basically agree on these percent 
ages The figures are conveniently summarized 
in Plaintiffs Supplemented and Amended Pro-
posed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I^ aw 
at HA 13 15 19 (UP for 1984) 20 22 25 (UP for 
1985) 27 29 32 (D * RG for 1984) 33 35 38 
(D & RG for 1985) 
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The assessed value of the plaintiffs' rail 
transportation property in Utah was as fol-
lows *• 
1984 1985 
UP $35,928,000 $39,760,000 
D & RG $19,305,200 $20,048,565 
Thus, the ratio of assessed value to true 
market value was as follows 
1984 1985 
UP 19 46% 23 53% 
D & RG 21 25% 23 38% 
III 
THE PLAINTIFFS' 
EQUALIZATION CLAIMS 
(5) The court's conclusions in part II-D 
of this opinion give the left fin If of the 
equation required by the 4P amely, 
the ratio of assessed value to <e market 
value of rail transportation property within 
the state See supra note 3 The parties 
have stipulated to the right half of the 
equation, namely, the ratio of assessed val 
ue to true market value for all other com 
mercial and industrial property in the state 
The stipulation presents the court with two 
scenarios, depending on whether or not the 
48 See pltffs exs 391 at 4 392 at 2 394 at 2 
and 396 at 2 
49 The stipulation also resolves by agreement 
the question of what constitutes "all other com 
mercial and industrial property" in Utah for 
purposes of the 4R Act The stipulation speci 
fies four categories of other commercial and 
industrial properties—certain mining and oil 
and gas properties utilities locally assessed per 
sonal property and locally assessed real proper 
ty The parties have agreed on the true market 
value and assessment rates for three of the four 
categories See pltffs exs 496 it 497 The only 
dispute is over the true market value and assess-
ment rate for locally assessed real property and 
the only disagreement between the parties there 
is whether or not the court should apply the 20 
percent discount statute in determining true 
market value 
90. A revised version of the statute was enacted 
in 1987 and is codified at section *°- 2 304 of 
the Utah Code 
The statute further required the State Tax 
Commission to "develop and implement compa 
rable sales or cost appraisal methods in valuing 
taxable property" that exclude the various fees 
services closing costs and other expenses relat 
ed to the sales transaction and other intangible 
values Utah Code Ann § 59 54 5(2) (Supp 
1986) The timetable for the State Tax Commis 
sion to develop and implement such methods 
has been pushed back to January 1 1990 See 
court upholds a state statutory scheme that 
discounts the assessed value of real proper-
ty in the state an additional twenty per 
cent ° 
Section 59-5-4 5 of the Utah Code stated 
When the county asseslsjor uses the 
comparable sales or cost appraisal meth 
od in valuing taxable property for assess 
ment purposes, the assessor is required 
to recognize that various fees, services, 
closing costs, and other expenses related 
to the transaction lessen the actual 
amount that may be received in the 
transaction The county assessor shall, 
therefore, take 80% of the value based on 
comparable sales or cost appraisal of the 
property at its reasonable fair cash value 
for purposes of assessment 
Utah Code Ann $ 59-5-4 5(1) (Supp 
1986)" 
Two county assessors testified that local 
assessments of commercial and industrial 
real property are generally based on the 
cost appraisal method See Tr at 2344, 
2351, 2374 •" The defendants therefore ar-
uf § 59-2-304(2) (Supp 1988) County asses-
sors are required to use the methods the State 
Tax Commission develops for assessments be-
ginning January 1, 1990 Id. 
91 The assessors also testified that of the three 
approaches commonly used namely, the cost, 
income and market comparable approaches to 
value the cost approach generally results in the 
highest values See Tr at 2343-44, 2374 The 
intervenors suggest that the discount statute 
simply brings the assessed values of locally as 
sessed real property more in line with the val 
ue* of slate assessed properties, which give 
more weight to the income approach—in other 
words that one should discount cost indicators 
of value by 20 percent to get a value that is 
comparable to values based on an income indi 
cator A similar argument was rejected in 
Louisville A Nashville Railroad Company v Lou 
utana Tax Commission. 498 FSupp 418 421 
(M D La 1980) This court similarly finds the 
argument unpersuasive It also ignores the evi 
dence The evidence showed that Mr Prawitt 
gives some weight to the cost indicator of value 
for the railroads Moreover, Mr Bexell. the 
Weber County Assessor, testified that the cost 
approach for real property results in values 
about 20 percent less than those determined 
under sales assessment ratio studies the statuto 
rily authorized method of valuing other com 
mercial and industrial property under the 4R 
Act See Pub I No 94-210 § 306(2)(e) 90 Stat 
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gue that, for purposes of the 4R Act, the 
true market value of locally assessed com 
mercial and industrial property should be 
80 percent of the appraised value, as re-
quired by the statute 
The state's intent in passing the discount 
statute appears to have been to tax real 
property owners only on what they might 
expect to receive from a sale of their prop-
erty and not on a hypothetical gross sales 
priceM That intent may be admirable 
Moreover, the statute may pass constitu 
tional muster" Nevertheless, the court 
concludes that applying the statute to de 
termtne assessment ratios under the 4R 
Act discriminates against the railroads by 
artificially increasing the ratio for other 
commercial and industrial property 
The 4R Act requires a comparison be 
tween two ratios, and, as all the experts in 
this case agreed, for comparisons to be 
valid the items compared must be compara 
ble That which is compared under the 4R 
Act is "true market value " Although the 
statute does not define "true market val 
ue," the experts all basically agreed that 
true market value (or its various syno 
nyms) is the price that a willing and knowl 
edgeable seller and a willing and knowl 
edgeable buyer would agree on in an arm s 
length transaction See, eg,Tr at 12 (Dr 
at 55 Yet the slate still reduces the values 
determined under the cost approach by 20 per 
cent 
92 The legislative history of the statute suggests 
that the act may also have been meant lo reduce 
the relative burden on locally assessed laxpay 
ers that arose out of |a | statewide reappraisal 
program which had the effect of immediately 
injecting a high degree of inflation into resi 
dential values Rio Algom Corp v San Juan 
County 681 P 2d 184 193 (Utah 1984) The 
legislature apparently felt that the reappraisal 
progi am placed an unfaii burden on locally 
assessed properties because the formulae used 
to assess state assessed properties did not tend 
to factor the effects of inflation into the stale as 
sessed properties or if they did they did so at a 
much more modest and less abrupt pace Id 
The evidence in this case makes the legislature s 
assumptions suspect l)r Schoenwald testified 
thai the slates appraisal methods do factor in 
the effects of inflation and if they do so at a 
much more modest pace it may be because 
inflation affects the value of rail assets less 
dramatically than it affects the value of teal 
Schoenwald's definition of fair market val 
ue) The fact that the seller might not net 
the sale price does not mean that that price 
is not true market value '4 
The evidence in this case was that the 
figures arrival at using the comparable 
sales and cost appraisal methods of valua 
tion—before applying any discount—are 
considered true market value See, eg, 
Tr at 2302 (testimony of Max Arnold), 
2361-62 (testimony of Steven C Bexell), 
common ex 11 (Utah State Tax Commis 
sion Assessment Sales Ratio Study for 
1984) at 2 (referring to the undiscounted 
values as fair market value") M In arnv 
ing at the railroads' true market value, the 
state relies in part on a cost appraisal 
method yet it does not reduce its final cost 
indicator of value by 20 percent Similarly, 
its stock and debt approach is a form of 
comparable sales appraisal method, yet the 
state does not reduce its stock and-debt 
indicator of value by 20 percent nor does it 
deduct so-called transaction costs, such as 
brokerage commissions in arriving at its 
final stock and debt indicator of value 
Thus, if the court is to compare true mar 
ket value to true market value, it should 
compare values before any adjustments for 
transaction costs or other so-called intangi 
bles are made 
property In trying lo adjust taxpayers relative 
burdens the legislature would do well to bear in 
mind Sir Hermann Black s warning Oh what 
a tangled web we weave when (first) we practice 
lo relieve Sayings of the Week Sydney 
Morning Herald July 6 1985 quoted in A Ptctio 
nary of Irgal Quotations 161 (S James & C 
Slebbings comp 1987) 
53 In the Rut Algom case 681 P 2d 184 (Utah 
1984) the Utah Supreme Courl held that section 
S9 S-4 5 did not violate article XIII of the Utah 
Constitution or the equal protection provisions 
of either the stale or federal constitutions See 
681 P 2d at 194 
54 Indeed the parlies would generally consider 
the transaction costs associated with the sale in 
arriving at true market value 
53 The parties stipulation itself indicates that 
the true inarkel value of locally assessed real 
piopeity is the value determined by the assess 
ment sales ratio study before the 20 percent 
reduction is applied See Settlement Slipula 
Hon § IH3)(b)(v) 
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[6] In short, the court concludes that, 
for purposes of the 4R Act, the true mar-
ket value of "all other commercial and in-
dustrial property" in the state of Utah 
must be determined before the 20 percent 
discount statute is applied. Cf. Louisville 
& Nashville R.R. Co. v. Department of 
Revenue, 736 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir.1984) (an 
across-the-board reduction in assessed val-
ues of commercial and industrial pro|>ertie8 
under a state statute authorizing reduc-
tions in values to reflect costs of sale con-
stituted discrimination in violation of the 
4R Act because it "handled] non-selling 
local property owners a windfall . . . that 
was not bestowed on railroads").*4 This 
does not mean that the state cannot contin-
ue to give the 20 percent discount to locally 
assessed real property. It simply means 
that, in determining whether the state's 
assessments of railroads discriminates 
against the railroads in violation of the 4R 
Act, the court must consider the value of 
locally assessed real property before the 
statutory discount is applied. The state 
may still be free to choose to tax real 
property on the basis of the net amount the 
property owner could expect to receive 
from a sale of his property. But that net 
amount is not "true market value" as that 
term is used by appraisers and in the 4R 
Act 
Based on the stipulation of the parties, 
the court finds that the ratio of assessed 
value to true market value for all other 
commercial and industrial property within 
the state for assessment year 1984 was 
15.4 percent and for assessment year 1985 
was 16.18 percent. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
(7) Based on the court's conclusions in 
part II-D and part III of this opinion, it is 
clear that the state of Utah has discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff railroads in its 
56. The Eleventh Circuit left open the question of 
whether the state would violate the 4R Act if, in 
delei mining the just value of commercial and 
industrial property it deducted the actual costs 
of sale for those properties that actually sold 
during the year. 
it, tax assessments of the plaintiffs for the 
r- years 1984 and 1985 in that it has assessed 
n- them at a higher rate than it assessed all 
in other commercial and industrial property 
nt within the state for the same period. How-
le
 ever, the 4R Act only authorizes relief if 
9f the ratio of assessed value to true market 
in
 value for rail transportation property ex-
l
'~ ceeds the ratio for all other commercial and 
"
8
 industrial property "by at least 5 per cen-
* turn." Pub.L. No. 94-210 § 306(2)(c), 90 
n
~ Stat, at 54. The court must therefore com-
pare the various assessment ratios for each 
* of the plaintiffs and for "all other commer-
cial and industrial property" in the state 
for each assessment year to determine 
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief. 
The percentage by which UP and the D & 
8 RG were overvalued for each of the assess-
,g ment years is as follows: 
 1984 1985 
lf UP 26% 46% 
e D & RG 38% 45% 
 Thus, the plaintiffs are entitled to relief 
il under the 4R Act.17 
e
 The defendants are hereby ORDERED 
e
 to assess the plaintiffs as follows: For 
assessment year 1984, the defendants are 
' ORDERED to assess the plaintiffs based 
on an assessed value that is 15.4 percent of 
their true market value as determined by 
•' the court or stipulated to by the parties. 
* For assessment year 1985, the defendants 
r
 are ORDERED to assess the plaintiffs 
1
 based on an assessed value that is 16.13 
\ percent of their true market value as deter-
>
 mined by the court or stipulated to by the 
parties. The defendants are hereby EN-
JOINED from collecting property taxes 
from the plaintiffs for assessment years 
1984 and 1985 based on assessed values 
that bear a greater ratio to true market 
i value than 15.4 percent and 16.13 percent 
respectively. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
37. The state concedes that, if UP and D & RG 
are entitled to equalization relief under the 4R 
Act. SP is entitled to iclict as well. 
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Comparison of Appraisals ' 
UNION PACIFIC 
1984 
Cost Approach 
Net book value 
Obsolescence 
Cost indicator 
Income Approach 
Income estimate 
Capitalization rate (direct cap) 
Capitalized value of income 
Construction in progress 
Capitalized value, operating leases 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income estimate (NROI \ net lease rentals) 
Capitalization rate (yield cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 
Stock and Debt Approach 
Market value, R.R. stock 
R.R. long-term debt 
R.R. net current assets & liabilities 
R.R. value 
Allocation factor (applied only to stock value 
by G & I) 
Market value, R.R. operating property 
Leased equipment 
Stock and debt indicator 
Total value, parent's stock & debt 
Total value, non-railroad & non-operating 
property 
Stock and debt indicator 
Correlated Values 
Cost indicator 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 
Stock and debt indicator 
Correlated market value 
Schoenwald 
(ex. C-30) 
5,555,803 
(2,815,681) 
338,643 
15.40% 
2,198,981 
10,549,892 
(7,531,760) 
^6TS\T52 
2,740,122 
2,198,981 
3,018,132 
2,608,557 
Goodwin SL 
State Ifflander 
(ex. C-32) (ex. C-31) 
6,205,607 
(1,828,350) 
320,000 
9.77% 
3,275,333 
81,972 
92,118 
3,449,423 
4,450,294 
83.98% 
3,737,360 
106,017 
3,843,367 
4,377,259 
3,449,423 
3,843,367 
3,700,000 
6,200,299 
(1,942,554) 
2,740,122 4,377,259 4,267,746 
356,910 
8.90% 
4,010,229 
4,010,229 
N/A 
15.11% 
4,577,513 
3,074,843 3,000,000 
1,491,073 1,414,415 
(115,622) 
4,414,415 
89.39% 
4,096,115 
34,246 
4,130,361 
4,257,746 
4,010,229 
4,577,513 
4,130,361 
4,100,000 
I. All dollars are expressed in thousands. Final due to rounding, 
indicators may vary slightly h u m column totals 
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APPENDIX A—Continued 
UNION PACIFIC 
1986 
Cost Approach 
Net book value 
Obsolescence 
Cost indicator 
Income Approach 
Income estimate 
Capitalization rate (direct cap) 
Capitalized value of income 
Construction in progress 
Capitalized value, operating leases 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income estimate (NROI f net lease rentals) 
Capitalization rate (yield cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 
Stock and Debt Approach 
Market value, RR. stock 
RR long-term debt 
R.R. net current assets & liabilities 
R.R. value 
Allocation factor (applied only to stock value 
by G & I) 
Market value, R.R. operating property 
Leased equipment 
Stock and debt indicator 
Total value, parent's stock & debt 
Total value, non-railroad & non-operating 
property 
Stock and debt indicator 
Correlated Values 
Cost indicator 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 
Stock and debt indicator 
Correlated market value 
Schoenwald 
(ex. C-33) 
6,671,608 
(3,187,444) 
2,484,164 
810,815 
16.00% 
1,942,694 
8,881,003 
(6,290,824) 
2,690,179 
2.484,164 
1,942,694 
2,590,179 
22MS87 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
1984 
Cost Approach 
Net book value 
Obsolescence 
Cost indicator 
Income Approach 
Income estimate 
Capitalization rate (direct cap) 
Schoenwald 
(ex. C-36) 
467,739 
(286,022) 
181,717 
State 
(ex. C-35) 
6,475,611 
(2,076,376) 
4,399,234 
310,000 
11.98% 
2,587,646 
85,762 
87,118 
2,760,511 
2,674,843 
1,427,374 
32,464 
4,134,671 
81.77%^ 
3,380,866 
93,266 
3,474,122 
4,399,234 
2,760,611 
3,474,122 
8,400,000 
State 
(ex. C-38) 
641,000 
(197,962) 
343,039 
23,000 
8.28% 
Goodwin & 
Ifflander 
(ex. C-34) 
6,467,163 
(2,661,884) 
3,805,279 
366,887 
10.30% 
3,562,010 
3,562,010 
2,600,000 
1,322,267 
3,922,267 
86 69% 
3,567,207 
28,640 
3,604,847 
3,806,279 
3,562,011 
3,604,847 
$,mm 
Goodwin & 
Ifflander 
(ex. C-37) 
537,697 
(207,282) 
330,415 
25,851 
8.30% 
Capitalized value of income 277,778 311,453 
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Schoenwald 
(ex. C-36) 
Construction in progress 
Capitalized value, operating leases 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income estimate (NROI + net lease rentals) 
Capitalization rate (yield cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 
Stock and Debt Approach 
Market value, R.R. stock 
R.R. long-term debt 
R.R. net current assets & liabilities 
R.R. value 
Allocation factor (applied only to stock value 
by G & I) 
Market value, R.R. operating property 
Leased equipment 
25,183 
15.40% 
163,626 
State 
(ex. C-38) 
&,1<& 
5,964 
291,894 
350,000 
87,657 
(5,026) 
432,632 
81.87% 
354,187 
8,946 
Goodwin & 
Ifflander 
(ex. C-87) 
311,468 
300,000 
76,767 
375,757 
89.43% 
344,047 
6,771 
Stock and debt indicator 
Total value, parent's stock & debt 677,366 
Total value, non railroad & non-operating 
property (331,531) 
Stock and debt indicator 345,835 
Correlated Values 
Cost indicator 181,717 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 163,526 
Stock and debt indicator 345,835 
Correlated market value 254,681 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
1985 
Schoenwald 
(ex. C-39J 
363,133 
343,039 
291,894 
363,133 
320,000 
State 
(ex. C-41) 
350,817 
330,415 
311,463 
360,817 
330,000 
Goodwin & 
Ifflander 
(ex. C-40) 
Cost Approach 
Net book value 
Obsolescence 
Cost indicator 
Income Approach 
Income estimate 
Capitalization rate (direct cap) 
Capitalized value of income 
Construction in progress 
Capitalized value, operating leases 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income estimate (NROI i net lease rentals) 
Capitalization rate (yield cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 
Stock and Debt Approach 
Market value, H.R. stoclc 
R.R. long-term debt 
598,509 
(159,082) 
439,428 
27,000 
11 00% 
245,455 
1,582 
5,038 
252,075 
350,000 
79,394 
586,883 
(198,380) 
387,503 
30,727 
1010% 
304,282 
304,232 
275,000 
82,405 
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APPENDIX A-Continued
 G o o d w l n 4 
Schoenwald State Ifflander 
(ex C-39) (ex C-41) (ex C-40) 
R R net current assets & liabilities 13,99$ 
RR value 443,393 357,405 
Allocation factor (applied only to stock value 
by G & I) 87 67% 93 22% 
Market value, R R operating property 388,729 338,760 
Leased equipment 6,181 8,132 
Stock and debt indicator 394,910 346,892 
Total value, parent's stock & debt 
Total value, non railroad & non-o| 
property 
Stock and debt indicator 
Correlated Values 
Cost indicator 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 
Stock and debt indicator 
Correlated market value 
1955-1984 
SCHOENWALD'S 5 YEAR VALUE FROM 1950-1954 FOR 1955 AY 
(ADJUSTED DISCOUNT RATE) 
(000) 
491,129 
(212,393) 
278,736 
278,736 
278,736* 
APPENDIX B 
439,428 
252,075 
394,910 
320,000 
387,503 
304,232 
346,892 
325,000 
YFAR 
1966 
1966 
1967 
196M 
1969 
I960 
1M1 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1966 
1966 
1967 
I * * 
ISM!) 
11170 
1971 
197^ 
1973 
1974 
1976 
1976 
NRQI » 
43 739 
mm 38 BIB 
43 461 
56 967 
82 836 
SI 814 
46 776 
61 112 
63 468 
66 944 
86 266 
Ml 468 
M0/.I9 
HI 663 
114416 
I0M4J4 
14^086 
161 342 
14*691 
112 H72 
IJ5 7JO 
DIPRtClATlON 
EXPt-NSfc 
26 007 
26 888 
26 847 
2M42J 
32 746 
36 636 
38 032 
39 103 
41428 
42 938 
46 942 
60H06 
64 572 
64 962 
66H28 
69 606 
bl Mil 
6J2M0 
66 8JJ 
68 179 
73H.J8 
?H 0 19 
I960 1964 6 YH NKOI AV(. -
DISCOUNT RATE 
PRESENT VAI l i t . 
DEt ERRED 
• TAXES 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
30 143 
3l7r»8 
16 7 W 
LA PITA 1 
EXPENDITURES 
61914 
47 812 
60 239 
64JI0 
70 093 
66J29 
49 898 
64 404 
76 803 
107 876 
121 J23 
207 929 
147 646 
M2MM7 
144 169 
I6J697 
147 2J9 
l ib 463 
137 blO 
197 844 
205 627 
179 948 
134 193 
6 8 8 * 
1681 614 
NET 
CASH 
-
 FL0W 
6 812 
20 213 
6 426 
17 674 
(390) 
12 042 
19 948 
21474 
16 737 
(11470) 
(8 437) 
(70 867) 
(II 616) 
(•J 114 
(6 7MM| 
10 226 
22 296 
78 902 
79 666 
24 Jb9 
12 941 
4J620 
DISCOUNT 
RATE 
688% 
6 91% 
6205 
6 91% 
668% 
7 26% 
740% 
7 34% 
7 36% 
7 16% 
720% 
740% 
799% 
8 46* 
9 17* 
loom 
12 67% 
1161% 
10 96% 
11 66% 
12 98* 
12 67* 
PV 
DISCOUNT 
RATE 
FACTOR 
1 
0 9446 
0 8918 
08397 
0 7864 
0 7362 
06864 
0 6391 
0 6964 
0 6646 
0 6176 
0 4827 
0 4494 
04161 
0 3837 
0 3616 
0 8196 
0 2838 
0 2643 
02292 
0 2066 
0 1819 
0 1616 
PRESENT 
VALUE 
• 463 
18024 
4666 
18 808 
(287) 
8 266 
12,749 
12 786 
9282 
(6 936) 
(4 073) 
(SI 848) 
(4 792) 
20 380 
(2 386) 
S267 
6 828 
20 066 
18236 
6008 
2 364 
8 019 
2 Di Schoenwald* appraisal of I) & K(» for tries, liic by the Anschul/ Corporation In the 
assessment year 198S is based solely on his tall of 1984 
analysis of the purchase of Rio Grande Indus 
SANDLIN v. IRON WORKERS DIST COUNCIL PENSION PLAN 
C l U M 7 1 * F.Supp 971 (N D A U . IMS) 
671 
YEAR NRQI • 
1977 149 764 
1978 179 842 
1979 190 818 
1980 214 861 
1981 214 407 
1982 1/7 78S 
1983 181 966 
1984 118 168 
DEPRECIATION 
EXPENSE 
82 891 
86 441 
93 698 
106 279 
109 989 
110 143 
109 343 
104 724 
ERAGE 1980-1984 . 
APPENDIX B-Contmued 
DEFERRED 
• TAXES 
39 697 
16316 
42 860 
44 920 
118 790 
9 613 
•8 638 
30 128 
tic 
CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURES -
203 837 
Mi 323 
260 07b 
808 604 
379 686 
136 779 
102 861 
6) 118 
112088 
DIVIDED BY 
NET 
CASH 
FLOW 
68 606 
32 622 
18 872 
(16 036) 
306 407 
144 628 
248 719 
136 982 
1600% 
DISCOUNT 
EATJ 
1190% 
1163% 
12 69% 
16 11% 
17 60% 
1816% 
16 60% 
16 40% 
16 00% 
- 11 002 019 
PV 
DISCOUNT 
RATE 
EM30B 
• 1444 
0 1294 
0 1149 
00998 
0 0849 
00718 
0 0616 
0 06*4 
006S4 
PRESENT 
4208 
2 108 
(1601) 
26 014 
10 377 
16 821 
7 261 
1198 996 
68 608 
TOTAL MARKET VAI UL OK NET CASH FLOW FROM 1966-1984 PLUb OUT YEAR INTO PERPETUITY $247 604 
SCHOENWA1D 6 YR NROI AVO 1960-1964 - $34 193 DIVIDED BY 6 88% - 1681614 1 8681614 
SCHOENWALD OVER VALUATION (UNDER VALUATION) 1884 010 
(o f lit NOMNI SttflM> 
^\T* / * * ' ' * ' * * ** 
Eugene SANDLIN, Plaintiff, 
v 
IRON WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 
OF TENNESSEE VALLEY AND VI-
CINITY PENSION PLAN. Defendant. 
Civ. A. No. 88-AR-6135-NW. 
United States District Court, 
N D Alabama, 
Northwestern Division 
Dec 15, 1988 
Pensioner sued the administrator of an 
ERISA pension fund for fund's alleged fail 
ure to respond reasonably to pensioner's 
request for information The District 
Court, Acker, J , held that the fund's 402-
day failure to supply information warrant 
ed a penalty of $15,000 
So ordered 
Pensions *=»87 
ERISA administrator's refusal to sup 
ply information requested by pensioner 
whose benefits were cut off warranted pen 
aity of $15,000 for 402-day failure to an 
swer, trustees and their agents deliberate-
ly and intentionally withheld information 
from pensioner, understandably causing 
him frustration and distress, if not ultimate 
monetary loss Employee Retirement In 
come Security Act of 1974, § 602(c), 29 
U S C A § 1182(c) 
John B Baugh, Gonce, Young & West 
brook, Florence, Ala, for plaintiff 
Norman J Slawsky, Jacobs and Lang 
ford, P A , Atlanta, Ga, pro hac vice, and 
Thomas N Crawford, J r , Cooper, Mitch, 
Crawford, Kuykendall & Whatley, Birming 
ham, Ala , for defendant 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
ACKER, District Judge 
The court tried the above-entitled cause 
without a jury in Florence, Alabama, on 
November 15, 1988 Plaintiff, Eugene 
Sandlin, framed his complaint under the 
fc mployee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), 29 U S C §§ 1001, et aeq, against 
the Ironworkers District Council of Tennes 
see Valley and Vicinity Pension Plan, an 
ERISA governed pension plan as to which 
Sandlin was and is a pensioner Sandlin 
sought both pension benefits which he 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RIO ALGOM CORPORATION, a 
Delaware corporation, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
v. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, et al.. Defendant, 
and Respondents. 
No. 18782. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 13, 1984. 
Owners of state-assessed properties 
challenged tax statutes as unlawfully in-
creasing their ad valorem pro|>erty taxes 
by requiring them to pay greater taxes to 
compensate for reduced taxes paid by own-
ers of county-assessed pro|>erties. The 
Seventh District Court, San Juan County, 
Boyd Bunnell, J., ruled against taxpayers 
on their motion for partial summary judg 
ment and held statute constitutional, and 
taxpayers appealed. The Supreme Cxnirt, 
Stewart, J ., held that: (I) statute reducing 
by 20 percent the value of county assessed 
property appraised by comparable sales or 
costs methods was not violative of constitu-
tional tax uniformity requirement as re-
quiring owners of state-assessed pro|M?rties 
to pay greater taxes to compensate for 
reduced taxes paid by owners of county-as-
sessed properties in absence of evidence 
that state properties were assessed at mar-
ket value or that they bore a tax burden 
greater than their pro rata share of pro|>er-
ty taxes or that deduction of transaction 
costs from comparable sales of figures or 
estimates of cost defeated constitutional 
objective of establishing a valuation that 
was fair and equitable in comparison with 
and commensurate with valuation of other 
kinds of property, and (2) statute which 
rolled back the value of county assessed 
real property to reach 1978 levels produced 
valuations that were not based on market 
value and, as such, was violative of consti 
tutional tax uniformity requirement. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded 
Howe, J., concurred and filed opinion. 
Hall, C.J., concurred in part and dis-
sented in part filed opinion. 
1. Taxation «=M9 
Constitutional provisions requiring 
that all tangible pro|>erty "be taxed in pro-
portion to its value" and that pro|»erty be 
valued "according to its value in money" 
must be construed as requiring that the 
valuation for assessment and taxation be, 
as near as reasonably practicable, a s|>ecific 
cash value for which the property value 
would sell in the open market. U.C.A. 1953, 
59-5-4.5 (Repealed). 
2. Constitutional l^iw <*=>4H( I) 
Acts of the legislature are presumed 
constitutional especially when dealing with 
economic matters based on factual assump-
tions. 
.1. (oiiNtilultonal Law ®^IH(I> 
A party attacking the constitutionality 
of a statute must affirmatively demon-
strate its unconstitutionality. 
4. Constitutional U w «=»48(l> 
Presumption of constitutionality ap-
plies with particular force to tax statute. 
5. Taxation <£»4<M8> 
Because of the lack of a more precise 
common denominator than "market value" 
for use in achieving uniformity and in def-
erence to the inherent difficulties in assess-
ing value, in dealing with assessments of 
prices of pro|>erty, constitutional require-
ment of tax uniformity must IK* construed 
as permitting a necessary latitude in defin-
ing "market value." Const. Art. 13, § 3. 
6. Taxation <^»40(8) 
(Constitutional authority vested in the 
legislature to adopt means to achieve that 
degree of uniformity of valuation that is 
practicably attainable within the general 
confines of the term "market value" is 
intended to assure that the taxes that are 
levied in a given county will result in each 
property's being accountable for its pro 
rata share of the burden of local govern 
ment. II.C.A.1953, 59-5-4.5 (Repealed). 
RIO ALGOM CORP. v 
ClUuUI rid 
7. Taxation «=»40(8) 
Statute reducing by 20 percent the val-
ue of county assessed property appraised 
by comparable sales or costs methods was 
not violative of constitutional tax uniform-
ity requirement as requiring owners of 
state assessed properties to pay greater 
taxes to compensate for reduced taxes paid 
by owners of county-assessed properties in 
absence of evidence that state properties 
were assessed at market value or that they 
bore a tax burden greater than their pro 
rata share of property taxes or that deduc-
tion of transaction costs from comparable 
sales of figures or estimates of cost defeat-
ed constitutional objective of establishing a 
valuation that was fair and equitable in 
comparison with and commensurate with 
valuation of other kinds of property. U.C. 
A 1953, 59-5-109; Const. Art. 13, §§ 2, 3. 
8. Taxation e»4(MH) 
Since "market value" is not a term 
having a wholly fixed and precise meaning, 
it is reasonable and constitutionally permis-
sible for the legislature to recognize that 
transaction costs can and do influence val-
ues computed on actual sales prices, as 
well as other valuation formulae, to provide 
that they may be taken into account in 
determining "market value." U.C.A. 1953, 
59-5-109; Const. Art. 13, §§ 2, 3. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
9. Taxation «=>40(8) 
When inflation has a significant and 
different effect on the value of properties, 
the legislature may readdress the imbalanc-
es and inequities created. U.C.A. 1953, 59-
5-109; Const. Art. 13, S$ 2, 3. 
10. Taxation «=»42(l> 
The legislature may not establish for-
mal classifications of property that result 
in nonuniform or disproportionate tax bur-
dens, but it may seek to enforce the consti-
tutional uniformity requirement by at 
tempting to equalize the tax burden borne 
by those taxpayers who pay a greater tax 
in proportion to the value of their property 
than others. U C.A.I953, 59-5-109; Const 
Art 13, §S 2, 3. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY Utah 1 8 5 
1*4 (Utah 19S4) 
11. Constitutional U w 4=>228.5 
Taxation e=»42(l> 
Equal protection provisions of the Fed-
eral and State Constitutions accord particu-
larly wide latitude to legislative classifica-
tions in tax statute. Const. Art. 1, § 2; 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
12. Constitutional Law <*=>229<3) 
Taxation <*=»40(8> 
Statute reducing by 20 |>ercent the val-
ue of county assessed property appraised 
by comparable sales or costs methods is 
not violative of the equal protection provi-
sions under the State and Federal Constitu-
tions as requiring owners of slate assessed 
property to pay greater taxes to compen-
sate for reduced taxes paid by owners of 
county-assessed property. U.C.A. 1953, 59-
5-4.5(Repealed); Const. Art. 1, § 2; U.S. 
C.A. Const Amend 14. 
13. Taxation <t~40(8> 
An ad valorem tax system must IK? 
based on periodic reassessments that take 
into consideration the fluctuating factors 
that affect value. Const. Art. 13, § 3. 
14. Taxation «=M0<8) 
An indefinite, partial freeze on the 
evaluation of some properties in the state 
is inherently inconsistent with the basic 
concept of an ad valorem tax system. 
Const. Art. 13, § 3. 
15. Constitutional Law <&=5 
If the Constitution is to be changed for 
some inequity, the people must make that 
change by constitutional amendment. 
16. Taxation e=>49 
Statute which rolled back the value of 
county assessed real property to reach 1978 
levels produced valuations that were not 
based on market value and, as such, was 
violative of constitutional tax uniformity 
requirement. U.C. A. 1953, 59-5-109; 
Const Art 13, *i§ 2, 3. 
17. Courts «=» 100(1) 
Decision determining that the statute 
which rolled back the value of all county-
assessed real property to its 197H level was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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violative of the constitutional tax uniform-
ity requirement was prospective and effec-
tive only from and after January 1. 1984, 
but as to the six taxpayers who were par-
ties to the appeal, it was retroactive for the 
year for which the suit for tefxtid was 
brought U C A 1953, 59-5- 109; Const 
Art 13, §§ 2. 3 
18. Taxation *»5I3<7» 
Owners of s ta te assessed property 
seeking to recover an alleged overpayment 
of taxes under protest on ground that stat-
ute declared unconstitutional caused a shift 
in tax burden to their pro|»erties must dem-
onstrate that county assessed pro|>erties 
were appraised at less th . . i t . niHI t rue 
values, and, in addition, im fish the 
t rue value of their own pi- inde-
pendent evidence, and the , i used 
must give due effect to the san, . onomic 
factors as the formulae used to value the 
county assessed properties. U C A 1953, 
59-5-109 
19. Taxat ion tf^ltfftf) 
Although there usually is a presump 
tion that pro|»erty assessed by a s ta te or 
county assessor has been appraised a t full 
value, the presumption applies only when a 
taxpayer challenges the valuation of his 
own property and not when he challenges 
the appraised value of another 's property 
U C A 1953, 59-5-109 
20. Taxation e=>543<7. K) 
If the taxpayers demonstrated tha t the 
county-assessed pro|>erties were appraised 
at less than their 1981 t rue values and 
established the true value of their s ta te 
assessed properties by independent evi 
dence, the taxpayers could recover the dif 
ference between the amount of taxes they 
paid and the amount (hey would have paid 
had the s ta tute not been in effect, and if 
the taxpayers ' s ta te assessed pro|»erties 
were appraised at less than full value, the 
taxpayers would be entitled to what they 
would have paid had the s ta tu te not been in 
effect, less the amount they underpaid 
their taxes because the properties were 
umlerassesstui U C A J 953, 59-5-109 
James B Lee, James M Elegante, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants 
Bruce K Halhday, Monticello, Bill Tomas 
Peters , Salt Lake City, for defendants and 
respondents 
STEWART, Justice 
This is an action brought by plaintiffs 
Rio Algom Corporation, Utah Power and 
l i g h t Company, Atlas Corporation, Energy 
Fuel* Nuclear, Inc, Consolidated Oil and 
Gas, Inc , and Northwest Pipeline Cor|»ora-
tion against San Juan County and various 
of its officials, the San Juan School District 
and various of its employees, and the Sta te 
Tax Commission and its commissioners for 
a refund of a par t of the property taxes the 
; ! untiffs paid, over protest, to San Juan 
< unity for the year 1981 
The plaintiff taxpayers are owners of 
state-assessed properties located in San 
Juan County On this' apical , they chal 
lenge the constitutionality of two s ta tu tes 
(1) U C A . 1953, «* 59 5-4 5 (Supp 1981), 
which reduces by 20 percent the value of 
county assessed property appraiser) by 
comparable sales or cost methods, and (2) 
U C A . 1953. s 59-5-109 (Supp 1981), 
which rolls back the value of all county as 
sessed real property to its 1978 level 
Plaintiffs contend that the reduction of the 
assessed value of county assessed proper-
ties, but not s ta te assessed properties, has 
unlawfully increased their ad valorem prop-
erty taxes by requiring them to pay great-
er taxes to compensate for the reduced 
taxes that owners of county assessed prop-
erties pay The plaintiffs' contention is 
that the two challenged statutory provi-
sions violate, on their face, the tax uniform-
ity and equal protection provisions of the 
Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
I AD VALOREM PROPERTY 
TAXES GENERALLY 
U C A , 1953, s 59-5-4 5 (Supp 1981) and 
t) 59 5 109 (Supp 1981) were enacted in 
RIO ALGOM CORP. v. SAN JUAN COUNTY 
C H C M 6 S I 916 IM (Utah 1984) 
Uuh 187 
1981. Laws of Utah 1981, ch 231, § 1 ' 
Section 59-5-4 5 provides 
Assessor to recognize certain expenses in 
valuing property—percentage limitation 
When the county assessor uses the com 
parable sales or cost appraisal method in 
valuing taxable property for assessment 
purposes, the assessor is required to rec 
ognize that various fees, services, closing 
costs, and other expenses related to the 
transaction lessen the actual amount that 
may be received in the transaction The 
county assessor, shall, therefore, take 
807c of the value based on comparable 
sales or cost appraisal of the property as 
its reasonable fair cash value for pur 
poses of assessment 
Section 59-5-109 provides-
All locally assessed taxable real property 
shall be appraised at current fair market 
value and the value of such property 
rolled back to its January 1, 1978, level 
as such level is determined by the s ta te 
tax commission 
In the trial court, the plaintiffs sued for 
a refund of that portion of their 1981 prop 
erty taxes which they contend should have 
been paid by county assessed property 
owners in San Juan County who were mi 
derassessed pursuant to the above s ta t 
utes On a motion for partial summary 
judgment, <»<* 59-5-4 5 and 59-5-109 were 
attacked as being facially unconstitutional 
Plaintiffs adduced no evidence of actual 
nonuniformtty in the tax assessments of 
state-assessed properties as compared with 
county-assessed properties Plaintiffs' ar-
gument was that county assessed proper-
ties were not assessed at current market 
value, and therefore the assessments were 
unconstitutional as a matter of law De 
fendants opposed the motion in part on the 
ground that the issues could not be adjudi 
I. In Us 1982 budget session the legislature 
passed a proposed constitutional amendment 
thai was lalifietl by the volets in the November 
1982 genetal election and became effective Jan 
uary 1, 198) t h e amendment alleis Anule 
XIII. s 1 to read 
(I) the I egistatuit shall pioside b\ law a 
umfoim ami equal tate of assessment on all 
tangible pi open \ in the state accoidmg to its 
value in mone\ exiept as otherwise ptoxuied 
cated by summary judgment because of the 
existence of issues of fact Defendants 
submitted evidence indicating that state-as-
sessed properties were undervalued and 
that the s ta tu tes in question were intended 
by the Legislature to redress a substantial 
and discriminatory shift of property taxes 
from s ta te assessed properties to county 
assessed properties The trial court ruled 
against the plaintiffs on the motion and 
held the s ta tu tes constitutional The court 
held that the s ta tu tes were enacted pursii 
ant to the s ta te 's constitutional authority to 
classify property and to establish different 
methods for valuing different types of 
property 
The constitutional at tack on §§ 59-5-4 5 
and 59-5-109 focuses primarily on §§ 2 and 
3 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution 
Section 2 of that article as it read in 1981 
provided 
All tangible property in the state 
shall be taxed in proportion to its value, 
to be ascertained as pi ox tiled by law 
f Emphasis added | 
Section 3 of Article XIII provides 
The legislature shall provide by law a 
uniform and equal ra te of assessment 
and taxation on all tangible property in 
the st i te , according to tts value in mon 
cy, and shall prescribe by law such regu 
lations as shall secure a just valuation 
for taxation of such property so that 
every person and corporation shall pay a 
tax in pro|M>rtion to the value of his, her, 
or its tangible property (Emphasis 
added j 
Two other constitutional provisions also 
deal with the assessment of ad valorem 
property taxes and are pertinent to this 
case Section 4 of Article XIII deals with 
the taxation of mines and mining claims 
in Section 2 of this Artule [I mphasis added 
to show alteration ) 
Section 2 was simultaneously am< tuled to allow 
the ( (gis laluie to exempt up |o 4S pciceul of 
the (an mailed value ol i evidential piopeilv 
Ailicle XIII § 2(8) 
Ihe I egislattiie also lepealed t) S9 S-4S effci 
l i u as of the same date the conslUulioii.il 
amendment betainc elleetise l a w s of Utah 
1981 ch 2*1 * I 
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All metalliferous mines or mining 
claims, both placer and rock in place, 
shall be assessed as the legislature shall 
provide; provided, the basis and multiple 
now used in determining the value of 
metalliferous mines for taxation pur-
poses and the additional assessed value 
of $5.00 per acre thereof shall not be 
changed before January 1, 1935, nor 
thereafter until otherwise provided by 
law. All other mines or mining claims 
and other valuable mineral deposits, in-
cluding lands containing coal or hydro-
carbons and all machinery used in mining 
and all property or surface improve-
ments upon or appurtenant to mines or 
mining claims, and the value of any sur-
face use made of mining claims, or min-
ing property for other than mining pur-
poses, shall be assessed as other tangible 
property, 
n-j Section 11 of Article XIII provides that 
I the "State Tax Commission shall adminis-
*-° ter and supervise the tax laws of the state. 
It shall assess mines and public utilities 
. . . . It shall have such other powers of 
original assessment as the legislature may 
provide." 
Pursuant to § 59-5-3 (Supp 1983), the 
Legislature has directed the Commission to 
assess the following properties: 
Pi|>elines, power lines and plants, ca-
nals and irrigation works, bridges and 
ferries, and the property of car and 
transportation companies, when they are 
operated as a unit in more than one 
county; all pro|»erty of public utilities 
whether 0|>eruted within one county or 
more; all mines and mining claims, and 
the value of metalliferous mines based 
on two times the annual net proceeds 
thereof as provided in section 59-5-57, 
and all other mines and mining claims 
and other valuable deposits, including 
lands containing coal or hydrocarbons, 
nonmetalliferous minerals underlying 
land the surface of which is owned by a 
person other than the owner of such 
minerals, all machinery used in mining 
and all property or surface improve-
ments upon or appurtenant to mines or 
mining claims and the value of any sur-
face use made of nonmetalliferous min-
ing claims or mining pro|>erty for other 
than mining purposes; must be assessed 
by the state tax commission as herein-
after provided; except that property as-
sessed by the unitary method, not neces-
sary to the conduct and which does not 
contribute to the income of the business 
shall be assessed separately. All taxable 
pro|>erty not required by the Constitution 
or by law to be assessed by the state tax 
commission must be assessed by the 
county assessor of the several counties 
in which the same is situated. For the 
purposes of taxation all mills, reduction 
works and smelters used exclusively for 
the purpose of reducing or smelting the 
ores from a mine or mining claim by the 
owner thereof shall be deemed to be ap-
purtenant to such mine or mining claim 
though the same is not u|ion such mine 
or mining claim. 
Under this section and its antecedent, the 
State Tax Commission has assessed the 
tangible properties of the plaintiffs in this 
action. 
Under Article XIII, § 3, the property tax-
es paid on each property are required to 
have a uniform proportion to the value of 
the property. Although the objective is 
easily stated, its attainment is more diffi-
cult. Because of the many different kinds 
of property and the various factors that 
affect their values, the determination of 
what constitutes equal "in proportion to 
the value of his, her or its tangible proper 
ty," under Article XIII, fc 3, cunnot be 
made by application of any single formula. 
Of primary importance is the determina-
tion of what valuation methods should be 
utilized, and that depends on the nature of 
the properties to be taxed. Residential, 
commercial, transportation, mining, and 
public utilities, etc., must be treated differ-
ently because of the economic conditions 
that give value to such properties. Some 
properties are income producing; some are 
not. Some types of property sell frequent-
ly in an open market and have a market 
value that may he reasonably estimated on 
RIO ACCOM CORP. v 
Cllc M M l P 2d 
the basis of comparable market sales; 
some types of property are rarely sold and 
have no ascertainable market value based 
on comparable sales. The value of some 
properties may be strongly influenced by 
general economic or market conditions, 
while others are not. Some may be "wast-
ing asset" type properties (such as mines 
and oil and gas properties), while most are 
not. Indeed, some properties may have a 
value that is peculiar to the owner and to 
no one else. See Kennecott Copper Corp. 
v. Salt Lake County, 122 Utah 431, 250 
P.2d 938 (1952) (where the issue was the 
valuation of a mine dump). 
The constitution and laws of the state 
divide the responsibility for valuation of 
tangible properties between the State Tax 
Commission and the county assessors of 
the respective counties. Article XI11, §§ 5 
and 11. County-assessed properties, such 
as residences and farmland, are assessed 
on the basis of cost or comparable sales, 
and commercial enterprises that are coun-
ty-assessed are usually assessed on a capi-
talized income method. The Tax Commis-
sion utilizes a wide variety of assessment 
methods and formulae. The basic valua-
tion methods utilized by the Commission 
are cost, income, and stock and debt. A 
number of variations of these methods and 
often substantial discretion are used to 
modify the basic methods. 
The cost method values pro|>erty on the 
basis of net book value, which equals origi-
nal cost less depreciation. That method 
gives very little effect to the impact of 
inflation in the assessment process. 
Valuations are also made on the income 
approach. However, its application in a 
given case may vary. The valuation of 
large growth companies under this formu 
la, for example, is generally done on the 
basis of a five-year average of the ratio of 
the value of assets to net income. The 
ratios used involve a variety of measures 
of the value of assets and may include 
current book value, current net book value, 
average book value over five years, and 
average net book value over five years. 
Different levels of income are used for 
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other companies, and the number of years 
utilized in the formula may also vary. The 
decision as to which ratios and how many 
years to use is based upon the discretion of 
the appraiser utilizing the approach or the 
Commission itself. 
The stock and debt method ia based on 
the equity and liabilities of the company as 
shown on its balance sheet. It is applied to 
value state assessed properties that are 
sold so infrequently that the comparable 
sales method cannot be used. Again, sub-
stantial discretion may be exercised by the 
appraiser in valuing a company on this 
basis. In addition, the Commission may 
use the "correlated value" method, which is 
mentioned below. 
Properties owned by utilities are valued 
by a weighted average of the three basic 
methods. For example, the properties 
owned by Utah Power & Light Company 
and Mountain Fuel Company thus are val-
ued by a formula using 50 |>ercent cost, 45 
percent income, and 5 percent stock and 
debt. The Commission also uses a variant 
of this formula called the "correlated 
value" method, by which each of the above 
factors is given such weight as the judg-
ment of the Tax Commission dictates. 
State appraisers, acting under the gener-
al direction of the State Tax Commission or 
a Commissioner, have considerable discre-
tion in determining which method should be 
utilized in assessing a particular property 
and the weight to be given to each indica-
tor of value. 
Pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 59-5-57, the 
legislature has provided that metalliferous 
mines are to be valued at two times the 
average net annual proceeds for the pre-
ceding three calendar years. Nonmetalli-
ferous mines are presently valued by capi-
talizing net income, using a five-year aver-
age, and negative values are taken into 
consideration. See Utah Tax Commission 
Regulation A12-4-12. Under Tax Commis-
sion Property Tax Regulation No. A12-4-
10, oil and gas properties are valued "in an 
amount equal to 80% of the gross realiza-
tion from the sale of oil or gas which was 
produced from each such property during 
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the calendar year prior to the date of as 
s e s s m e n t ' 
In sum the Tax Commission uses a v a n 
ety of formulae to value projM rties How 
ever the formulae used a re generally not 
very sensitive to inflation, e s |* cially those 
formulae based in whole or in par t on hook 
value 
Because of the methods used to assess 
county assessed properties—especially cost 
of reproduction and comparable sales, 
which are highly sensitive to inflation—and 
because of recent high ra tes of inflation 
and the statewide reassessment of county 
assessed properties during the 1970s, the 
assessed valuation of county assessed prop 
erties es|>ecially residential properties has 
become disproportionately high to s ta te as 
sessed properties From 1971 to 1981, the 
value of county assessed properties in 
creased 245 percent a multiple of slightly 
less than 37^ During the same time, the 
value of s ta te assessed properties increased 
approximately only 45 percent Although 
the total increase in the value of county as 
sessed properties was undoubtedly not en 
tirely attr ibutable to general inflation it is 
a fair inference that a significant par t of 
"d the increase was The tomp u itivcly small 
' increase in the value of s ta te assessed 
pro|M*rties was no doubt a reflection in par t 
of valuation formulae tha t gave little effect 
to inflation The differences in the effects 
accorded inflation by the assessment for 
mulae were no doubt substantial factors in 
producing the disparity between the in 
creases in the value of county assessed and 
slat* assess* d properties That disparity 
was the basis for lh« \A gislature s « na< t 
mg the s tatutes in question 
In partial sup|>ort of their (M)sition on 
summary judgment the defendants sub 
nutted the unrebiitted affidavit of a deputv 
Salt l>ake (oun ty auditor which stated 
(Olver the period from 1971 to 1981 there 
is demonstrated a trend that shows the 
continuing disparity in the growth in val 
ue of locally assessed property as com 
pared to state assessed property This 
disparity and trend has continued in spite 
of the legislative attempt to curb the 
trend by enacting Sections 59 5-4 5 and 
59-5^109 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended 1981 Does the trend result 
from the regulations procedures and as 
sessment practices of the Tax Commis 
sion7 These statistics, on comparison 
fail to illustrate any of the contentions 
put forth by the Plaintiffs as being disad 
vantaged by the challenged legislation 
II T H E CONSTITUTIONAI ITY Or 
A Sections 2 and f of Article XIII of the 
Utah Constitution 
We first address the plaintiffs conten 
turns that § 59 5-4 5 violates Arti< le XIII 
of the Utah Constitution s|»ee ificallv s*» 2 
and 3 of that article The argumc nt is th it 
the s ta tute in permitting a 20 p< r ten t re 
duction from the comparable sales a p p r u s 
al or a cost appraisal is in confix t with the 
language in § 2 that requires that all tangi 
ble pro|ierty shall be taxed in proportion 
to its value and the language, in *» i that 
pro|»ertv should be valued according to its 
value in money 
( I ] This language was construed in 
State ex rel Cunningham v Thomas, lb 
Utah 86 50 P <>15 (1897) to mean that 
property should be valued as tic ar as is 
reasonably practicable at its full cash val 
ue, in other words the valuation for 
assessment and taxation shall be as near 
as reasonably practicable equal to the cash 
value for which the properly v tine d would 
sell in the o|>en market lit at 90 50 
P at 615- lh Su also Hat mi i i State 
7<r» ( ommission II lit ih 2d <2I 152 P 2el 
87<> (19<»<l) Kuinuott ( oppu ( oi p i 
Salt lakt (ountu 122 lit ih Ml 250 P 2d 
918(1952) In particular the e Unit is t i n t 
§ 59 5-4 5 is uiuonstitution il b<e inse it 
permits assessments it other t h i n in irket 
value 
| 2 , 3 | An analysis of the constitutional! 
ty of s 59 5-4 5 must begin with the pre»po 
sition that acts of the !> gisl iture ire pre 
sumed constitutional cspccidly when <l< il 
mg with economic m itte is b ise <l on f u t u a l 
assumptions liaku i Mathtson lit dt 
RIO AM.OM CORP v 
UltuMI P2d 
607 P 2d 2 U (1979) Salt I ake (ity i Tax 
Commission 11 Utah 2d *59 159 P 2d J97 
(19(>l) A p i r ty attacking the constitution 
ality of i s ta tu te must affirmative ly 
demons t r i t c its unconstitutionality f a 
Stone i Ih pa it men t oj Rtgistiation 
Utah 567 P 2d 1115(1977) SaltlakeCity 
i Tax (omniission supra Thomas i 
Daughters oj Utah Pioneers 114 Utah 
108 197 p 2d 477 (1918) 
111 The presumption of constitutionality 
applies with p irticular force to tax s ta t 
utes Although we are concerned here 
with the constitutionality of § 59 5-4 5 un 
der Article XIII of the Utah Constitution 
what has been stated by the United States 
Supreme Court with respect to tax s ta tu tes 
challenged under the frejual Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
relevant to the instant problem In San 
Antonio S7hool District i Rodriguez 411 
US 1 40 9 I S ( t 1278 1100 % l Ed 2d 
16 (197 I) the (e»urt stated 
No sche me of taxation whether the t ix 
is imposed on properly income or pur 
chases of goods and services has yet 
bec n de vised whic It is fre e of all discrinu 
natorv impact In such a complex arena 
in which no pc rfect alternatives exist the 
Court docs well not to impose toe» rigor 
ous a st inel irel of se rutwty lest all lo< il 
fiscal s< he me s become subjects of criti 
cism undt r the Fcpial Protection Clause 
(Footnote omitted ] 
.See also Madden i Kentucky 109 U S 8 i 
(»0 S ( t 406 84 I r d 590 (1940) Nut 
\ork Rapid Transit (orp i M M )f)rk 
101 I I S 77 1 58 S ( t 721 82 I I el |02 t 
(1918) 
Under (IM (It ih ( oustilution there is no 
gener i l constitutional authority for classi 
fying pre>p<rt\ for assessment purposes 
I he pi un f i i t is however t i n t ehffere nt 
types of prop< rty cannot be issc sse d under 
one formuli He cause of the necessity let 
use ehffc re nt me thods for assessing diffe r 
ent types of preipe rty a certain degree of 
de f u t o el issifuatiein is unavoidable 
Therefore notwithstanding the basic con 
stitutional objective e>f uniformity there 
are mmv de fie to classifu itions that re 
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suit from the various valuation formulae 
utilized for es t imating market value 
15 61 Because of the lack of a more 
precise common denominator than market 
value for use in achieving uniformity and 
in deference to the inherent difficulties in 
assessing value *J I confers on the I^gisla 
ture the powe r to provide by law for just 
valuations Accordingly when dealing 
with assessments of classes of prof>erty 
*» I must be re M\ to permit a nc cc ssary 
latitude m defining marke t value State 
ex rel ( unmngham i Thomas 16 Utah 
8b 99 50 P 615 618(1897) the case upon 
which the plaintiffs heavily rely recognized 
as much 
Because of its dissimilarity the process 
by which the judgment jof valuation| is 
formed must vary and probably as to all 
property except money perfe ct eepiahty 
in vain itions and assessments is unat 
tamable owing to the fallibility of the 
human judgment 
The point was made eve n more cle arly in 
Unittd Statts Smelting Rifining & Mm 
ingio i Hayius 111 Utah 172 181 17b 
P 2 d 622 <»27 (1917) 
It will be observed t i n t these provi 
sions (s*s 2 and i of Article X111 ] reepnre 
t i n t all t mgiblc property shall be 
subjecteel to i uniform inel equal r i te of 
assessmc nt ae e ordmg to its v iluc in inon 
ey The mcttmd or yarelstuk by which 
the valuation m money is te» be deter 
mine el sb ill be prescribed by the le gisla 
ture It is not required (h i t the same 
V irelstie k or me thod of de te running value 
sh dl be use d with re spe e 1 let .til kinds of 
property Kill the different formula 
wliuh m iy be ipphe d lo different kinds 
of property must be sue It that they um 
and te nd to se e ore for isse ssme nt pur 
poses t \ tin thon f tir nul e eput ible in 
cennpinsori with ind eeunme nsurate with 
the v ilu ition ol ettlte r kinds of propt rty 
When the va lu ihon thus secureel is such 
that if the uniform and equal rate of 
t ixation is applied to the valuation the 
property is taxed in the same proportion 
to its value as is all other tangible prop 
e r t y the methoel e/f i r n v i n g it the is 
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sessed valuation is not subject to consti-
tutional objections as violative of our Ar 
t ide XIII 
Thus, §§ 2 and 3 of Article XIII permit the 
l eg i s l a tu re to adopt means to achieve that 
degree of uniformity in valuation that is 
practicably attainable within the general 
confines of the term "marke t value " The 
objective is to assure that the taxes that 
are levied in a given county will result in 
each property 's being "accountable for its 
pro rata share of the burden of local 
government " Appeal of Johnstoivn Asso-
ciates, 494 Pa 433, 438, 431 A 2*1 932, 934 
< 1U81 > Accotd Kenney v heeblei Co, f>.*l 
PaCommw 507, 411) A 2d 210 (1980)* 
|71 Plaintiffs contend that a reduction 
in the value of county assessed pro|>erlics 
by 20 percent demonstra tes on its face an 
unconstitutional discrimination in favor of 
county assessed pro|»erties However, the 
plaintiffs have not a t tempted to demon 
^3 s t ra te by affidavit or otherwise that their 
' own properties are assessed at maiket val 
ue or that they hear a tax burden grea ter 
than their pro rata share of the property 
taxes in San Juan C/ounty Nor have they 
demonstrated that the deduction of " t rans 
action cos ts" from comparable sales fig 
ures or est imates of cost as (leniulted by 
§ 59-5-4 5 defeats the constitutional objec 
tive of establishing "a valuation (that i s | 
fair and equitable in comparison with and 
commensurate with the valuation of other 
kinds of property " United Stales Smelt 
ing, Refining & Mining Co v llaynes, 
supra, 111 Utah at 181, 17<i P 2d at <»27 
Nor have the plaintiffs demonstrated 
that § 59-5-*4 5 is not consistent with the 
constitutional requirement that properties 
be valued at market value See State ci 
iel Cunningham e Thomas, supra In 
2 Piopcrty lax sthenic* llial sptulual lv allow 
t-lassif nations uic designed m pail lo spitad 
I lie lax buidcn on the al>ihl> ol piopnix lo 
pioduic i iuomt In It//on \ti>ne h/n I itn in 
v Stale Hd of / quuhmlton I \H Moiil 60 \ ISM 
P2d SS. 64 (I960) llu. town slaliel 
I lit* pni|K>s4 ol ilie i lassilii.ilion slalole IS 
lo slilll lilt lundi n nl luxts l iom piopei l\ as 
sin h lo pioeluelivilv 01, in o l lm woids lo 
IIII|M»SC ill*, bin ik us ol i^ovt rniiR ill upon 
pioptily in piopoiliou lo Us list lis piodui 
deed, Thomas itself recognizes that the 
term "market value" is a term that cannot 
be applied in an overly rigid fashion 
The numerous formulae used to deter 
mine market value demonstrate that the 
term is a judgment not subject to mathe 
matical precision that is based on a wide 
variety of factors 
"Market value," the basis for all assess-
ment valuation, is an at tempt to create a 
fictitious sale of the subject pnqierty by 
assuming an owner willing to sell and a 
buyer desiring to buy When, as in the 
instant case, there is no actual buyer 
desiring to purchase the property for 
continuation of its s|>eeia! use. the prop-
erty 's highest and beat use as a special 
pui'|Mjse property must still be considered 
for valuation pur|M»ses The very nature 
of special purjKise property is such that 
market value cannot readily be deter-
mined by the existence of an actual mar-
ket, and therefore other methods of valu-
ation, such as reproduction cost, must be 
resorted to 
Math i oj MeCanntl. Minn, HOI N W 2d 
910, 924 (1980) Accord United National 
Coip e County of Ileum pin, Minn, 299 
N W2d 7.1, 7h (1980) 
riven when there are sales of the type of 
pioperly to be assessed, it Is still the case 
that the term "market v.due" is at best an 
approximation In United National Coip 
e County oj Hennepin, supia, 299 
N W 2d at 7t>, n 4, the court s t a t td 
Market value and sales puce a te not 
s\nonymotis Although le ten t sales of 
pioperties of a similar na tu ie are per 
stiasive in determining market value, fat 
tors such as sales and holding prices in 
the aiea, location, a n ess, age, use, s i /e , 
livilv lis uliltl\ Us t>i ini al silling in lln. i t o 
iiomii oigaiii/alion ol sotitl>, so dial « . \n \ 
one IAIII lu t.illitl upon lo i oiiti il>ul< . m o i d 
inn lo Ins alnlilv lo lx ai bin dins oi a s i i i . u k 
so as max In |l ilaliou ounilcil | 
S< c also [fuiiht (i>nttt\ i Alihisi>n in/nia A 
Sunm 11 K\ An/ 476 I* 2*1 6S7 (l«»/0) I lie 
Hl.ili ( on .Million thus uoi pi i mil i l a . s i lna 
lions .is sui h ixi«pl lo llu i \|t nl III it Xili.li 
Mil I) 2 pi i mils spiti.il l i talmii i l ol i isiiltii 
Hal pi opt i lu s 
RIO AL<;<>M CORP. v 
Cite •• M l P2d 
type of construction, method of financing 
and the a rm's length nature of a transac 
tion may render any comparisons invalid 
In Mattel oj McCannel, supra, U01 
N W 2d at 922, the court phrased the point 
in a somewhat different manner "AI 
though selling price is usually a good indie 
ator of market value if the sale is an arm's 
length transaction between parties with 
equal bargaining power, the terms or condi 
tions of a sale may affect the selling price 
and make it unrepresentative of the proper 
ty 's actual v a l u e " See also Minnesota 
Entertainment Enterprises v State, 30<> 
Minn 184, 187, 285 N W 2d 390, 392-93 
(1975), Deitch Co v Board of Property 
Assessment, 417 Pa 213, 218, 209 A 2d 397, 
402 (1965) 
181 Since "market value" is not a term 
having a wholly fixed and precise meaning, 
it is reasonable and constitutionally permis 
sible for the Legislature to recognize that 
"transaction costs" can and do influence 
values computed on actual sales prices, as 
well as other valuation formulae, to provide 
that they may be taken into account in 
determining market value That conclu 
sion is supported by the language in Article 
XIII, *» 2 that gives the l eg i s la tu re some 
|>ower to define value (Since there is no 
claim in this case that the amount of the 
transaction costs provided for in § 59-5-4 5 
is factually arbi trary, the reasonableness 
of the amount of those costs is in effect 
conceded ) 
191 Fur thermore , the leg is la ture was 
justified in enacting § 59-5-4 5 for another 
reason The l eg i s l a tu re acted on the pre 
muse that the then existing property tax 
scheme in the s ta te was discriminatory be 
cause it required county assessed taxpay 
ers to shoulder an unfair portion of the 
taxes and violated the requirement of uni 
fortuity The l eg i s l a tu re was well aware, 
as the legislative history of both challenged 
acts unequivocally demonstrates , that there 
had been a large shift of the property tax 
burden from s ta te assessed properties to 
3 lu iespouse |«> iUc plainlilis lequesl lot ail 
missions I lie lax Commission iknieil that all 
piopeily untlt i Us jui isdu lion was assessed al 
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county assessed properties as a result of 
inflation In part, the problem arose out of 
the statewide reappraisal program, which 
had the effect of immediately injecting a 
high degree of inflation into residential val-
ues In contrast , the formulae used to 
assess s tate assessed properties did not 
tend to factor the effects of inflation into 
the state assessed properties, or if they did, 
they did so at a much more modest and less 
abrupt pace When inflation has a signifi-
cant and differing effect on the value of 
properties, the l eg i s l a tu re may redress the 
imbalances and inequities created North 
ein Natural lias Co v Williams, 208 
Kan 407, 493 P 2d 5B8 (1972), Supervisor 
oj Assessments v Otremba, 50 Md App 
o08, 440 A 2d 403 (1982) 
The l eg i s l a tu re ' s factual premise that 
s ta te valuation and county valuation were 
not uniform has not been attacked 3 I)e 
fendants filed affidavits with the Court on 
the cross motions for summary judgment 
that lend some support to the factual prop-
osition that there is a significant lack of 
uniformity Kven without the defendants ' 
evidence, however, we would still be oh 
hged to presume that there is a valid factu 
al basis for the challenged s ta tute See 
Muttei of MtCannel. supia, 301 N W 2d at 
9 Hi, El well e Ileum pin County, 301 
Mum t>3, 221 N W 2d 538 (1974) 
110) Certainly the l eg i s l a tu re may not 
establish formal classifications of property 
that result in nonuniform or dispro|M>rtion 
ate tax burdens Hut the leg is la ture may 
seek to enforce the uniformity requirement 
of ^ 3 by at tempting to equalize the tax 
burden borne by those taxpayers who pay 
a greater tax in pro|>ortion to the value of 
their property than others In permitting 
transaction costs to be deducted from a|>-
praisals based on comparable sales or cost 
appraisal method, the l eg i s l a tu re has uel 
ther departed from the "cash value" re 
qutremenl of Article XIII, <» 3, nor gone 
beyond its constitutional duty lo "prescribe 
by law such regulations as shall secure a 
Us t u n e nl (an easli value and luilhci denied 
dial llu plamlilfs pio|HH\ was assesstd al 100 
|Ki i in l ol the l u n e n l lull i asli value 
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just valuation for taxation " Id Clearly, 
the s ta tu te is not based on a plan or a 
principle designed to violate equality and 
uniformity Denver v I^eunn, 106 Colo 
331, 105 P 2 d 854 (1940) 
The overarching purpose of §§ 2 and 3 of 
Article XIII is to achieve uniformity in the 
ad valorem taxing scheme The definition 
of value is one element in a formula de-
signed to achieve tha t end by establishing a 
common denominator for valuation pur 
poses The law has long been that where 
"it is impossible to achieve both the s tan 
dards of the t rue value and the uniformity 
and equality required by law the lat ter 
requirement is to be preferred as the jus t 
and ultimate purpose of the law " Deln 
ware Lackawanna & Western Raihoad v 
Neeld, 23 N J 561. 570, 130 A 2d 6. 11 
(1957), quoting Swur City Bridge Co v 
Dakota County, 260 U S 441, 43 S Ct 190, 
67 L E d 340(1923) 
To assess pro|M»rty a t its jus t \ a l ue is 
only one of the fundamental require 
ments of law The assessment mus t fur 
ther represent the owner'1 < qual portion 
of the burden of taxaf I if the 
assessors have not appraise u .*«. lull val 
ue but only a t a fixed percentage of t rue 
value then such t rea tment must be uni 
form and equal on all real es ta te and 
tangible pro|»ertv, so much so tha t if 
both cannot be obtained then equality 
must prevail 
Ktttery Electric Light Co v Assessors oj 
the Town of hittery Me. 219 A 2d 728, 
734 (1966) 
In the instant case, the l eg i s l a tu re 
might have dealt with the problem of uni 
form taxation bv requiring adjustments in 
the formulae used by the Sta te Tax Com 
mission to assess s tate assessed preqierties 
As a practical mat ter the Legislature may 
well have decided not to a t tempt that a|>-
proach because of the complexity and diffi 
culty of having to deal with so many differ 
ent kinds of formulae for assessing market 
value By acting as it did, the liegislature 
acted neither unconstitutionally nor unrea 
sonably 
Accordingly we hold that § 59-5-4 5 
was constitutional under Article XIII 
B Equal Protection and Uniform Oper 
ation of the Laws 
(11) Equal protection provisions of the 
federal and s tate constitutions accord par 
ticularly wide latitude to legislative classifi 
cations in tax s ta tu tes Apache (*ounty v 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railuay, 
106 A m 356. 476 P 2d 657 (1970) No 
scheme of taxation," whether property, in 
come or otherwise * has yet been devised 
which is free of all discriminatory impact ' 
San Antonio School District i Rodn 
guez, 411 U S 1, 41, 93 S Ct 1278. 1,101, 36 
L E d 2d 16 (1973) In Nashnlle, Chatta 
nooga <£ St Louis Railway v Rioumng, 
310 U S 362, 368, 60 S Ct 968, 971, 84 
L E d 1254 (1940) the Supreme Court s ta t 
ed 
This Court has previously had occasion 
to advert to the narrow and sometimes 
cramping provision of these s ta te uni 
formity clauses, and has left no doubt 
that their inflexible restrictions u|»on the 
taxing powers of the state were not to be 
insinuated into that meritorious concep 
tion of equality which alone the Equal 
Protection Clause was designed to as 
sure 
(121 In sum § 59-5-4 5 does not violate 
the equal protection provisions of the s ta te 
and federal constitutions 
HI CONSTITUTION ALII Y OF 
s 59 5 109 
I J C A , 1953 § 59 5-109 (Stipp 1981) pro 
vides that all ' locally assessed real proper 
ty shall be appraised at e urn nt f ur m u ke t 
value and the value ol such prop* rty rolled 
back to its January I 1978 level Article 
XIII of the Utah Constitution authorizes ad 
valorem property taxes The term ,u\ va 
lorem tax" means literally according to its 
value" and is used to designate an assess 
ment of taxes against property at a certain 
rate on its value Von ell > dhason 50 
An? 542 74 P 2d 47 (1917) 
RIO AL<;OM ( O R P v SAN JUAN COUNTY 
tllraaMtl P 2d IM (l)lah 19S4) 
Utah 195 
113,141 A critical factor in establishing 
assessments that represent reasonably ac 
curate approximations of value is tune 
Virtually all factors that influence value 
vary with time An ad valor* m tax system 
must, therefore be based on periodic re as 
sessments that take into consideration the 
fluctuating factors that affect value To 
free7e the value of some properties at a 
given point in time, and not others must 
necessarily result in nonuniform assess 
ments In Moon Lake Etettnc Associa 
tton i» State Tajr Commission 9 Utah 2d 
384, 145 P 2 d 612 (1959) this Court held 
unconstitutional a s ta tutory formula that 
fixed the assessment of a property for ad 
valorem tax purposes The Court stated 
"The effect of these ( s t a tu to ry | sections is 
nothing unless it prevents the accurate 
assessment of pro|ierty in a given case to 
its full value The conflict with the consti 
tution is clear Id at 387 M5P2dat<>14 
That is precisely the difficulty with the 
ro l lh ick s ta tuh * It n<c<ssanly follows 
that an inch finite partial fre« /* on th< 
valuation of some prop* rties in the state is 
inherently inconsistent with the basic con 
cept of an ad valorem tax system IneviU 
bly, the s ta tu te would produce valuations 
that are not based on market value and 
that are in violation of the princ iple of 
uniformity • 
( I 5 | We recognize t i n t s 59 5-109 w i s 
enacted to redress a disparity l>< twee it as 
sessments of s ta te assessed and count\ is 
sessed properties But if the constitution 
is to be changid to adjust for MHIK IIH qui 
ty, the> ptoph must make (hat < h uige l»y 
constitution il tint udnie ut 
( I 6 | In sum the fixing of base line is 
sessments of county assess* <l real pi oper 
ties as of a give n year in the past VM I tah 
Hotel ( o i l oiuason Utah, 659 P 2d 10 ><> 
(198J), is a violation of Article XIII ss 2 
and 3 and is unc (institution tl 
IV PROSPECllVr- AND 
RrTROA( H V r 
r r r r C I S 
Defendants i rgue that if either of these 
s ta tutes is found IIIK onshtution il the n (lie 
( ourt should make its ruling prospective 
only as we did in overruling pnor decisions 
in / oyat Order of Moose No 259 t> Coun 
ty Hoard Utah 657 P 2d 257 (1982) Oth 
e rwise defendants maintain local govern 
ments will be subject to enormous financial 
and administrative burdens Taxing dis 
tricts throughout the s t a te have relied on 
the provisions of these s ta tu tes in setting 
their null levies for 1981 through 198a* 
I^ocal governments operate on very precise 
and often strained budgets that are care 
fully tied to these levies Since 1981 a 
number of owners of s ta te assessed proper 
tics h ive paid their taxes under protest or 
have filed formal complaints with the Tax 
Commission Retroactive effect to a deci 
sion altering the relative tax burdens be 
tween locally assessed and state assessed 
properties would require reopening the as 
sessme nt process as to tax obligations not 
yet final To the extent that this might 
result in re fmuh of f ixes paid on state as 
s< ss« d |>ro|»<rties it would impose incle bt 
edness for future repayments from locally 
assessed properties Such indebtedness 
could be huge in counties that derive high 
proportions of their budgets from state as 
sessed properties 
The purely prospective application of a 
state court decisietn overruling prior au 
thoritv in a < IMI ease violates no right 
under the United SUtes Constitution 
(tteat Notthun Railuay i Sunburst Oil 
d Rt funny (o 287 U S 158 53 S Ct 145 
77 I I d 160 (19*2) (The prospective or 
n t r o u t i v c eff« < t of <U c isions in criminal 
< is< s m\ol \<s i difle r« nt range of consul 
eri t ion uid is nc i lh t r precedent for nor 
should he dee nice! influenced by what is 
done in < ivil c is* s ( ompare State v Nor 
ton t»7r» p 2d 577 (198 1)) In recent years 
the United States Supreme1 ( o u r t has on 
s e \ e r i l occasions held civil legislation un 
constitution il
 t\tu\ then given only prosper 
tive effe* t to its holding in order to avoid 
imposing undue administrative or financial 
burdens on agencies of local government 
r u Ittnont kurtzman 411 V i> 192 91 
S ( t 1461 16 I M 2 d 151 (1971), City of 
I'homn i kolodzHjshi 1 9 q | I S 204 9(1 
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SCI 1990, 26 L E d 2 d 523 (1970), Ciprt-
a no v City oj tloumu, 395 U S 701, 89 
S C t 1897, 23 L E d 2 d 047 (1909) The 
prospective effect the Court gave to its 
holding on the unconstitutionality of the 
hroad jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts IH 
another example Northern Pipeline Con 
struct ion Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co, 
458 I! S 50, 102 S Ct 2858, 73 I. Ed 2d 598 
(1982) 
Similarly, in cases holding that state tax-
es or assessment procedures were unconsti 
lutional, numerous state courts have direct 
ed that their holdings should have only 
prospective effect Eg, Southern Pacific 
Co v Cochise County, 92 Aru 395, 377 
P 2 d 770 (1963), Deltona Corp v Hadey, 
Fla, 330 So 2d 1103 (1976), Strickland v 
Newton County, 244 Ga 54, 258 S E 2d 
132 (1979), Kansas City Millwright Co v 
Kalb, 221 Kan 658, 562 P 2d 65 (1977), 
Jacobs v Leu i nylon Fayette Ihban Coun 
hrj ty Government, Ky , 500 S W 2d 10 (1977), 
I Salorto r Glasei, 93 N J 447, 461 A 2d 
^ J 1100 (1983), Soo Line Rail,ond r State, 
N i l , 286 N W 2 d 459 (1979), Pttktns r 
County of A/bet matte, 214 Va 416, 200 
S E 2 d 566 (1973), (iottlub e City oj Mil-
waukee, 33 Wis 2d 408, 147 N W 2d 033 
(1967) 
These state decisions rely on the need to 
preserve the financial solvency of local 
government units, the great financial and 
administrative hardship that would be en 
tailed if general retroactive effect were 
allowed, and the tax authorities' justifiable 
reliance on the statute, which is presump 
tively constitutional To the objection that 
an unconstitutional act is void from its 
inception so that everything done thereun 
der must be undone, the New Jersey Su 
pre me Court cited the mi|»ortauce of recog 
lining "that we are acting within the 
framework of appropriate equitable relief 
with respect to an unconstitutional taxation 
statute " Salouo r Gla.s< t, 93 N .) at f>h t, 
401 A 2d .it 1108 In fashioning an equita 
bl< remedy, reliant e mten sts weigh heavi 
ly. ami the tour! should seek a blend of 
what is necessary, what is lair, and wb.it is 
workable Id at 564, 461 A 2d at 1109, 
relying on the opinion of Chief Justice 
Burger in Lemon r huttzman, sit pi a 
We relied on these same considerations in 
directing purely prospective elfect (front a 
future date) to our overruling decision in 
Isoyal Ordet oj Moose No 259, supra 
On the basis of the circumstances of this 
case, the foregoing considerations and au 
thorities persuade us of the appropnate 
ness of prospective effect to our bidding 
that § 59-5-109 is unconstitutional 
One of the criticisms of giving only pro 
spective effect to a decision is that it turns 
the court's opinion into an advisory opinion 
or dicta It also deprives the litigants, who 
have sustained the burden of attacking an 
unconstitutional statute, of the fruits of 
their victory For this reason, prospective 
effect may even discourage challenges to 
statutes of questionable validity In re 
spouse to these considerations, some deci 
sions that give only prospective effect to a 
holding of unconstitutionality as to all oth 
er parties give the holthng retroactive ef 
feet as to the litigants or others who have 
litigation (tending Stm klattd c Ntwton 
County, suptn ((la parties onl>) huii 
sas City Mtllwi tyht Co v ha lb, supia 
(Kan —parties and others with action pend 
ing), Pet kins v County oj Albet matte, 
supra (Va—parties only) See yene tally 
Schaefer, "Pros|»ective Rulings Two Per 
speclives," I9HJ Suptemc COM// Review 1, 
6, Schaefer, "The Omtrol of 'Sunbursts' 
Techniques of Pros|>ective Overruling," 42 
N Y UL Rev Ml , 638-40 (1967) We gave 
this kind of hunted retroactive effect to a 
decision that local government legislation 
was unconstitutional, a decision that was 
otherwise prospective only Cutttt e IU tt 
eer County Set rue A tea No One, 16 
Utah 2d 280, 283, 399 P 2d 410, 4 12 (1965) 
117| For the same reasons that motivat 
ed the foregoing de< isions we duett that 
our holding of line nnstit ut lou.iht \ h< pro 
spec Uvc and old « live onl\ horn and a l h r 
Jauiiaiy I 19X1 As to tin six plaintiff 
taxpayeis who an p.utus to tins .ipp4.il 
bowevei Ibis decision shall he u t i o . u l K c 
for the year for which this suit toi lefund 
was brought 
RIO ALOOM CORP. v. 
UicaaMI P 2d II 
V PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND 
Having concluded that § 59 5-109 is un 
constitutional, it is appropriate to state the 
guidelines that should be applied in deter 
mining what relief may be granted on re 
mand 
1181 For the plaintiffs to recover an al 
leged overpayment of taxes paid under pro 
test on the ground that § 59-5-109 caused 
a shift in the tax burden to their properties, 
plaintiffs must prove two elements First, 
the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the 
county assessed properties were appraised 
at less than their 1981 true values Sec 
ond, the plaintiffs must establish by inde 
pendent evidence the true value of their 
own properties, and the appraisal used 
must give due effect to the same economic 
factors as the formulae used to value the 
county assessed properties Reading Co 
v Woodbrtdye, 45 N J 407, 426, 212 A 2d 
649, 659-60 (1905), In ie Appeals of 
Kents, 34 N J 21, 33, 166 A 2d 763, 769-70 
(1961), Tri Terminal Corp v Edgewatet, 
68 N J 405, 412, 346 A 2d 396, 400 (1975), 
Fott Lee v Hudson Ten ace Apat tint nt\ 
175 N J Super 221, 236, 417 A 2d 1124, 
1132 (1980), Anaconda Co v Perth Am 
boy, 157 N J Super 42, 53-54, 384 A 2d 
531, 536-37 (1978) 
(191 Although there usually is a pre 
sumption that property assessed by a slate 
or county assessor has been appraised al 
full value, the presumption applies only 
when a taxpayer challenges the valuation 
of his own property and not when he dial 
lenges the appraised value of another's 
property Eg, State ex ret Stephan v 
Martin, 227 Kan 456, 463, 608 P 2d 880, 
887 (1980), Reading Co v Woodbrtdye, 45 
N J at 429, 212 A 2d at 661 To extend 
that presumption to plaintiffs' properties in 
this case would conflict with the implied 
legislative finding that slate assessed prop 
erties were underassessed It would also 
conflict with the Tax Commission's admis 
sion thut plaintiffs' properties are not val 
ued at full value • To presume that plain 
tiffs' properties are assessed at full value 
SAN JUAN COUNTY Utah 1 9 7 
M (Ui»h 1984) 
under these circumstances could well be 
contrary to fact and could result in enhanc-
ing the inequality the legis lature sought to 
redress Ste Reading Co t» Woodbndge, 
supra, 212 A 2d at 660 
1201 If plaintiffs prove both elements, 
they may recover the difference between 
the amount of taxes they paid and the 
amount they would have paid if § 59-5-109 
had not been in effect See First National 
Hank r Chnstensen, 39 Utah 568, 577-78, 
118 P 778, 781 (1911), Continental Na 
tional Bank i> Nay lor, 54 Utah 49, 58, 179 
P 67, 71 (1919) If the plaintiffs* proper 
ties were appraised at less than full value, 
they will be entitled to what they would 
have paid had § 59-5-109 not been in ef 
feet, less the amount they underpaid their 
taxes because their properties were under 
assessed 
The case is affirmed in part, reversed in 
part, and remanded for further proceed 
ings No costs 
OAKS and DURHAM, J.l , concur 
HOWE, Justice (concurring) 
1 concur except in the application in part 
11(A) of the principle that "where it is 
impossible to achieve both the standard of 
the true value, and the uniformity and 
equality required by law, the latter require 
nient is to be preferred as the just and 
ultimate purpose of the law " That princi 
pie apparently originated in Sioux City 
Budge Co v Dakota County, 260 U S 
441, 43 S C t 190, 67 I. Ed 340 (1923), 
where that Court relied upon it to justify 
its departure from a statute requiring prop-
erty to be valued at its fair market value in 
order to comply with a constitutional man 
date that there be uniformity and equality 
of taxation By applying the principle, the 
Court was able to afford relief to a tax pay 
er whose property had been assessed at 
full fair maiket value while other proper 
tits in the county had been assessed at only 
55 < '1 In principle was applied under HUUI 
lur circumstances in Dvluivun', Lut Kuwait 
na & Wtstttn Raihoad i> Neeid, 23 N J 
4. See ii 3 supra Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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561. 130 A 2d 6 (1957) cited in the main 
opinion. 
In the instant case, however, valuation at 
fair market value is mandated by article 
XIII, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, and its requirements cannot be re-
laxed in an effort to obtain uniformity and 
equality also mandated by section 3 In 
the context of this case, the principle can 
have no application 
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and dis-
senting) 
I join the Court in declaring the roll back 
provisions of 11 C A , 1953, § 59-5-109 
(Supp 1981) unconstitutional on their face 
However, for the same reasons, I also view 
as unconstitutional on their face the provi-
sions of U C A , 1953. § 59-5-4 5 (Supp 
19HI), which reduce the value of taxable 
real property assessed by the counties by 
200* 
Article XIII. sections 2 and 3 of the 
Constitution of Utah in unequivocal Ian 
guage require that all non exempt tangible 
pro|»erty, both real and personal, be as 
sessed at a "uniform and equal rate," and 
•"rj that it be assessed and taxed 'according to 
I its value in money " 
This Court has long heretofore interpret 
ed the term "according to its value in mon 
ey" as the full cash value of the property ' 
Also, the term "full cash value" has been 
determined to be synonymous with the 
terms "actual cash value," "market value," 
' reasonable fair cash value" and "value in 
money " * 
It is thus to be seen that § 59-5 4 5 is 
unconstitutional on its face in that it directs 
the county assessor to assess and tax conn 
ty assessed property at 80'/! of its "reason 
able fair cash value" rather than at UM)"' 
of its value This is precisely the sort of 
inequality and lack of uniformity that vio 
tales the express provisions of article XIII, 
sections 2 ami 3, mpta 
1 Stale v lhnma*. 16 Ulali 86. SO l» 6IS <I8<*7) 
2 kenneiott ( opper (ntp i Salt I <tke < onttt\ 
122 Huh 411 ?S0 T2d <M8 (l«S2) 
The defendants recite the legislative his-
tory of the subject statute, which reflects 
that a disparity was found to exist in the 
valuation of county assessed and state as 
sessed property The disparity was appar 
ently occasioned by the different valuation 
methods employed by the state and the 
counties The counties generally utilized a 
comparable sales method that readily re 
fleeted the effect of inflation upon market 
value. However, the state continued to 
inflexibly follow its usual cost, income, 
stock and debt approaches to market value 
and failed to in any way eomi>ensate for 
the effects of inflation This caused con 
siderable consternation on the part of coun 
ty assessors who were compelled to assess 
the pro|>erty of their constituents at sharp 
ly increasing values while stale assess-
ments lagged far behind It was to relieve 
this inequity in assessment that the Leg is 
lature enacted the subject statutes How 
ever well mtentioned the legislative enact 
inents were, the> nevertheless do not meet 
constitutional muster 
Article XIII. section 3, supta. confers 
upon the legislature the obligation and 
duty to "provide by law a uniform and 
equal rate of assessment and taxation" and 
to "prescribe bv law such regulations as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of 
such pro|»erty " However, that authority 
must be read in light of the overriding 
concept espoused by the constitution, l e , 
that all pro|>erty be assessed at a "uniform 
and equal rate," and that it be taxed "ac-
cording to its value in money " The case 
of Vtntctl States Smtltiuq. h'e/imuq <V-
Mttnnq Co v Haynes.1 relied upon bv the 
defendants does not hold to the contrary 
flathei. it is supportive of this basic propo 
sition This is to be seen in that no matter 
which method or yardslak the legislature 
chooses to determine the valuation of prop 
erty in money, the end result th.it must be 
achieved is just that, l e "aceoiding to its 
value in innnev 
3 111 Utah 172. 176 I' 2d 622 (IV47) 
WELLS v. CHILDREN 
ClteasMtl P 2d 
Viewed in light of what has just been 
said, the subject legislation causes state as 
sessed and county assessed pro|»erty to be 
assessed at unequal rates and at values 
other than actual market value Further 
more, the legislation tends to compound 
rather than alleviate the problem of dispari 
ty in assessed valuation This it does by 
leaving in place and thereby sanctioning 
the erroneous assessment practices of the 
state that fail to assess property according 
to its actual value Rather than legislating 
so as to insure that the assessment prac 
tices of the state be revamped so as to 
bring them in conformity with constitution 
al mandate, the legislation directs the coun 
ty assessor to also violate the constitution 
by assessing property at a rate 20'^ less 
than actual value 
I would reverse the decision of the trial 
court in its entirety 
(O f«l» n«miiM> 
CindyN Fay WELLS. Ouarduin ad litem 
for Dennis Edgar Wells. Jr., a minor 
over the age of 11 years, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY OE UTAH. 
Successor in Custody of Kit . . Mother 
of Infant K . and K.K . Defendants and 
Appellants. 
v 
John DOE and Mnrv Doe and Robert D 
Maack. Esq . (Guardian ad litem for In-
fant It . Intervenors and Appellants 
No. 18537. 
Supierne Court of Utah 
March 23. 1984 
Unwed ininoi father brought action 
through guardian ad litem seeking c ustody 
of newborn child that had been released to 
state adoption agency and subsequently to 
adoptive parents, after father failed lo 
make timely filing of his acknowledgment 
of paternity as required by statute The 
Seventh District Court. Or.tud Cnuiit\, 
S AID SOC. OF UTAH Utah 1 9 9 
199 (Utah 1984) 
Royd Bunnell. J , granted custody of child 
to father on grounds that statute could not 
constitutionally be applied to him, and 
mother, agency, and adoptive parents ap 
pealed The Supreme Court, Oaks, J , held 
that (1) statute specifying procedure for 
terminating parental rights of unwed fa 
ther is constitutional under due process 
clause of United States Constitution, {2) 
such procedure is consistent with due pro 
cess requirements of Utah Constitution, 
and (3) agency correctly applied statute on 
facts of case and did not violate fathers 
federal or state due process rights 
Judgment reversed, case remanded 
with directions 
1. Children Out of-Wedlock <S=»20 
Parent and Child <s=»2( 1) 
The relationship between parent and 
child is protected by Federal and State Con 
stitutions, these protections include the fa 
ther of an illegitimate child 
2. InfantH ®=>|55, 156. 157 
Con ditutionaliy ptohc l td parental 
rights can be lost, tlt< \ tan be siirtendered 
pursuant to statute, they can be lost 
through abandonment of the child by mat 
tion or course of conduct for which parent 
is personally responsible, such rights can 
also be teimutated through parental unfit 
ness or substantial neglect II C A 1953, 
78 30 t(l, 2b 78 30 5 
3. Adoption <£=>I4 
To serve its purpose for welfare of 
child, determination that newborn child can 
be adopted must be final as well as luuncdi 
ate 
I Adoption e=>7 2<3> 
The stal l 's st iong inteiest in immedi 
ale secuie adoptions for eligible newborns 
piovides a sufficient justification for signil 
leant variations in parental tights of imw< d 
fathers, who, in contrast to mothers, are 
not automatically identified by vutue of 
their role in the process of birth 
5 Constitutional Law o > 2 l 2 l t h 
Infants C--|;{2 
Statute sp«.« il\ mg plot « dure for lei nil 
nating parental rights of unwed lather, 
Hquiniig lathet to file acknowledgment of 
paternity pnoi to date
 ( Inld is n It a s . d to 
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DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and Dakal, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, Plaintiffs and Respon-
dents, 
refer the reader to that opinion for a full 
expression of my views on this practice. 
u£ 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN AS-
SOCIATION, Defendant and Petitioner. 
No. 870343. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 12, 1989. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Ap-
peals, Third District, Salt Lake County; J. 
Dennis Frederick. 
Ted Boyer, H. Mifflin Williams, III, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and petitioner. 
Jerome H. Mooney, Arthur M. Strong, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and respon-
dents. 
Prior report: 765 P.2d 1277. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Having heard oral arguments and having 
further reviewed the record and the briefs 
on file, it appears that certiorari was inv 
providently granted. The case is therefore 
dismissed. 
STEWART, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
(dissenting): 
1 dissent I do not join in dismissing the 
writ of certiorari. No valid reason exists 
for doing so, and the majority expresses 
none. In Israel Pagan Estate v. Capitol 
Thrift and Loan, 771 P.2d 1032 (Utah 
1989) (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting), I set 
out the conditions under which the United 
States Supreme Court dismisses writs of 
certiorari as having been improvidently 
granted and suggested that we follow its 
practice. None of those conditions exist 
here, and I decry the wasteful use of time 
and money of the parties, their lawyers, 
and this Court which dismissal promotes. I 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF 
UTAH, a nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Utah State Tax Commis-
sion, and Utah State Insurance Depart-
ment, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 1W76. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 19, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 1989. 
Nonprofit health service corporation 
challenged constitutionality of statute im-
posing premium income tax on health ser-
vice corporations and other insurers, but 
exempting mutual benefit associations and 
cooperative benefit associations. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, J. 
Dennis Frederick, J., granted summary 
judgment in favor of State, Tax Commis-
sion, and Insurance Department. Corpora-
tion appealed. The Supreme Court, Zim-
merman, J., held that imposing premium 
income tax on nonprofit health service cor-
poration, but exempting mutual benefit as-
sociations, did not violate "uniform opera-
tion of laws" provision of State Constitu-
tion, equal protection clause, or prohibition 
against private or special law. 
Affirmed. 
1. Constitutional Law «=»213.1<2) 
Examination into reasonableness of ec-
onomic legislation under "uniform opera-
tion of laws" provision of State Constitu-
tion is at least as vigorous as that required 
by federal equal protection clause. Const. 
Art. 1, § 24; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD v. STATE Utah 6 3 5 
Cll«u779 T2A 434 (Utah Iftt) 
2. Constitutional Law *»209 
If statutes can withstand scrutiny un-
der "uniform operation of laws" provision 
of State Constitution, they comply with fed-
eral equal protection clause. Const. Art 1, 
§ 24; U.S.C.A. Const. A mend. 14. 
3. Constitutional Law *»213.1(2) 
In scrutinizing legislative measure un-
der "uniform operation of laws" provision 
of State Constitution, it is necessary to 
determine whether classification is reason-
able, whether objectives of action are legit-
imate, and whether there is reasonable re-
lationship between classification and pur-
poses. Const Art. 1, $ 24. 
4. Constitutional Law ••70.1(12) 
In tax area and in other areas of pure-
ly economic regulation, broad deference is 
given to legislature when scrutinizing rea-
sonableness of classifications and relation-
ship to legitimate, legislative purposes un-
der "uniform operation of laws" provision 
of State Constitution. Const Art 1, $ 24. 
6. Constitutional Law *»229.2 
Taxation *»9S4 
Insurance companies and health ser-
vice corporations on the one hand and mu-
tual benefit associations and cooperative 
benefit associations on the other hand were 
relevant groupings in "uniform operation 
sof laws" challenge to statute imposing pre-
mium income tax on health service corpora-
tions and statute imposing premium income 
tax on other insurers, but exempting mutu-
al benefit associations and cooperative ben-
efit associations. Const Art 1, $ 24; U.C. 
A.1953, 81-14-4(1), 31-87-9(2) (Repealed); 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
6. Constitutional Law *=»70.1(5) 
Supreme Court deciding challenge to 
statutes under "uniform operation of laws" 
provision of State Constitution is not free 
to break out groups that might be distin-
guishable if legislature did not do so. 
Const. Art. 1, $ 24. 
7. Constitutional Law «=»229.2 
Taxation «=»955 
Imposing premium income tax on non-
profit health service corporation and other 
insurers, but exempting mutual benefit as-
sociations, was reasonably related to legit-
imate purposes of raising revenue and giv-
ing special treatment to fraternal nature of 
associations, and, therefore, did not violate 
"uniform operation of laws" provision of 
State Constitution or equal protection 
clause, even though associations could op-
erate as for-profit corporations and were 
not required to be adjuncts of nonprofit, 
religious, cooperative, or benevolent orga-
nizations, and even though two of the six 
mutual benefit associations in State did not 
restrict themselves to issuing policies only 
to employees of single company or mem-
bers of church or association; corporation 
failed to show tax took business from it or 
other commercial insurers. Const Art 1, 
§ 24; U.C.A.1953, 31-14-4(1), 31-37-9(2) 
(Repealed); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
8. Constitutional Law *=»213.1(2) 
In determining whether classifications 
that legislature has used are reasonably 
related to legitimate legislative purpose 
and comply with "uniform operation of 
laws" provision of State Constitution, Su-
preme Court is not limited to considering 
those purposes that can be plainly shown to 
have been held by some or all legislators. 
Const Art. 1, \ 24. 
9. Constitutional Law *=»211(2) 
Impact of measure can be relevant in 
determining whether legislative body has 
exceeded bounds of broad discretion it has 
in fashioning purely economic legislation 
and can be relevant in determining whether 
legislation complies with "uniform opera-
tion of laws" provision of State Constitu-
tion. Const Art 1. $ 24. 
10. Statutes «=»96<1) 
Taxation *=»955 
Statutes imposing premium income tax 
on insurers of nonprofit health service cor-
porations, but exempting mutual benefit 
associations and cooperative benefit associ-
ations, are "general laws" and do not vio-
late state constitutional prohibition against 
private or special laws, in that statute com-
plied with "uniform operation of laws" re-
quirement of State Constitution. Const 
Art 1, % 24; Art 6, ft 26; U.S.C.A. Const Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Amend 14, U C A 1958, 31-14-4(1), 31-37-
9(2) (Repealed) 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions 
11 Statutes *»77(1) 
If law satisfies "uniform operation of 
laws" provision of State Constitution, it 
will not violate prohibition against private 
or s|»ecial law Const Art 1, $ 24, Art 6, 
§ 26 
David R Money, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant 
David L Wilkinson, Stephen G Schwen-
diman, Bruce H Pettey, Mary Beth Walz, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appel 
lees 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice 
Plaintiff Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Utah ("Blue Cross"), a nonprofit health 
service corporation, appeals from a summa 
ry judgment granted against it and in favor 
of defendants State of Utah, Utah State 
Tax Commission, and Utah State Insurance 
Department (collectively, "the State") 
This judgment upheld against state and 
federal constitutional challenge a pair of 
Utah tax statutes Taken together, these 
statutes levied a 2 26 percent tax on sub-
scription income received by nonprofit 
health service corporations and on premium 
income received by all other insurance com-
panies in the state, but exempted from the 
tax the premium income received by insur-
ance companies organized as mutual bene-
fit associations ("MBAs") Utah Code 
Ann 55 31-14-4(1), 31-37-9(2) (Supp 
1981)' We conclude that the tax scheme 
enacted by these statutes is constitutional, 
therefore, the trial court's ruling is af 
firmed 
Blue Cross initiated this action against 
the State, challenging the taxing scheme 
represented by sections 31-14-4(1) and 31-
37-9(2) of the Code It contended that 
I Title 31 of the Code has been repealed and 
replaced by title 31A 1985 Utah U w s ch 242, 
§ 58 effective July I 1986 This opinion will 
address the constitutionality of the tax levied by 
title 31 because it was the law in effect at the 
MBAs were in all material respects indis 
tinguishable from Blue Cross, a health ser-
vice corporation, against which the MBAs 
competed directly It also contended that 
by exempting MBAs from the 2 25 percent 
tax imposed on all other insurers, the legis 
lature had placed Blue Cross at a competi 
tive disadvantage and that in treating the 
MBAs add Blue Cross differently, the leg 
islature had created a classification that 
bore no reasonable relation to the purpose 
of the taxing scheme, which was to raise 
revenue Blue Cross attacked the taxing 
scheme under the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution as well as under the 
uniform operation of the laws provision 
and the special laws ban contained in the 
Utah Constitution U S Const amend 
XIV, § 1; Utah Const art I, § 24, Utah 
Const art VI, 5 26 Both Blue Cross and 
the State filed motions tor summary judg 
ment The trial court granted the State's 
motion and denied that of Blue Cross, hold 
ing that as a matter of law, Blue Cross had 
not demonstrated the taxing scheme's un 
constitutionality Blue Cross appeals that 
determination 
A grant of summary judgment is appro-
priate only when no genuine issue of ma Le-
na I fact exists and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
Utah RCivP 66(c), see, eg, Ron Cose 
Roofing and Asphalt Paxnng, Inc v 
Blomquxst, 773 P 2d 1382, 1384 (1989) In 
considering an appeal from a grant of sum 
mary judgment, we view the facts in a light 
most favorable to the losing party below 
Eg, Sejlel v Capital Ctty Bank, 767 P 2d 
941, 946 (Utah Ct App 1989), Payne ex rel 
Payne v Myers, 743 P2d 186, 187-88 
(Utah 1987) And in determining whether 
those facts require, as a matter of law, the 
entry of judgment for the prevailing party 
below, we give no deference to the trial 
court's conclusions of law those conclu 
sions are reviewed for correctness Eg, 
Bonham v Morgan, — P 2d , 
time Blue Cross filed its first complaint See 
Utah Code Ann $ 31A-l-202(2) (1986) ( An ac 
lion or proceeding commenced under any law 
repealed by this title is not affected by the 
repeal") 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUh SIIIKLU v SI AIL 
CIUM779 PJd *34 (Utah 1989) 
Utah fat 
102 Utah AdvRep 8, 9 (Feb 23, 1989), 
Scharfv BMG Corp, 700 P 2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1985) 
Blue Cross renews on appeal all the chal 
lenges it made below We consider first its 
claims that the taxing scheme violates both 
the equal protection clause of the federal 
constitution and the uniform operation of 
the laws provision of the Utah Constitu 
tion US Count amend XIV, § 1, Utah 
Const art I, § 24 We will then treat the 
assertion that the tax violates the special 
laws ban of article VI, section 26 
(1,2) The principles and concepts em 
bodied in the federal equal protection 
clause and the state uniform operation of 
the laws provision are substantially similar 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co v Salt Lake 
City Corp, 752 P 2d 884, 888 (Utah 1988), 
Malan v Lewis, 693 P 2d 661, 669-70 (Utah 
1984) However, our examination into the 
reasonableness of economic legislation un 
der article I, section 24 of the Utah Consti 
tution is at least as vigorous as that re 
quired by the federal equal protection 
clause, and probably more so Mountain 
Fuel Supply, 752 P 2d at 889, 890, see 
Recent Developments, 1989 Utah L Rev 
143, 317 Therefore, if the statutes under 
attack can withstand scrutiny under article 
I, section 24, they will not be found to 
violate the federal equal protection clause 
752 P 2d at 890 Accordingly, we will con 
sider Blue Cross's claims under article I, 
section 24 
(3) Article I, section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution commands that "(a]ll laws of a 
genera) nature shall have uniform opera 
tion " Utah Const art I, § 24 The con 
cept underlying this provision is "the set 
tied concern of the law that the legislature 
be restrained from the fundamentally un 
fair practice" of classifying persons in such 
a manner that those who are similarly situ 
ated with respect to the purpose of a law 
are treated differently by that law, to the 
detriment of some of those so classified 
Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P 2d at 888 
In scrutinizing a legislative measure under 
article I, § 24, we must determine whether 
the classification is reasonable, whether the 
objectives of the legislative action are legit 
imate, and whether there is a reasonable 
relationship between the classification and 
the legislative purposes 752 P 2d at 890, 
see Malan, 693 P 2d at 670-75 
[4] It is important to note at the outset 
that our uniform operation of the laws 
analysis is guided by the well settled propo-
sition that all statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional and the party challenging a 
statute bears the burden of proving its 
invalidity ( tty of West Jordan v Retire 
ment Bd, 767 P 2d 530. 537 (Utah 1988), 
Baker v Matheson, 607 P 2d 233, 236 
(Utah 1979), State Tax Comm'n v Wright, 
596 P 2d 634, 636 (Utah 1979) It is also 
important to note that although the broad 
outlines of the analytical model used in 
determining compliance with the uniform 
operation of the laws provision remain the 
same in all cases, the level of scrutiny we 
give legislative enactments varies See, 
e g, Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P 2d at 888 
n 3, Condemann v University Hospital, 
775 P 2d 348 353-57 (Utah 1989) (opinions of 
Durham and Stewart, JJ ) In the tax area, 
as m other areas of purely economic regu 
lation, we give broad deference to the legis 
lature when scrutinizing the reasonable 
ness of its classifications and their relation 
ship to legitimate legislative purposes 
City of West Jordan, 767 P 2d at 637, 
Mountain f>\iel Supply, 762 P 2d at 
888, Baker, 607 P 2d at 236 That broad 
deference leads us to sustain a classifies 
tion if "facts can reasonably be conceived 
which would justify the distinctions or dif 
ferences in stM*? policy [expressed by the 
challenged legislation] as between different 
persons " Baker, 607 P 2d at 244 (citing 
Lindsley v Natural Carbonic Gas Co, 
220 US 61, 31 SCt 337, 66 LEd 369 
(1911)) We do not, however, "accept any 
conceivable reason for the legislation 
Rather, we judge such enactments on the 
basis of reasonable or actual legislative 
purposes " Malan, 693 P2d at 671 n 14 
(5,6] Having stated the legal principles 
that govern our review of Blue Cross's 
claims, we proceed to the analysis, begin 
ning with the statutory scheme, for it de-
termines the classification at issue Nor 
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mally, there would be little dispute about 
the definition of the class to be tested 
Here, however, where two sections of the 
Code combine to impose the taxes under 
attack, the classification issue is comphcat 
ed Section 31-37-9(2)f taxes at a 2 25 
percent rate the premium income of all 
health service corporations, while section 
31-14-4(1) * taxes at the same rate the pre-
mium income of all other insurers, but ex-
empts MBAs4 The question is whether 
these two sections should be viewed sepa-
rately, thereby placing Blue Cross in one 
class and all other insurers, including 
MBAs, in another, with members of each 
class subject to being compared only with 
other members of the same class, or wheth-
er the two sections should be viewed as 
part of one taxing scheme that classifies all 
insurers together, thereby permitting com 
parison of the law's treatment of sub-
groups within that larger class, such as all 
insurers but the MBAs, and the MBAs 
Under our cases, if the legislature has clas 
sifted all insurers but the MBAs in one 
group and the MBAs in another, those are 
the classifications we must examine We 
are not free to break out groups that might 
be distinguishable if the legislature has 
not See Crowder v Salt Lake County, 
552 P2d 646, 647 (Utah 1976), gee also 
State v Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 726 P2d 
202, 205 (Ct App 1986), Aetna Life Ins Co 
There shall be paid to the state tax commis-
sion by every corporation subject to the provt 
sions of this act a tax of 2'/M of the total 
subscription income received by it during the 
next preceding calendar year from contracts 
covering risks in this slate less the amount of 
mil subscription income returned or credited 
to subscribers on direct business in this state 
Utah Code Ann § 31-37-9(2) (Supp 1981) (em 
phasis added) 
Every insurance company engaged tn the trans 
action of business tn this state shall pay to the 
state tax commission, on or before March 31 
in each year (I) a tax of 2'/*H of the total 
premium received by it during the next prated 
tng calendar year from insurance covering 
property or risks located in this state, other 
than workmen s compensation and occupa 
lional disease disability insurance premiums 
specified in subsection (3). and other than 
ocean marine as specified in subsection (2) 
hereof less the amount of ail premiums re 
turned or credited to policyholders on direct 
business in this state and premiums received 
v Washington Life & Disability Ins 
Guar Ass'n, 83 Wash 2d 523, 527 n 6, 520 
P2d 162, 165 n 6 (1974) (en banc) To 
resolve this issue, a brief history of the 
premium income tax is necessary 
As early as 1907, the legislature passed 
laws regulating "insurance corporations " 
Utah Compiled Laws tit 14, ch 7, §§ 403-
422 (1907) Those laws imposed a tax on 
"[ejvery insurance company doing business 
in this state" of 1 5 percent of the gross 
premiums received, less any property tax 
paid to the state Id at (§ 419, 421 "So-
cial," "benevolent," and "religious" orga 
nidations were excluded from these insur-
ance laws, including the premium tax provi-
sion Id at i 418 We are unaware of 
whether any of the then-existing social, 
benevolent, or religious organizations of-
fered insurance to any of their members at 
the time, although the specific exemption 
would suggest that this is a distinct possi 
bility The 1907 statute did not define "in 
surance corporations" This lack was 
remedied in 1909, when insurance corpora 
tions were defined to include "all corpora-
tions, associations, partnerships or individu 
als engaged as principals in the insurance 
business, excepting fraternal and benevo-
lent orders and societies" 1909 Utah 
Laws ch 121, % 2 (emphasis added) 
In 1909, the legislature authorized the 
creation of county mutual insurance compa-
for reinsurance of such property or risks and, 
less the amount of dividends, including pre 
mium reduction coupons maturing within 
said year, paid or credited to policyholders 
within this state or applied in abatement or 
reduction of premiums due during the calen 
dar year next preceding and less premiums 
on policies which have been or will be issued 
by domestic benefit fMBAsJ. or co-operative 
benefit associations. 
Utah Code Ann f 3l~14-4()) (Supp 1981) (em 
phasis added) 
Technically, section 31-14-4(1) gives the 
MBAs a deduction rather than an exemption 
But since the deduction eliminates the MBAs' 
liability for premium tax. it is de facto an ex 
emotion, and we will refer to it as such 
4 Subscription income" for health service cor 
porations, the term used in section 31-37-9(2). 
is equivalent to "premium income" for other 
insurance companies, and the remainder of this 
opinion will refer to both types of income as 
premium income 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD v. STATE 
a t * • • 779 rjd 4*4 (Vtmk IMtJ 
Utah 639 
nies that could provide protection against 
losses occasioned by fire 1909 Utah Laws 
ch 95 In 1916, these county mutuals were 
exempted from the general statutes regu-
lating insurance companies, including the 
provision imposing the 15 percent tax 
Utah Compiled Laws ttUe 19, ch 11, $ 1187 
(1917) The insurance laws were recodified 
in 1933 At this time, county mutuals and 
fraternal benefit societies were each bro-
ken out and covered by then* own specific 
provisions of title 43 of the 1933 Code, and 
each was explicitly excluded from the other 
provisions of the insurance laws, including 
that imposing the premium tax Utah Rev 
Stat §§ 43-8-18, 43-9-4 (1933) 
"Benefit associations" made their first 
appearance in the Code in 1935 At that 
time, the legislature required that they 
comply with the provisions of the newly 
enacted statute 1935 Utah Laws ch 41 
It appears that these associations were not 
to be subjected to the premium tax then 
applicable to all insurance companies, and 
it also appears that the new benefit associ 
atlons were defined so as to permit the 
fraternal or religious benefit associations 
that had been previously exempted from 
the insurance laws to continue business 
under this new form with the proviso that 
those societies and/or organizations paying 
sick or death benefits to members or their 
dependents would be exempt from provi 
sions of the Act 1935 Utah Laws ch 41, 
§ 18 During the same legislative session, 
the premium income tax on insurance com 
names was raised from 1 5 percent to 2 25 
percent, where it remains today 1935 
Utah Laws ch 40 
In 1941, the legislature provided for the 
creation of "cooperative life insurance asso-
ciations " 1941 Utah Laws ch 47 These 
associations appear not to have been sub-
jected to the general premium tax applies 
ble to insurance corporations In 1943, the 
3. In debate on the floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives regarding the imposition of the 2 25 
percent premium tax on Blue Cross and the 
other health service corporations Representa 
live Gunnell the chair of the committee that 
recommended the legislation said the commit 
tee had studied this issue for several years and 
"felt at that time that this bill that covers Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield should bring Blue Cross/Blue 
laws of Utah were recodified At that 
time, insurance companies, benefit associa-
tions, and cooperatives were each covered 
by separate titles See Utah Code Ann 
tit 43, §§ 3, 11, 12 (1943) All the insur-
ance laws were recodified in 1947 At that 
time, the exemption from the premium tax 
enjoyed by "domestic benefit or coopera-
tive benefit associations" was inserted in 
the section imposing the tax on other insur-
ers 1947 Utah Laws tit 43, ch 14, 
§ 4(1) The name "benefit associations" 
was also changed to "mutual benefit asso-
ciations " 1947 Utah Laws title 43, ch 31 
In 1947, the legislature added chapter 30 
to title 43 It applied to "non profit hospi 
tal service plans" such as Blue Cross This 
is the first time such plans appeared in the 
Code These hospital service plans were 
excluded from the coverage of the insur-
ance laws that contained the 2 25 percent 
premium tax 1947 Utah Laws tit 43, ch 
30 
In 1969, the insurance laws were again 
recodified What were then termed health 
service corporations were brought under 
the jurisdiction of the state Commissioner 
of Insurance, and the 2 25 percent premium 
tax was imposed on them At the same 
time, the legislature barred the entry of 
any new MBAs or cooperatives into the 
insurance field, however, existing compa 
nies of that type were grandfathered, and 
the grandfathered companies remained tax 
exempt, as they had been since they were 
first recognized in the statutes The rea 
son for shifting health service corporations 
such as Blue Cross into the category of 
insurers subject to the premium tax ap-
pears to have been a desire to equalize 
what the legislature saw as competitive 
unfairness resulting from then* previous 
tax exempt status• 
Shield under the same regulations and under 
the same taxing situation as other insur 
ance companies in the State I think I 
state as chairman of the committee the feeling 
of that committee—that the Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield Insurance Company should be taxed 
equally, and that it would be absolutely fair In 
light of the competitive situation that exists in 
the insurance industry" 
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As this history reveals, there is a good 
deal of variety in the types of organizations 
offering insurance, and ways of organizing 
and operating insurers are constantly 
evolving. Over the years since 1907, when 
insurance companies were first explicitly 
recognized in the Utah at » legisla-
ture has classified insu< grouped 
them together in various wa> <tt different 
times for purposes of regulation and taxa-
tion.* Since 1969, the legislature has 
grouped health service corporations and 
other insurance corporations together for 
purposes of imposing the 2.25 percent pre-
mium tax, and it has grouped mutual bene-
fit associations and cooperative benefit as-
sociations together for the puiftoses of ex-
empting them from the tax. Based on the 
legislature's very conscious decision in 
1969 to group insurance corporations and 
health service corporations together for the 
purposes of the premium tax nnd to contin-
ue to exempt expressly MBAs and coopera-
tives from that tax, we conclude that we 
must accept those classifications for the 
purpose of analyzing the constitutionality 
of the premium tax. We therefore reject 
efforts by the State and Blue Cross to have 
us consider other groupings for comparison 
purposes, such as health service corpora-
tions and MBAs, or health service corpora-
tions alone. The relevant groupings for 
our purposes are insurance companies cov-
ered by section 31-14-4 and health service 
corporations covered by section 31-37-9, on 
the one hand, and MBAs and cooperative 
benefit associations, a mug! :• of insur-
ance companies, on the otlui (hereafter 
referred to collectively as "MBAs"7). 
17] Having settled the question of the 
relevant classifications, we next move to 
the three-step analytical model used to de-
termine compliance with the uniform opera-
tion of the laws provision of article I, sec-
*. It is also noteworthy that a new form of what 
might broadly be termed health care insurance 
has emerged recently in the form of health 
maintainence organizations, or HMOs, and the 
legislature has chosen not to consider these in-
surance at all. They are not separately regulat-
ed, and they are not subject to the premium tax. 
The same is true of the "insurance" offered by 
motor clubs; they are not regulated, and their 
tion 24. See p. 637, supra. The first 
question is whether there is anything inher-
ently unreasonable in the legislature's clas-
sifying all insurers together but then treat-
ing as a separate class those organized as 
MM As. On its face, that distinction is not 
patently unreasonable. There might well 
be characteristics of companies organized 
as MBAs that would warrant treating them 
differently than other insurers. Indeed, 
the legislature has classified different in-
surers differently at various times for vari-
ous regulatory or revenue purposes. 
Therefore, we cannot say that in the ab-
stract, the classifications drawn by the 
statutes create a discrimination "with no 
rational basis." Mountain Fuel Supply, 
752 P.2d at 890 (quoting Mountain States 
Legal Found, v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, 636 
P.2d 1047, 1065 (Utah 1981)). And the 
basis upon which the classification is made 
is certainly not proscribed. See Mountain 
Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 890. 
The second issue under our analytical 
model is the legitimacy of the objectives 
pursued by the legislation. Here, the State 
advances two purposes. The first and pre-
dominant purpose of the premium income 
tax is to raise revenue for general govern-
mental expenses. This is a legitimate pur-
pose. Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 
890. A second and somewhat subsidiary 
purpose suggested by the State for the 
inclusion in 1969 of health service corpora-
tions within the group of insurers subject 
to the premium tax is to equalize taxation 
of insurers who compete with each other. 
As for the exclusion of the MBAs from the 
tax, the State suggests that the legislature 
may have thought the "fraternal" nature 
of the MBAs warranted treating them dif-
ferently than more commercially oriented 
insurers. This, too, is a legitimate legisla-
premium income is not taxed. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 31-42-31 (1974). 
7. From our review of the record, we are unable 
to determine whether there are. in fact, any 
cooperative benefit associations. Certainly, 
none are part of this litigation. Therefore, for 
the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to 
those exempted from the premium tax as MBAs. 
BLUE CROSS AND Bl 
OtaaaTTV PJ4 
tive purpose.* 
The third and most critical question is 
whether the legislature chose a permissible 
means to achieve its legitimate ends. Ac-
cording to Blue Cross, MBAs are in all 
significant respects operationally indistin-
guishable from other insurers and compete 
directly against them. Blue Cross also con-
tends that it has lost business to the MBAs 
because of the price-distorting impact of 
the premium tax. Blue Cross submitted a 
conclusory affidavit in support of this lat-
ter proposition which stated that Blue 
Cross had been unsuccessful in gaining the 
health insurance business of certain institu-
tions served by MBAs and that the premi-
um tax exemption enjoyed by MBAs gave 
them a competitive pricing advantage, in-
cluding Blue Cross. Given the lack of any 
significant differences between the MBAs 
and nonprofit health service corporations 
and the competitive burden the premium tax 
creates for Blue Cross when competing with 
the MBAs, Blue Cross contends that the 
MBAs' premium tax exemption constitutes 
a discrimination that is not reasonably relat-
ed to any legitimate legislative end; there-
fore, it must be declared invalid and the 
whole premium tax scheme struck down. 
Blue Cross dismisses the State's claim 
that in imposing the tax on health service 
corporations, the legislature was also at-
tempting to remedy a perceived market 
place inequity—that Blue Cross had proven 
itself to be a very successful competitor in 
the health care insurance market, that its 
exemption from the premium income tax 
paid by other generally for-profit insurers 
had become unfair, and that treating MBAs 
differently by continuing their exemption 
was appropriate because their "fraternal" 
character distinguished them from the com-
mercial insurers—by asserting that there is 
virtually no legislative history explaining 
why the MBAs' exemption was continued. 
On this basis, Blue Cross contends that 
there is no legitimate objective for the leg-
t. Blue Cross strenuously objects thai this sup-
posed purpose was raised for the first lime on 
appeal. Our review of the record indicates thai 
this is not the case The issue was raised before 
the trial court, and extensive reference to the 
UE SHIELD v. STATE Utah $41 
*S4 (Utah I9t9) 
is la tion beyond revenue enhancement and, 
therefore, we must judge the segregation 
of MBAs and Blue Cross into two different 
classes against that purpose only. 
[8] In this approach to the issue, Blue 
Cross misp**rceives the applicable standard 
of review when addressing purely economic 
enactments. As stated earlier, in determin-
ing whether the classifications the legisla-
ture has used in such enactments are rea-
sonably related to a legitimate legislative 
purpose, we are not limited to considering 
those purposes that can be plainly shown to 
have been held by some or all legislators. 
We will sustain a classification if we can 
reasonably conceive of facts "which would 
justify the distinctions or differences in 
state policy [expressed by the challenged 
legislation] as between different persons." 
Baker, 607 P.2d at 244 (citing Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 
S.Ct. 337, 66 LEd. 369 (1911)). We do not 
"accept any conceivable reason for the leg-
islation Rather, we judge such enact-
ments on the basis of reasonable or actual 
legislative purposes." Malan, 693 P.2d at 
671 n. 14. But we do not require any exact 
proof of those purposes; it is enough that 
they may be reasonably imputed to the 
legislative body. 
With this standard in mind, we move on 
to consider the relationship of the means 
used to a legitimate end. From the legisla-
tive history cited to the trial court, it ap-
pears obvious that the health service corpo-
rations were subjected to the premium tax 
in 1969 because the legislature thought it 
unfair to exempt them from a tax imposed 
on their competitors in the marketplace. 
There is nothing in the legislative history, 
however, that helps explain why the MBAs' 
exemption was continued. It is in the his-
tory of the premium tax that we find a 
probable reason for treating the MBAs dif-
ferently: the legislature considered MBAs, 
unlike health service corporations, to be 
different in character than the run-of-the-
legislative history of the premium tax scheme 
was submitted in support of the State's conten-
tion. Blue Cross certainly cannot contend that 
it has been surprised by the assertion of this 
claim again on appeal. 
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mill commercial insurer This legislative 
judgment about the character of those ex 
empted from the premium tax has a long 
history, dating back to the initial insurance 
legislation in 1907 From then on, what 
have variously been labeled fraternal, coop-
erative, religious, or mutual benefit associ-
ations that offer insurance to their mem 
here or adherents have been exempt from 
the premium tax and, at various times, 
have been subjected to entirely separate 
schemes of regulation The question for 
us is whether the judgment that MBAs are 
sufficiently different to be eligible for dif 
ferent tax treatment is sustainable 
In an effort to find a reasonable basis for 
the legislature's separate classification of 
M BAs for purposes of the premium tax, we 
have reviewed their organizational struc 
ture and mode of operation, as they are 
explained in the statutes and record In 
summary, we can say that while health 
insurance in Utah is offered by a variety of 
types of companies, including stock insur 
$} era,* mutual insurers,19 reciprocal insur 
I ers," mutual benefit associations,11 and 
^ health service corporations " and each is 
organized and functions in a slightly differ 
ent manner, there is little inherent in any 
of these forms of organization that is of 
much significance when it comes to deter-
mining what sorts of products they can or 
do offer in the insurance marketplace 
And whatever distinctions may exist in or-
ganization, function, or product offered, 
9 Utah Code Ann tit 31. ch 8(1974) 
10 Utah Code Ann til 31 ch 9 (1974 * Supp 
1981) 
11 Utah Code Ann tit 31 ch 10 (1974 A Supp 
1981) 
12 Utah Code Ann tit 31 ch 31(1966) 
IB Utah Code Ann tit 31 ch 37 (1974 4 Supp 
1981) 
14 Deseret Mutual Benefit Association has forty 
one policyholders most of which are affiliates 
of the Corporation of the President of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Lalter-Day Saints 
Deseret Mutual does not use a sales force and 
does not solicit insurance business from the 
general public 
Associated American Mutual Life Insurance 
Company has only three policyholders—Deseret 
the legislature did not find those distinc 
tions significant for tax classification pur 
poses This is evident because MBAs 
share many characteristics both with 
health service corporations and with others 
of the insurers mentioned above, yet the 
legislature chose to treat MBAs differently 
for purposes of the premium tax 
The only characteristic that seems to set 
MBAs apart from the insurers taxed is that 
of the six MBAs in Utah, most are nonprof 
it and restrict their business to issuing 
policies only to employees of a single com 
pany or to members of a church or associa 
tion to which the MBA is captive " There 
is nothing in the statutes under which the 
MBAs are organized that requires them to 
so restrict their business or prevents them 
from being operated as for profit corpora 
tiona However, all but two have so re-
stricted themselves with respect to the 
sources of their business, and only one 
MBA is operated as a for profit corpora 
tion This raises two questions first, can 
the legislature treat all insurers sharing 
these characteristics as a separate class for 
purposes of the premium tax, second, if 
the class includes some insurers that do not 
share those characteristics, does that fact 
invalidate the classification measure7 We 
treat these questions separately 
The first issue, whether these character 
istics are sufficient to justify the legisla 
ture's treating those sharing them as a 
Mutual Benefit Association Intermountain 
Health Care (formerly owned by the LD S 
Church) and the Corporation of the President 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints Associated American provides coverage 
only for employees of Intermountain Health 
Care 
Electric Mutual Benefit Association provides 
group hospital and surgical insurance and acci 
dental death insurance to employees of Utah 
Power it light Company 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association pro-
vides insurance to members of the Utah Edu 
cation Association and others who are engaged 
in certain educational activities in Utah 
Gem State Mutual offers insurance to anyone 
in Utah but primarily sells group policies to 
small businesses 
Allied Mutual Assurance Association is a for 
profit corporation that offers insurance to any 
one in Utah but it does not offer health or 
accident insurance 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD v STATE 
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distinct class of insurers for purposes of The explanation 
the premium tax, we answer in the positive 
We see nothing illegitimate in treating in 
surers that can be characterized as ad 
juncla of nonprofit, religious, cooperative, 
or benevolent organizations as different 
than what might be characterized as com 
mercial insurers By exempting MBAs 
from the premium tax, the legislature may 
have been expressing its judgment that 
entities of this type are not comparable to 
commercial insurers that compete in the 
open market and should not therefore be 
burdened by the premium tax That judg 
ment does not appear to be without rational 
foundation 
Blue Cross notes that the law under 
which these insurers are organized does 
not require MBAs to have the characters 
tics that we conclude could have motivated 
the legislature to treat them separately 
The relevant question is not whether the 
law requires those characteristics, but 
whether in fact they share those character 
istics If they all did, we would have no 
further question about whether the exemp-
tion is reasonably related to a legitimate 
legislative purpose, however, they do not 
Gem State Mutual and Allied Mutual As 
surance do not have the same captive affil 
lation with a specific group that character 
izes all the rest of the MBAs, both these 
companies sell to anyone in Utah, and Gem 
State sells health insurance, presumably in 
direct competition with Blue Cross and oth 
er health insurers We cannot conceive of 
any reason why such insurers would be 
treated differently for purposes of the pre-
mium tax To this extent, then, the legisla 
ture, in exempting all entities organized as 
MBAs from the premium tax, has used a 
classification that imperfectly effects its 
purposes 
This gives rise to the second issue posed 
above if the class includes some insurers 
that do not share the characteristics that 
could be legitimately used to define the 
class, does that fact invalidate the classifi 
cation measure7 We think that it does not 
Utah 643 
for this conclusion re-
quires th t we return to the standard gov 
eming review of challenges under the uni-
form operation of the laws provision of 
article 1 section 24 to the constitutionality 
of legislation that is purely economic As 
noted earlier, we accord the legislature 
broad deference when reviewing the rea 
sonableness of the relationship between the 
classifications it uses and legitimate legis 
lative purposes it seeks to achieve How 
ever, the analytical model spelled out above 
does not explicitly address the question of 
what we do when faced with what we con 
elude is an imperfect classification, even 
after we accord the legislative act every 
presumption The answer lies in an exami 
nation of the impact of the misclassifica 
tion 
(9] There is nothing inherent in the arti 
cle 1, section 24 test as it was stated in 
Malan and our other decisions based on 
equal protection or uniform operation of 
the laws principles such as Allen v Inter 
mountain Health Care, Inc, 635 P 2d 30 
(Utah 1981) and Redwood Gym v Salt 
Lake County Comm'n, 624 P 2d 1138 
(Utah 1981), that expressly requires us, in 
determining the constitutionality of an en 
actment, to take into account the impact of 
the legislative classification under attack 
on those classified However, it seems 
clear that the impact of a measure can be 
relevant to determining whether the legis 
lative body has exceeded the bounds of the 
broad discretion it has in fashioning purely 
economic legislation 
For example in Mountain Fuel Supply, 
appellant Mountain Fuel contended that 
Salt Lake City had created an arbitrary 
classification when it singled out for the 
imposition of a franchise tax, set at four per 
cent of gross receipts, all public utilities 
supplying natural gas, electricity, and tele-
phone service and all others supplying nat 
ural gas, electricity, and telephone service 
in competition with the public utilities>ft 
Mountain Fuel contended that the classifh 
IS The Salt Lake City ordinance under attack 
taxed equally all suppliers of gas electricity 
and telephone services It was not limited in its 
reach to public utilities Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co v Salt Lake City Corp 752 P 2d 884 886 * 
n 1 (Utah 1988) But see opinion of Howe J 
concurring 752 P 2d at 891 
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cation was Invalid because It did not treat 
equally all those similarly situated; specifi-
cally, the City did not impose the tax on 
those who sold heating fuels other than 
gas and electricity in direct competition 
with those taxed Finally, Mountain Fuel 
contended that as a result of this tax, its 
ability to compete for certain customers, 
such as those able to switch from coal to 
gas with ease, was severely hampered 
The Court rejected Mountain Fuel's chal-
lenge to the ordinance In so doing, we 
accepted as fact the claim that those sub-
jected to the tax, including both utilities 
and nonutihties, were competitively disad-
vantaged to some degree because of the 
tax 752 P 2d at 891 We also implicitly 
accepted as fact the contention that natural 
gas and electricity competed with other 
fuels in the heating fuel market Id But 
we determined that the question was not 
whether Salt Lake City had dra vn perfect-
ly the boundaries of the class of persons to 
be taxed; rather, the question was whether 
the City had drawn them in a permissible 
fashion. The permissibility of the classifi-
cation was determined by balancing the 
justifications advanced by the City for ex-
cluding those who might logically have 
been included in the class aga<« * the harm 
allegedly suffered by those in \ led as a 
result of the exclusion of their competitors. 
Id. We concluded that Mountain Fuel had 
not shown that the competitive disadvan-
tage imposed on those taxed as a result of 
the arguably misdrawn class lines was suf-
ficiently great, given the effectiveness of 
the tax in accomplishing the City's aims 
and the administrative efficiencies realized 
by not including in the taxed class those 
providing heating fuels other than natural 
gas and electricity, to warrant a finding 
that the burden resulting from the ordi-
nance was "unreasonable" or "unjustifia-
ble " Id.1* 
It is important to note that in evaluating 
the justifications for imposing the tax on 
suppliers of natural gas, electricity, and 
telephone service, the Court gave wide lati-
tude to the City in demonstrating that the 
16. Tor another case reflecting the examination 
of the burdens imposed by a tax in considering 
the reasonableness of the classification scheme 
classification boundaries it drew were rea-
sonably related to its revenue and tax-
spreading objectives. Although the justifi-
cations for not taxing suppliers of alterna-
tive heating fuels focused on the ease of 
collecting the tax from public utilities and 
their ability to pass the tax on to custom-
ers, the fact remains that the tax was also 
levied on small-scale, non-utility suppliers 
of those same commodities and services. 
The administrative ease and efficiency 
claims advanced by the City to distinguish 
the public utilities from the suppliers of 
alternative fuels arguably did not apply 
when the non-utility suppliers who were 
taxed were compared with the alternative 
fuel suppliers who were not. See 752 P 2d 
at 891. 
At the margins, then, the operation of 
the City's classification scheme might not 
have stood the test of its justifications. 
Some might have been excluded who could 
logically have been included and vice versa. 
However, the Court still affirmed the valid-
ity of the City's ordinance because, on the 
whole, after considering the burdens it im-
posed on those taxed, it appeared to be a 
reasonable attempt to achieve the legit-
imate government ends. 
In so holding, we demonstrated the oper-
ation of the principle that in the area of 
purely economic legislation, and especially 
taxation, we do not require perfection 
This principle was well stated in Baker v. 
Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979): 
Legislative enactments that are basi-
cally economic in nature rarely affect all 
persons equally. Such enactments re-
quire classifications which necessarily re-
flect legislative judgments which accord 
various weights to various shadings of 
differences in human affairs Razor thin 
distinctions which are entirely devoid of 
some arbitrariness are rarely, if ever, 
possible. The rationality of the classifi-
cations is a matter of degree. If courts 
were to insist upon logical precision in 
creating classifications not consistent 
with the nature of the problem to be 
defining those subject to it, see Continental 
Bank 4 Trust Co v Farmtngton City. 599 P 2d 
1242 (Utah 1979) 
Cite M 779 FJd 
addressed, legislative power would be 
seriously crippled As Justice Holmes 
observed, "We must remember that the 
machinery of government would not 
work if it were not allowed a little play in 
its joints " Bam Peanut Co v Ptnson, 
282 US 499, 501, 51 S Ct 228, 229, 75 
LEd 482 (1931) 
607 P 2d at 243, see Recent Developments, 
Uniform Operation of Economic Regula-
tions, 1989 Utah L Rev 143, 307 
Returning to the present case, the ques-
tion is whether the legislature acted imper-
missibly when it used a classification— 
MBAs—to achieve its objective of exclud-
ing insurers that can be characterized as 
adjuncts of nonprofit, religious, cooper a 
tive, or benevolent organizations from the 
premium tax when that classification is 
over inclusive in that it exempts not only 
such organizations, but also two insurers 
that are apparently indistinguishable from 
those taxed As noted, the classification 
used in Mountain Fuel was also over in-
clusive It taxed nonutility vendors that 
did not fit the justifications offered for the 
classification and that were presumably 
disadvantaged by the tax when competing 
against sellers of alternative fuels Yet we 
upheld the classification, inasmuch as there 
had been no showing that the competitive 
burden imposed was unreasonable in light 
of the reasons offered in support of the 
classification used in imposing the fran-
chise tax 
Similar logic applies in this case Blue 
Cross submitted a conclusory affidavit to 
the trial court suggesting that it had been 
unable to secure contracts for insurance 
from some customers who had insured 
through MB As However, Blue Cross did 
not show that this business would have 
gone to it or to some other commercial 
insurer but for the premium tax, nor did it 
demonstrate that any disadvantage which 
resulted from the premium tax that it or 
the other insurers suffered when compet-
ing with MBAs was substantial or caused 
Blue Cross or the other insurers any finan 
cial hardship The legislature is not to be 
denied an "effective means of raising need 
ed revenues unless that means imposes an 
unreasonable burden on the affected par 
ties." Mountain Fuel, 752 P 2d at 891 
6JM (Utah I9S9) 
In the present case, Blue Cross failed to 
show that it or any other insurer incurred 
any burden Therefore, even though we 
cannot conceive of any reason for exempt-
ing two MBAs from the premium tax, that 
misclassification of insurers resulting from 
the measure is not sufficient to warrant 
striking down the tax 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude 
that the challenge to the premium tax un 
der article I, section 24 must be rejected 
Since we reject that claim under the Utah 
Constitution, we also reject the challenge 
made under the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment to the United 
States Constitution Mountain Fuel, 752 
P 2d at 890 
(10,11) The next issue is Blue Cross's 
challenge to the premium tax under article 
VI, section 26 of the Utah Constitution 
That provision states: "No private or spe-
cial law shall be enacted where a general 
law can be applicable " Utah Const art 
VI, § 26 Our cases make it clear that a 
special law is a law that classifies its objects 
unreasonably, as by selecting from a gener 
al class particular persons, places, or things 
for the purpose of conferring privileges or 
imposing burdens See, eg, Hulbert v 
State, 607 P2d 1217, 1223-24 (Utah 1980), 
Utah Farm Bureau Ins Co v Utah Ins 
Guar Ass'n, 564 P 2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977) 
Although there may be some differences 
between the reach of article I, section 24 
and article VI, section 26, our cases to date 
have, in essence, viewed the special laws 
ban to be the flip side of the uniform opera 
tion of the laws command See State v 
Bishop, 717 P 2d 261, 265 (Utah 1986) If a 
law satisfies the requirement of article I, 
section 24, that all laws of "a general nature 
shall have uniform operation," it will not 
violate article VI, section 26 
In the present case, we have found that 
sections 31-14-4(1) and 31-37-9(2) operate 
to validly impose a premium tax on msur 
ers, except for MBAs As such, these stat 
utes constitute general laws And we have 
found that they do not offend the uniform 
operation of the laws requirement of article 
1, section 24 We therefore conclude that 
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they do not violate the special laws ban of 
article VI, section 26 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm 
the judgment of the trial court 
HALL, CJ , HOWE, Associate CJ , 
and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ, 
concur 
to f «l» JNIMMI mi tM> 
8TATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Henry S BRUCE, Jr, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No 860326. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
July 28, 1989 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt l*ke County, Leonard 
H Russon, J , of aggravated robbery De-
fendant appealed The Supreme Court, 
Howe, Associate C J , held that (1) investi 
gatory stop was pro|»er, (2) in court identl 
fication by police officer was proper, (3) 
prior convictions should not have been ad 
nutted for impeachment purposes but ad 
mission was harmless, and (4) defendant's 
conviction would be reduced from aggrava 
ted robbery to robbery 
Conviction vacated in part and case 
remanded 
Zimmerman, J , filed a concurring and 
dissenting opinion in which Durham, J , 
concurred 
1 Criminal Law «=>1036 1(4) 
Defendant did not waive for appellate 
review challenge to admission of evidence 
which was subject of motion to suppress 
when defendant failed to further object to 
adniisHiofi of evideiue at trial where trial 
judge was also judge who presided over 
suppression hearing 
2 Criminal Law *»1168(4) 
In the absence of clear error, the Su-
preme Court upholds trial judge's factual 
assessment underlying decision to grant or 
deny suppression motion 
2. Arrest «»t3.6(2) 
Police officers may, in appropriate cir-
cumstances and in appropriate manner, ap-
proach person for purposes of investigating 
possible criminal behavior, even though 
there is no probable cause to make arrest 
4. Arrest «-**.« 4) 
In justifying particular investigatory 
intrusion, police officer must be able to 
point to specific and articulable facta 
which, taken together with rational infer-
ences from those facta, reasonably warrant 
intrusion 
6 Arrest *»*3 6(C) 
While police officers who issued radio 
broadcast may have improperly placed two 
black males in front seat of orange car 
seen leaving scene of robbery, sufficient 
information was provided and articulable 
facta existed to support at least reasonable 
suspicion that robber was in orange car, 
therefore, stop was made in objective re-
liance on broadcast which was issued by 
officers possessing reasonable suspicion 
justifying stop 
6. Criminal Law *»339 HK2) 
In-court identification of defendant by 
police officer, who pulled defendant's ar-
rest file and looked at his photograph to 
see if defendant was person officer had 
seen standing across from store on night of 
robbery, was admissible, although it was 
contended that identification was baaed on 
out-of-court one photo showup, there was 
no reasonable likelihood of irreparable mis-
identification at trial resulting from police 
officer's conduct 
7 Criminal Law *»782(6 6) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to give cautionary instruction 
on eyewitness identification where four 
eyewitnesses identified defendant two wit-
nesses stood only an arm s length from 
STATE v 
C I I « M T 7 » f i d 
man they both identified as defendant, they 
had particularly good opportunity to ob-
serve, it was highly likely that result would 
have been exactly the same even if caution 
ary instruction had been given, and defense 
counsel's cross examination of State's wit 
nesses and extensive closing argument 
more than sufficiently alerted jury to possi 
bility of error in eyewitness identification 
8 Witnesses «=>345(1) 
Convictions for crimes not involving 
dishonesty or false statement cannot be 
used for im|>eachment purposes unless 
they are felony convictions and trial court 
haa applied proper balancing test under 
rule Rules of Evid , Rule 609(a) 
9 Witnesses *=>34S(1) 
Factors to consider when balancing 
probative value of prior crimes evidence 
against prejudicial effect, for purposes of 
determining admissibility for impeachment, 
include nature of crime, as bearing on char 
acter for veracity of witness, recentness or 
remoteness of prior conviction, similarity 
of prior crime to charged crime, tmpor 
lance of credibility issues in determining 
truth in prosecution tried without decisive 
nontestimonia) evidence, and importance of 
accused's testimony, as perhaps warrant 
nig the exclusion of convictions probative 
of accused's character for veracity 
10 Witnesses •-345(2) 
Prior conviction for theft may be ad 
missibte for impeachment purposes if in 
fact crime was committed by fraudulent or 
deceitful means Rules of Evid, Rule 
609(a) 
11. Criminal Law «=»1170%U) 
Witnesses «=»337(lt. 19) 
Defendant's prior convictions for steal 
tng type crimes of retail theft and attempt 
ed burglary were not crimes of "dishonesty 
or false statement" which could be admit 
ted for impeachment purposes, however 
admission of prior convictions was harm 
less given evidence of guilt Rules of 
Evid , Rule 609(a)(2) 
12 Criminal I .aw <*=•! I70%< I) 
Standard for reveraal in cases involv 
ing erroneous failure to exclude prior con 
BRUCE Huh 647 
* 4 * (UUkli ! * • * ) 
vic lions for impeachment purposes is 
whether, absent error, there was reason-
able likelihood of more favorable result for 
defendant U C A 1953, 76-6-301. 76-6-
302 
13 Criminal Law ^»1184(3) 
There was insufficient evidence to es 
tablish that defendant used firearm or fac 
simile thereof, or any deadly weapon, in 
course of committing robbery, therefore, 
defendant was entitled to have conviction 
reduced from aggravated robbery to rob 
bery U( A 1953, 76-^302 
Debra K Loy, Salt Uke City, for defen 
dant and appellant 
David L Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellee 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
Defendant Henry S Bruce, Jr , appeals 
from his jury conviction of aggravated rob-
bery, a felony of the first degree Utah 
Code Ann § 76-6-302 (1978, Supp 1989) 
On November 26, 1985, the Corner Mart 
gas and convenience store in northwest 
Salt Lake City was robbed At approxi 
mately 3 00 in the afternoon, Sue Ann 
Candelana a store employee, received a 
phone call from a man claiming to have a 
gun pointed directly at her He instructed 
her to put all the money from the register 
in a bag and give it to a man who would 
soon be entering the store The caller 
threatened to shoot her if she did not com 
ply Within a few minutes, a young man 
whom she subsequently identified as defen 
dant entered the store and placed his hand 
under his jacket as though he had a gun 
and demanded that Candelana "do what 
the man on the phone said " She did not 
see a gun and later testified that she could 
not recall that the man made any reference 
to his having a gun She stated, "It just 
looked like a normal thing, like a gun, but 
it wasn t I knew it wasn't" Without 
putting the money in a bag, she gave the 
robber approximately $214, and he left the 
store, heading north on foot As he walked 
away, Candelana saw him appear to place 
the money down the front of his pants 
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ALLEGHENY PITTSBURGH COAL CO. v. COUNTY 
COMMISSION OF WEBSTER COUNTY, 
WEST VIRGINIA 
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST 
VIRGINIA 
No. 87-1303. Argued December 7, 1988-Decided January 18, 1989* 
The West Virginia Constitution in relevant part establishes a general prin-
ciple of uniform taxation so that all property, both real and personal, 
shall be taxed in proportion to its value. The Webster County tax as-
sessor, from 1975 to 1986, valued petitioners' real property on the basis 
of its recent purchase price Other properties not recently transferred 
were assessed based on their previous assessments with minor modifica-
tions. This system resulted in gross disparities in the assessed value of 
generally comparable property. Each year, respondent county commis-
sion affirmed the assessments, and petitioners appealed to the State Cir-
cuit Court. Eventually, a number of these appeals were consolidated 
and decided. The State Circuit Court held that the county's assessment 
system systematically and intentionally discriminated against petitioners 
in violation of the State Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Equal Protection Clause. It ordered respondent to reduce petitioners' 
assessments to the levels recommended by the state tax commissioner in 
Jus guidelines for local assessors. The State Supreme Court of Appeals 
reversed. It held that the record did not support a finding of intentional 
and systematic discrimination because petitioners' property was not as-
sessed at more than true value, as appropriately measured by the recent 
arm's-length purchase price of the property. In its view, any compara-
tive undervaluation of other property could only be remedied by an ac-
tion by petitioners to raise those other assessments 
Held 
1 The assessments on petitioners' property violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause There is no constitutional defect in a scheme that bases 
an assessment on the recent arm's-length purchase price of the property, 
and uses a general adjustment as a transitional substitute for an individ-
ual reappraisal of other parcels. But the Clause requires that such gen-
eral adjustments be accurate enough to obtain, over a short period of 
time, rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property own-
Together with No 87-1310, East Kentucky Energy Corp et al v 
County Coynmission of Webster County, West Virginia, also on certiorari 
to the same court 
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ers This action is not one involving permissible transitional inequality, 
since petitioners' property has been assessed at roughly * to 35 time* 
more than comparable neighboring propeity ami these discrepancies 
have continued for more than 10 yeais with little change The county's 
adjustments to assessments that aie carried over are too small to season 
ably dissipate the disparity Pp 342-344 
2 The Equal Protection Clause permits a State to divide different 
kinds of property into classes and to assign to each a different tax burden 
so long as those divisions and burdens are neither arbitrary nor capri-
cious West Virginia has not drawn such a distinction here as its 
Constitution and laws provide that all property of the kind held by peti 
tioners shall be taxed uniformly according to its estimated mai ket value 
There is no suggestion that the State has in practice adopted a differ-
ent system that authorizes individual counties to independently fashion 
their own substantive assessment policies The Webster County asses-
sor has, apparently on her own initiative, applied state tax law in a man 
ner resulting in significant and persistent disparity in assessed value 
between petitioners' and similarly situated property The intentional 
systematic undervaluation of such other property unfairlv deprives peti-
tioners of their rights under the Clause Pp 344-340 
3 The State might on its own initiative remove the discrimination 
against petitioners by raising the assessments of systematically and 
intentionally undervalued property in the same class A taxpayer in |>e-
titioners' position, however, forced to litigate foi redress, may not be 
remitted by the State to the remedy of seeking to have the assessments 
of the undervalued property raised P 346 
W Va , 360 S E 2d 560, reversed and l emanded 
REHNQUIST, C J , delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court 
E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., argued the cause for petition-
ers in both cases. With him on the briefs were John G. Rob-
erts, Jr., and William James Murphy. 
C. William Ullrich, Chief Deputy Attorney General of 
West Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him 
on the brief were Charles G. Brown, Attorney General, and 
Jack AlsopA 
tBriefs of anuci curiae urging reversal were filed for the National As 
sociation of Realtors by Lam em K Janik, and foi the National Taxpayer 
Union by Gale A Norton 
(Footnote is continued on /> iisf 
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CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The West Virginia Constitution guarantees to its citizens 
that, with certain exceptions, "taxation shall be equal and 
uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and 
personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value . . . ." 
Art. X, § 1. The Webster County tax assessor valued peti-
tioners' real property on the basis of its recent purchase 
price, but made only minor modifications in the assessments 
of land which had not been recently sold. This practice re-
sulted in gross disparities in the assessed value of generally 
comparable property, and we hold that it denied petitioners 
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to them by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Between 1975 and 1986, the tax assessor for Webster 
County, West Virginia, fixed yearly assessments for prop-
erty within the county at 50% of appraised value. She fixed 
a the appraised value at the declared consideration at which 
b the property last sold. Some adjustments were made in the 
assessments of properties that had not been recently sold, al-
though they amounted to, at most, 10% increases in 1976, 
1981, and 1983 respectively.1 
Benna Ruth Solomon and Eugene J Comey filed a brief for the National 
Association of Counties et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. 
by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Anthony T. Caso, and Jonathan M Coupal, 
and for the International Association of Assessing Officers by James F 
Gossett. 
1
 Petitioners contend that the adjustments to the assessments for prop-
erty not recently transferred were uneven at best. According to petition-
ers, a study of the assessed value of all coal tracts in Webster County from 
1983 to 1984 was in*«- i'tred at trial and demonstrated that the assessment 
of 35% of the tracts was unchanged during that period. The courts below 
do not appear to have made specific factual findings accepting or rejecting 
this study or petitioners' conclusions drawn from it. For the purposes of 
argument, we will accept the county's figures since we find that, even ac-
cepting those figures, the adjustments do not dispel the constitutional flaw 
in the assessment system. 
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In 1974, for example, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company 
(Allegheny) purchased fee, surface, and mineral interests in 
certain properties for a stated price somewhat in excess of 
$24 million, and during the tax years 1976 through 1983 its 
property was assessed annually at half of this figure. In 
1982 Allegheny sold the property to East Kentucky Energy 
Corp. (Kentucky Energy) for a figure of nearly $30 million, 
and the property thereafter was annually assessed at a val-
uation just below $15 million. Oneida Coal Company and 
Shamrock Coal Company participated in similar transactions 
in Webster County, and the property they purchased or sold 
was assessed in a similar manner. 
Each year, petitioners pursued relief before the County 
Commission of Webster County sitting as a review board. 
They argued that the assessment policy of the Webster 
County assessor systematically resulted in appraisals for 
their property that were excessive compared to the ap-
praised value of similar parcels that had not been recently 
conveyed. Each year the county commission affirmed the 
assessments, and each year petitioners appealed to the State 
Circuit Court. A group of these appeals from Allegheny and 
its successor in interest, Kentucky Energy, were consoli-
dated by the West Virginia Circuit Court and finally decided 
in 1985. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1303, p. 15a. An-
other group of appeals from Shamrock and Oneida were con-
solidated and decided by the West Virginia Circuit Court 
early the next year. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1310, 
p. 49a/ 
The judge in both of these cases concluded that the system 
of real property assessment used by the Webster County as-
sessor systematically and intentionally discriminated against 
2
 After each of these primary decisions adjudicating the validity of the 
assessments to the lands in question, petitioners obtained a number of 
other orders applying the findings in the primary decisions to their specific 
cases and to other appeals not consolidated in the primary decisions. See 
App to Pet. for Cert in No 87-1310, pp 79a, 83a, and 86a 
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petitioners in violation of the West Virginia Constitution and 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. He 
ordered the county commission to reduce the assessments on 
petitioners' property to the levels recommended by the state 
tax commissioner in his valuation guidelines published for use 
by local assessors. Underlying the judge's conclusions were 
findings that petitioners' tax assessments over the years 
were dramatically in excess of those for comparable property 
in the county. He found that "the assessor did not compare 
the various features of the real estate to which the high as-
sessment was applied with the various features of land as-
sessed at a much lower rate." App. to Pet. for Cert, in 
No. 87-1303, p. 29a; App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1310, 
p. 59a. "The questioned assessments were not based upon 
the presence of economically minable or removable coal, oil, 
gas or harvestable timber in or upon petitioners' real estate, 
as compared to an absence of the same in or upon [neighbor-
ing] properties." Ibid. Nor were they "based upon present 
use or immediately foreseeable economic development of pe-
titioners' real estate." Ibid. Rather, "[t]he sole basis of the 
assessment of petitioners' real estate was, according to the 
assessor, the consideration declared in petitioners' deeds." 
Ibid.3 
* Respondent argues in this Court that petitioners' land was not truly 
comparable to that of the surrounding properties. It points to the fact 
that one of the parcels held by Allegheny, and then by Kentucky Energy, 
comprising 4,287 acres, allegedly contains 32 million tons of low-sulfur coal 
recoverable by strip mining. This unusually valuable parcel skews the av-
erage value of all the properties, as well as serving as a basis for higher 
valuation of this parcel than those surrounding it. 
Petitioners make a number of answers: First, they rely on respondent's 
stipulations that "[t]he properties surrounding the property owned by 
. . . Petitioner, . . . are comparable properties in that they are substan-
tially the same geologically as the properties of the Petitioner . . . ." 
Record 1319-1320, 1085. Next, they point to the factual findings of the 
West Virginia Circuit Court, never rejected by the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals, that "[although the real estate of each of these petition-
ers is not identical to that of all other real estate in Webster County, it 
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This approach systematically produced dramatic differ-
ences in valuation between petitioners' recently transferred 
property and otherwise comparable surrounding land. For 
the years 1976 through 1982, Allegheny was assessed and 
taxed at approximately 35 times the rate applied to owners of 
comparable properties. After purchasing that land, Ken-
tucky Energy was assessed and taxed at approximately 
33 times the rate of similar parcels. From 1981 through 
1985, the county assessed and taxed the Shamrock-Oneida 
property at roughly 8 to 20 times that of comparable neigh-
boring coal tracts. These disparities existed notwithstand-
ing the adjustments made to the assessments of land not 
recently conveyed. In the case of the property held by Alle-
gheny and Kentucky Energy, the county's adjustment policy 
appears that petitioners' real estate is substantially similar to the real es-
tate of the others in topography, location, access, development, mineral 
content and forestation, and that the petitioners' real estate is substan-
tially similar to adjacent and contiguous tracts and parcels of real estate 
owned by others." App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1303, p. 16a; App. to 
Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1310, p. 50a. Finally, they note that the court's 
findings were founded on the testimony of Kentucky Energy's expert wit-
ness, the one who testified to the estimated 32 million tons of coal under 
Kentucky Energy's land, that the surrounding properties were equally 
promising. On direct examination he said: 
"As far as comparing this area with the surrounding property, geologically, 
those same seams are present on all the other properties [suggested as 
comparablel. The same coal seams are present there. . . . [T]he coal is 
there and I know that the chances of them being mineable are just as good 
there as they are on the [Kentucky Energy] properties. 
". . . There may be some variations, depending on which individual seam 
is mineable from one property to the other, but in the long run they are 
very similar properties located within the same area and there is no geolog-
ical reason that they should not be comparable." Brief in Opposition in 
No. 87-1303, pp. lOa-lla. 
We think that petitioners' submissions justify the conclusion on the 
record presented to us that their properties were, in aspects relevant to 
valuation and assessment, comparable to surrounding property valued and 
assessed at markedly lower amounts. 
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would have rr^piired more than 500 years to equalize the 
assessments. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
reversed. It found that the record did not support the trial 
courts ruling that the actions of the assessor and board of re-
view constituted "intentional and systematic" discrimination. 
It held that "assessments based upon the price paid for the 
property in arm's length transactions are an appropriate 
measure of the 'true and actual value* of . . . property." In 
re 1975 Tax Assessments against Oneida Coal Co., 
W. Va. , , 360 S. E. 2d 560, 564 (1987). That other 
properties might be undervalued relative to petitioners' did 
not require that petitioners' assessments be reduced: "'In-
stead, they should seek to have the assessments of other tax-
payers raised to market value/" Id., at , 360 S. E. 2d, 
at 565 (quoting Killen v. Logan County Comm'n, 
W. Va. , , 295 S. E* 2d 689, 709 (1982)). We 
K granted certiorari to decide whether these Webster County 
4^  tax assessments denied petitioners the equal protection of 
the law and, if so, whether petitioners could constitutionally 
be limited to the remedy of seeking to raise the assessments 
of-others. 485 U. S. 976 (1988). 
We agree with the import of the opinion of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia that petitioners have no 
constitutional complaint simply because their property is as-
sessed for real property tax purposes at a figure equal to 50% 
of the price paid for it at a recent arm's-length transaction. 
But their complaint is a comparative one: while their prop-
erty is assessed at 50% of what is roughly its current value, 
neighboring comparable property which has not been re-
cently sold is assessed at only a minor fraction of that figure. 
We do not understand the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals to have disputed this fact. We read its opinion as 
saying that even if there is a constitutional violation on these 
facts, the only remedy available to petitioners was an effort 
to have the assessments on the neighboring properties raised 
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by an appropriate amount. We hold that the assessments on 
petitioners* property in this case violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and that petitioners may not be remitted 
to the remedy specified by the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia. 
The county argues that its assessment scheme is rationally 
related to its purpose of assessing properties at true current 
value: when available, it makes use of exceedingly accurate 
information about the market value of a property—the price 
at which it was recently purchased. As those data grow 
stale, it periodically adjusts the assessment based on some 
perception of the general change in area property values. 
We do not intend to cast doubt upon the theoretical basis of 
such a scheme. That two methods are used to assess prop-
erty in the same class is, without more, of no constitutional 
moment. The Equal Protection Clause "applies only to tax-
ation which in fact bears unequally on persons or property of 
the same class." Charleston Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. 
Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 190 (1945) (collecting cases). The 
use of a general adjustment as a transitional substitute for an 
individual reappraisal violates no constitutional command. 
As long as general adjustments are accurate enough over a 
short period of time to equalize the differences in proportion 
between the assessments of a class of property holders, the 
Equal Protection Clause is satisfied. Just as that Clause tol-
erates occasional errors of state law or mistakes in judgment 
when valuing property for tax purposes, see Sunday Lake 
Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 353 (1918); Coulter v. 
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 196 U. S. 599 (1905), it does 
not require immediate general adjustment on the basis of the 
latest market developments. In each case, the constitu-
tional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a rough 
equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property own-
ers. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 526-527 
(1959), and cases there cited; cf. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas 
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Co., 320 U. S. 591, 602 (1944) (noting, in the ratemaking 
context, that "[i]t is not theory, but the impact . . . that 
counts"). 
But the present action is not an example of transitional 
delay in adjustment of assessed value resulting in inequalities 
in assessments of comparable property. Petitioners' prop-
erty has been assessed at roughly 8 to 35 times more than 
comparable neighboring property, and these discrepancies 
have continued for more than 10 years with little change. 
The county's adjustments to the assessments of property not 
recently sold are too small to seasonably dissipate the re-
maining disparity between these assessments and the assess-
ments based on a recent purchase price. 
The States, of course, have broad powers to impose and 
collect taxes. A State may divide different kinds of property 
into classes and assign to each class a different tax burden so 
long as those divisions and burdens are reasonable. Allied 
a Stores, supra, at 526-527 ("The State may impose different 
^ specific taxes upon different trades and professions and may 
vary the rate of excise upon various products"). It might, 
for example, decide to tax property held by corporations, in-
cluding petitioners, at a different rate than property held by 
individuals. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 
410 U. S. 356 (1973) (Illinois ad valorem tax on personalty of 
corporations). In each case, "[i]f the selection or classifica-
tion is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some 
reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no 
denial of the equal protection of the law." Brown-Forman 
Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573 (1910).4 
1
 We need not and do not decide today whether the Webster County as-
sessment method would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a 
State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational enforcement policy it 
appears to be. The State of California has adopted a similar policy as Arti-
cle XIIIA of its Constitution, popularly known as "Proposition 13." Prop-
osition 13 generally provides that property will be assessed at its 1975-
1970 value, and reassessed only when transferred or constructed upon, or 
in a limited manner for inflation. Cal. Const., Art. XIIIA, $2 (limiting 
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But West Virginia has not drawn such a distinction. Its 
Constitution and laws provide that all property of the kind 
held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform through-
out the State according to its estimated market value. 
There is no suggestion in the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia, or from any other authoritative 
source, that the State may have adopted a different system in 
practice from that specified by statute; we have held that such 
a system may be valid so long as the implicit policy is applied 
evenhandedly to all similarly situated property within the 
State. Nashville C. & S. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 
362,368-369 (1940). We are not advised of any West Virginia 
statute or practice which authorizes individual counties of the 
State to fashion their own substantive assessment policies in-
dependently of state statute. See Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 
U. S. 545 (1954). The Webster County assessor has, appar-
ently on her own initiative, applied the tax laws of West Vir-
ginia in the manner heretofore described, with the resulting 
disparity in assessed value of similar property. Indeed, her 
practice seems contrary to that of the guide published by the 
West Virginia Tax Commission as an aid to local assessors in 
the assessment of real property. 
"[IIntentional systematic undervaluation by state officials 
of other taxable property in the same class contravenes the 
constitutional right of one taxed upon the full value of his 
property." Sunday Lake Iron Co., supra, at 352-353; Sioux 
City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441, 445-446 
(1923); Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax 
Assessments in Greene County, Pa.y 284 U. S. 23, 28-29 
(1931). "The equal protection clause . . . protects the indi-
vidual from state action which selects him out for discrimina-
tory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on 
others of the same class/' Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 
inflation adjustments to 2% per year). The system is grounded on the be-
lief that taxes should be based on the original cost of property and should 
not tax unrealized paper gains in the value of the property. 
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U. S. 620, 623 (1946). We have no doubt that petitioners 
have suffered from such "intentional systematic undervalua-
tion by state officials" of comparable property in Webster 
County. Viewed in isolation, the assessments for petition-
ers' property may fully comply with West Virginia law. But 
the fairness of one's allocable share of the total property tax 
burden can only be meaningfully evaluated by comparison 
with the share of others similarly situated relative to their 
property holdings. The relative undervaluation of compara-
ble property in Webster County over time therefore denies 
petitioners the equal protection of the law. 
A taxpayer in this situation may not be remitted by the 
State to the remedy of seeking to have the assessments of 
the undervalued property raised. "The [Equal Protection 
Clause] is not satisfied if a State does not itself remove the 
discrimination, but imposes on him against whom the dis-
crimination has been directed the burden of seeking an 
^ upward revision of the taxes of other members of the class." 
i Hillsborough, supra, at 623, citing Sioux City Bridge Co., 
supra, 445-447; lowa-Des Moines NaVl Rank v. Bennett, 284 
II. S. 239, 247 (1931); Cumberland Coal Co., supra, at 28-29. 
The'judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Syllabus 
SHEET METAL WORKERS1 INTERNATIONAL 
ASSN. ET AL. v. LYNN 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
No. 86-1940. Argued November 7, 1988-Decided January 18, 1989 
In an attempt to alleviate a financial crisis plaguing petitioner local union 
(Local), which is an affiliate of petitioner international union (Inter-
national), the International's president appointed Richard Hawkins as 
trustee to supervise the Local's affairs, with authority under the In-
ternational's constitution to suspend the Local's officers and business 
representatives. Five days after a special meeting at which the Local's 
membership defeated Hawkins' proposal to increase their dues, Hawkins 
notified respondent Lynn, an elected business representative of the 
Local, that he was being removed "indefinitely" from his position be-
cause of his outspoken opposition to the proposal at the meeting. After 
exhausting his intraunion remedies, Lynn brought suit in Federal Dis-
trict Court, claiming that his removal violated the free speech provi-
sion of Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
of 1959 (LMRDA or Act). The court granted summary judgment for 
petitioners under F omega n v. Leu, 45(5 U. S. 431, which held that the 
discharge of a union's appointed business agents by the union president, 
following his election over the incumbent for whom the business agents 
had campaigned, did not violate Title J. However, the Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that Fintiegan did not control where the dismissed 
union official was elected rather than appointed, and rejecting the con-
tention that Lynn's removal was valid because it was carried out under 
Hawkins' authority as trustee. 
Held: The removal of an elected business agent, in retaliation for state-
ments he made at a union meeting in opposition to a dues increase sought 
by the union trustee, violates the LMRDA. Pp. 352-359. 
(a) Petitioners' argument is unpersuasive that Lynn's status as an 
elected, rather than an appointed, official is immaterial, and that the 
loss of his union employment cannot amount to a Title I violation because 
he remains a member of the Local and was not prevented from attending 
the special meeting, expressing his views on the dues proposal, or cast-
ing his vote. Even though Lynn was not actually prevented from ex-
ercising such Title I rights, his removal interfered with those rights by 
forcing him to chose between them and his job. Moreover, in contrast 
to the discharge of an appointed union official, the removal of an elected 
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er The subrogee insurer may still sue the 
insured for liability in excess of the policy 
amount or outside the scope of coverage 
In addition, the subrogee insurer may di-
rectly sue the insolvent insurer, although 
such suit is unlikely to produce any signifi-
cant recovery 
As to the third factor, we do acknowl-
edge that rights of indemnity and contribu-
tion are significant longstanding rights de-
rived from traditional principles of equity. 
After weighing the three factors, however, 
we believe RAM's cause of action against 
Dunbar Kappie is not such a vested right 
that it cannot be impaired by subsequent 
legislation. At this point, RAM's cause of 
action is merely a contingent right, one 
that could be reduced to a vested right only 
after litigation against Dunbar Kappie and 
sufficient proof, as determined by the trier 
of fact, to establish that Dunbar Kappie 
was in fact negligent in its design and 
manufacture of the product and that such 
negligence was the proximate cause of the 
employee's injury. We are particularly 
persuaded by the reasoning in Peterson 
and in Benson v Farmer* Union Central 
Exchange, Inc., 414 N W.2d 425 (Minn Ct 
App 1987), pet for rev dented (Minn Nov 
24, 1987), where the courts found that the 
legislature, as a matter of public policy, 
could enact retroactive legislation affecting 
various rights of recovery in pending per-
sonal injury actions 
Because we determine that RAM's action 
is barred under either Minnesota or Illinois 
law, we do not address the issue of which 
state's law should apply under a conflicts 
analysis. See PiUo, 146 Wis 2d at 632-33, 
427 NW.2d at 420 (no need to address 
which state's law applies where there is no 
conflict). 
DECISION 
The trial court correctly ruled that under 
either Minnesota or Illinois law, RAM's ac-
tion for indemnity and contribution against 
Dunbar Kappie, the insured of an insolvent 
insurer, is barred 
Affirmed. 
fo ittVMMtHSVSftMl 
N. NATURAL GAS v. BD. 
Clt«u443 NWid 
232 Neb 806 
jypNORTHERN NATURAL GAS COMPA-
NY and Enron Liquids Pipeline 
Company, Appellants, 
v. 
8TATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 
AND ASSESSMENT, Appellee. 
No. 88-706. 
Supreme Court of Nebraska 
July 14, 1989 
Pipeline company whose property was 
centrally assessed for tax purposes appeal-
ed from decision of the State Board of 
Equalization and Assessment dismissing its 
request that its unit valves be equalised 
with railroads and car companies doing 
business in Nebraska and deciding to 
equalize its property, and all other central-
ly assessed property, through application 
of statewide "aggregate level of assess-
ment" determined by Department of Reve-
nue to be 88 7% of actual value The Su-
preme Court, Hastings, CJ , held that (1) 
Board denied pipeline company equal pro-
tection by not taxing personal property of 
railroads and car companies, even though it 
acted involuntarily and under compulsion 
of federal law, and (2) underground pipe-
lines were personal property exempt from 
taxation, not fixtures 
Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings 
1. Taxation *»493.6 
Any person, county, or municipality af-
fected by final decision of State Board of 
Equalization and Assessment may prose-
cute appeal to Supreme Court Neb 
Rev St ft 77-510 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*»676 
When appeal from administrative 
agency is not taken pursuant to Admints 
trative Procedure Act because of special 
statute, standard of review in Supreme 
Court is to search only for errors appearing 
in the record, i e , whether decision con 
OF EQUAL. & ASSESS. Neb 249 
249 (Neb 19**) 
forms to law, is supported by competent 
and relevant evidence, and was not arbi-
trary, capricious, or unreasonable Neb 
Rev St § 84-918 
3. Taxation «=»446'A 
State Board of Equalization and As-
sessment has wide latitude of judgment 
and discretion in equalizing assessment of 
property 
4. Taxation *^446'A 
State Board of Equalization and As-
sessment acts in quasi judicial capacity 
when equalizing property 
5. Taxation «=»251 
Initial determination as to whether cer-
tain locally assessed property is exempt 
from taxation, made by county boards of 
equalization, involves mixed question of 
fact and law 
6. Appeal and Error «»893(1) 
In instances where Supreme Court is 
required to review case for error appearing 
in the record, questions of law are none-
theless reviewed de novo on the record 
7. Taxation «»460(1, 4) 
In application before State Board of 
Equalization and Assessment, taxpayer 
may employ any factual or legal argument 
in support of his, her, or its position re-
questing equalization, subject to final de-
termination of questions of law on de novo 
basis by Supreme Court on appeal 
8. Taxation «»45CK4) 
When State Board of Equalization and 
Assessment arbitrarily undervalues partic-
ular class of property so as to make anoth-
er class of property disproportionately 
higher, or achieves the same result because 
of legislative action, Supreme Court must 
correct constitutional inequity by lowering 
complaining taxpayer's valuation to such 
an extent as to equalize it with other prop-
erty in state Const Art 8, § 1 
9 Constitutional Law «=»229<3) 
Taxation *=»42(2) 
State Board of Equalization and As 
sessment denied equal protection to public 
service entity whose property was centrally 
assessed by not taxing personal property 
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of railroads and car companies in the same 
class, even though it was ompelled by 
federal law to exempt latter entities* prop-
erty from taxation. U.S.CA. Const 
Amend. 14. 
10. Taxation *»4<H8) 
Under principle that uniformity and 
equality required by law is to be preferred 
as just and ultimate purpose of law where 
it is impossible to secure both standard of 
true value and that of uniformity and equali-
ty, taxpayer whose property alone is taxed 
at 100% of its true value has right to have 
assessment reduced to percentage of that 
value of which others are taxed even 
though this represents departure from stat-
utory requirement U.S.CA. Const 
Amend. 14. 
11. Taxation *»ft7 
For tax purposes in Nebraska, "per-
sonal property" includes all property other 
than real property and franchises. Neb. 
Rev.St ft 77-104. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
12. Fixtures «»1 
To determine whether item constitutes 
future, Supreme Court looks at three 
factors—actual annexation to realty or 
something appurtenant thereto, appropria-
tion to use or purpose of that part of realty 
with which it is connected, and intention of 
party making annexation to make article 
permanent accession to freehold—and third 
factor is generally regarded as the moat 
important, with the other two having value 
primarily as evidence of intention. 
IS. Fixtures *»4 
Whether party making annexation in-
tends to make article a permanent acces-
sion to freehold can be inferred from na-
ture of articles affixed, relation and situa-
tion of that party, structure and mode of 
annexation, and purpose or use for which 
annexation has been made. 
14. Fixtures «=»7 
In considering issue of annexation 
when determining whether article is fix-
ture, important factor is whether removal 
of article will injure realty or article itself. 
16. Fixtures «»1 
Chattel that is necessary or useful ad-
junct to realty may be said to have been 
appropriated to use or purpose of realty to 
which it was affixed, whereas chattel that 
is attached for use which does not enhance 
value of land is generally deemed not to 
become part of land. 
16. Futures «»6 
Taxation *»220 
Underground pipelines were personal 
property exempt from taxation, not fix-
tures; pipeline company had right to re-
move pipeline and did so on occasion, pipe-
line was not adapted to agricultural use to 
which ground in which it was embedded 
was applied and did not improve land or 
make it more valuable, and pipeline compa-
ny did not intend to make pipelines a per-
manent accession to freehold in light of 
evidence that its normal method of opera-
tion was to obtain easements for purposes 
of laying pipelines, which were generally 
located on rights-of-way rather than land 
pipeline company owned in fee. Neb. 
Rev.St M 77-103. 77-104. 
17. Taxation *M2(1) 
Although taxing authorities may clas-
sify different types of property for taxa-
tion purposes, results reached by such dif-
ferent methods and reasonable classifica-
tions must be correlated so that valuations 
reached shall be uniform and proportion-
ate. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; Const 
Art 8. § 1. 
Syllabus by the Court 
1. State Equalization Board: Appeal 
and Error. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 77-510 (Cum. 
Supp. 1988) provides that any person, coun-
ty, or municipality affected by a final deci-
sion of the State Board of Equalization and 
Assessment may prosecute an appeal to the 
Supreme Court 
2. Administrative Law: Appeal and 
Error. When an appeal from an adminis-
trative agency is not taken pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act because of a 
special statute, the standard of review in 
this court is to search only for errors ap-
pearing in the record; i.e.. whether the 
N. NATURAL GAS v. BD. OF EQUAL. & ASSESS. 
Cite M 443 N.W-2d 249 (Neb. 19*9) 
Neb. 251 
decision conforms to law. is supported by 
competent and relevant evidence, and was 
not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 
3. 8Ute Equalization Board: Taxa-
tion: Valuation. The State Board of 
Equalization island Assessment has a wide 
latitude of judgment and discretion in 
equalizing assessment of property. 
4. State Equalization Board: Taxa-
tion: Valuation. The State Board of 
Equalization and Assessment acts in a qua-
si-judicial capacity when equalizing proper-
ty. 
5. Appeal and Error. In instances 
where the Supreme Court is required to 
review a case for error appearing in the 
record, questions of law are nonetheless 
reviewed de novo on the record. 
6. State Equalization Board: Taxa-
tion: Valuation: Appeal and Error. In 
an application before the State Board of 
Equalization and Assessment, a taxpayer 
may employ any factual or legal argument 
in support of his. her. or its position re-
questing equalization, subject to the final 
determination of questions of law on a de 
novo basis by this court on appeal. 
7. Stat* Equalization Board: Taxa-
tion: Valuation: Appeal and Error. 
When the State Board of Equalization and 
Assessment arbitrarily undervalues a par-
ticular class of property so as to make 
another class of property disproportionate-
ly higher, or achieves the same result be-
cause of legislative action, the Supreme 
Court must correct that constitutional ineq-
uity by lowering the complaining taxpay-
er's valuation to such an extent as to equal-
ize it with other property in the state. 
8. State Equalization Board: Taxa-
tion: Federal Acts. Equal Protection. 
The State Board of Equalization and As-
sessment, by not taxing the personal prop-
erty of certain property in a class, although 
acting involuntarily and under compulsion 
of federal law, nevertheless, by complying 
with that mandate, has denied another tax-
payer in that same class the equal protec-
tion of the law contrary to the 14th amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
9. Constitutional Law: Taxation: 
Valuation. The right of a taxpayer whose 
property alone is taxed at 100 percent of its 
true value is to have his, her, or its assess-
ment reduced to the percentage of that 
value at which others are taxed even 
though this is a departure from the re-
quirement of statute. 
10. Constitutional Law: Taxation: 
Valuation. Where it is impossible to se-
cure both the standard of the true value, 
and the uniformity and equality required 
by law, the latter requirement is to be 
preferred as the just and ultimate purpose 
of law. 
11. Taxation: Property: Words and 
Phrases. For tax purposes in Nebraska, 
persona) property includes all property oth-
er than real property and franchises. 
12. Property: Appurtenances: In-
tent To determine whether an item consti-
tutes a fixture, this court looks at three 
factors: (1) actual annexation to the realty, 
or something appurtenant thereto, (2) ap-
propriation to the use or purpose of that 
part of the realty with which it is connect-
ed, and (3) the intention of the party mak-
ing the annexation to make the article a 
permanent accession to the freehold. 
13. Property: Appurtenances: In-
tent Of the three factors determining 
whether an item constitutes a fixture, the 
most important is the intention to make the 
article a permanent accession to the free-
hold. 
14. Property: Appurtenances: In-
tent The intention of the party making 
the annexation can be inferred from the 
nature of the articles affixed, the relation 
and situation of the party making the an-
nexation, the structure and mode of annex-
ation, and the purpose or use for which the 
annexation has been made. 
l8o»15. Property: Appurtenances. In 
considering the issue of annexation, an im-
portant factor is whether removal of the 
article will injure the realty or will injure 
the article itself. 
16. Property: Appurtenances. If a 
chattel is a necessary or useful adjunct to 
the realty, then it may be said generally to 
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have been appropriated to the use or pur-
pose of the realty to which it was affixed. 
17. Constitutional Law: Taxation: 
Valuation. Although the taxing authori-
ties may classify different types of proper-
ty for taxation purposes, nevertheless, the 
results reached by such different methods 
and reasonable classifications must be cor-
related so that the valuations reached shall 
be uniform and proportionate. 
John K. Boyer, Norman H. Wright, and 
Amy S. Bones of Fraser, Stryker, Vaughn, 
Meusey, Olson, Boyer A Bloch, PC., Oma-
ha, for appellants. 
Robert M. Spire, Atty. Gen. and L. Jay 
Bartel, Lincoln, for appellee. 
HASTINGS, OX, and BOSLAUGH, 
WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, 
GRANT and PAHRNBRUCH, JJ. 
HASTINGS, Chief Justice. 
This is an appeal by Northern Natural 
Gas Company and Enron Liquids Pipeline 
Company (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as Enron) from a decision of the Nebras-
ka State Board of Equalisation and Assess-
ment (the Board) with respect to a request 
made by Enron for equalization of central-
ly assessed property. 
[1] Enron appealed directly to this 
court pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat ft 77-610 
(Cum.Supp.1988), which provides in part: 
"From any filial decision of the State Board 
of Equalization and Assessment with re-
spect to the valuation of any real or person-
al property, any person, county, or munici-
pality affected thereby may prosecute an 
appeal to the Supreme Court." 
[2] Since appeal was not taken pursu-
ant to Neb.Rev.Stat ft 84-918 (Reissue 
1987) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
this court's standard of review is not de 
novo on the record. This court has decided 
that when the Administrative Procedure 
Act is inapplicable because another method 
of appeal has been prescribed, the standard 
of review will be to search only for 
lawerrors appearing in the record; i.e., 
whether the decision conforms to law, is 
supported by competent and relevant evi-
dence, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable. In re Application A-15738, 
226 Neb. 146, 410 N.W.2d 101 (1987) (direct 
appeal to the Supreme Court from the De-
partment of Water Resources); Banner 
County v. State Bd. of Equal., 226 Neb. 
286, 411 N.W.2d 36 (1987). 
The disputes involved in this appeal 
arose in part as a result of three cases 
which were decided by the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Nebraska: Trailer 
Train Co. et ai v. Leuenberger, No. 
CV87-L-29 (D.Neb. Dec. 11, 1987), affd 
No. 88-1118 (8th Cur. Dec. 19, 1988), cert 
denied, Boehm v. Trailer Train Co. et ai, 
U.S , 109 S.Ct 2066, 104 LEd.2d 
630 (1989); Burlington Northern RR. Co. 
et at v. Leuenberger, No. CV87-L-565 
(D.Neb. Dec. 10,1987); and Oklahoma Gas 
& Electric Co. et aL v. Leuenberger, No. 
CV88-L-52 (D.Neb. Jan 26,1988). 
The plaintiffs in Trailer Train were car 
companies that furnish railcars to rail-
roads. Their only relationship to Nebraska 
stems from the fact that their railcars are 
located or operated in Nebraska by the 
railroads. The federal district court held 
that the assessment of the plaintiffs' per-
sonal property and the imposition, levy, or 
collection of any personal property taxes 
against the plaintiffs pursuant to Neb.Rev. 
Stat ftft 77-624 et seq. (Reissue 1986) vio-
lates ft 806(l)(d) of the Railroad Revitaliza-
tion and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 
(the 4-R Act), and permanently enjoined 
the imposition, levy, and collection of any 
personal property taxes from the plaintiffs. 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the 
levy and collection of Nebraska's ad valo-
rem tax on car company property violated 
the 4-R Act. 
The plaintiffs in Burlington Northern 
RR. Co. were several of the railroads that 
do business in Nebraska. The federal dis-
trict court preliminarily enjoined and re-
strained the collection of ad valorem prop-
erty tax payments for tax year 1987 on 
that portion of plaintiffs' operating proper-
ty that consists of personal property. The 
N. NATURAL GAS v. BD. 
Cite M 443 N.WJd 
court issued the preliminary injunction af-
ter finding reasonable cause to believe that 
the Uioperaonal property tax levied on the 
plaintiffs results in discriminatory treat-
ment of common carriers by railroad, in 
violation of § 306<l)(d) of the 4-R Act 
The plaintiffs in Oklahoma Gas & Elec-
tric Co. were carlines doing business in 
Nebraska. The federal district court en-
joined distribution of the Nebraska carline 
tax for the 1987 tax year, finding reason-
able cause to believe that the tax violates 
ft 806 of the 4-R Act 
The result in each case was reached 
through application of the 4-R Act, a feder-
al statute. To prevent the unreasonable 
burdening of interstate commerce that re-
sults from discriminatory state and local 
taxation of rail carrier property, Congress 
enacted the 4-R Act, Pub.L No. 94-210, 90 
Stat 64, ft 306 (codified at 49 U.S.C. ft 26c 
(1976); recodified at 49 U.S.C. ft 11603 
(1982) in accordance with the revised Inter-
state Commerce Act of 1978). 
At issue in Trailer Train was whether 
Nebraska's personal property taxation sys-
tem, which provides for extensive exemp-
tions from personal property tax under 
Neb.Rev.SUt ft 77-202 (Supp.1987), vio-
lates ft 306(lKd) of the 4-R Act, which pro-
hibits the imposition of any tax which re-
sults in discriminatory treatment of a com-
mon carrier by railroad. The federal dis-
trict court found that the Nebraska system 
of taxation did violate the federal statute. 
According to the court, 
Under the Nebraska scheme, the majori-
ty of the personal property in the state is 
statutorily exempted from taxation, 
while a minority of personal property, 
including all the property that belongs to 
Trailer Train in the state, is subject to an 
ad valorem tax on its actual value 
[T]he Nebraska system favors a majority 
of the property of possible taxpayers by 
exempting that property from taxation 
but denies the property of rail car lines 
the same favorable treatment. 
Trailer Train, supra, slip. op. at 6. The 
court further found that the actual result 
of Nebraska's taxation scheme is an unfair 
OF EQUAL. & ASSESS. Neb. 2 5 3 
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and discriminatory tax burden on the rail-
roads. 
In light of the federal district court's 
rulings in the three cases discussed above, 
Enron submitted a request with the Board 
asking that its unit values be equalized 
with the railroads and |8ncar companies 
doing business in Nebraska, i.e., that the 
portion of the unit value that is comprised 
of personal property be disregarded in de-
termining the amount of property tax it 
owes to the state. In conjunction with this 
request, Enron also sought a determination 
that its pipelines constitute personal prop-
erty. 
Enron is a public service entity within 
the meaning of Neb.Rev .Stat ft 77-801 
(Reissue 1986). Northern Natural Gaa, a 
division of Enron Corporation, owns, main-
tains, and operates a gas pipeline system in 
Nebraska. Enron Liquids, a subsidiary of 
Enron Corporation, owns, maintains, and 
operates a liquid hydrocarbon pipeline in 
Nebraska. Enron's property is centrally 
assessed by the state for property tax pur-
poses through the Tax Commissioner rath-
er than county assessors, pursuant to Neb. 
Rev.Stat ft 77-802 (Cum.Supp.1988). 
To establish the value of a centrally as-
sessed taxpayer, the Department of Reve-
nue uses a methodology known as "unit 
value." Rather than valuing individual 
items of property owned by such a taxpay-
er, the department values the property of 
the taxpayer as a total unit. Dennis Don-
ner, the central assessment manager of the 
Department of Revenue, explained the unit 
value method at the Board's August 2, 
1988, hearing: 
These values are derived by use of the 
unit value concept, which is a valuation 
of the company as a going concern, as 
opposed to just a simple summary of the 
assets of the company. The Department 
uses the traditional three approaches to 
value, that being the market[,] income 
and cost approach in developing these 
values, and then it correlates the results 
into an indication of value for the compa-
ny. This value is then allocated to the 
state of Nebraska, based on varying 
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factors, depending on which particular 
industry we're referring to. 
Once the department has calculated the 
unit value of the centrally assessed taxpay-
er and determined what portion of that 
value should be taxed by Nebraska, the 
Tax Commissioner apportions the total tax-
able value to all taxing subdivisions in 
which property of the taxpayer is located 
and certifies to the county assessors the 
value so determined. § 77-802. 
During the August 2, 1988, hearing, the 
Board dismissed Enron's request for equal-
isation with the railroads and car 
j^ifcompanies doing business in Nebraska. 
Additionally, the Board decided to equalise 
Enron's property, and all other centrally 
assessed property, through application of a 
statewide "aggregate level of assessment" 
determined by the Department of Revenue 
to be 88.7 percent of actual value. The 
department first calculated the average ra-
tio of assessed value to actual value for all 
classes of tangible property: residential 
(improved and unimproved), commercial 
and industrial (improved and unimproved), 
agricultural (improved and unimproved), 
personal, and centrally assetised. Then the 
department aggregated the average ratios 
to arrive at the 88.7 percent figure. 
At the Board's August 2, 1988, hearing, 
Enron objected to being equalized with the 
statewide "aggregate level of assessment" 
of 88.7 percent of value. In dismissing the 
matter, the Board stated in its order: 
(TJhe uncontraverted [sic] evidence 
shows that all property valued by the 
state, including the property of Enron, is 
at 100 percent of value; that said proper 
ty is equalized to the same level of value 
as all property valued by ''.<> state that 
being the aggregate level of value for all 
tangible property in this state; and, that 
the State Board has properly fulfilled its 
duty to equalize all the tangible property 
in the state. 
Enron argues before this court that its 
property should be assessed at 73.7 percent 
of actual value, the aggregate level at 
which unimproved agricultural land is be-
ing valued in this state. 
Since the perfection of this appeal, o 
December 19, 1988, an opinion was filed ii 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight 
Circuit which affirmed the decision of th 
U.S. District Court in Trailer Train Co. e 
al v. Leuenberger, No. CV87-L-2 
(D.Neb. Dec. 11, 1988). That court said ii 
part: 
In [Burlington Northern R. Co. t 
Bair, 584 F.Supp. 1229 (S.D.Iowa 1984) 
the other centrally assessed taxpayer 
were still subject to the personal propei 
ty tax as are the taxpayers here who ar 
not in agriculturally related businesses 
The railroad in that case received th 
same "preferential tax treatment" tha 
Trailer Train is accorded here. This i 
because the other taxpayers are not pre 
tectedjiuby § 306<lM<i). When three 
fourths of the commercial and industria 
personal property in the state is no 
taxed because personal property used ii 
agriculturally-related business is exempt 
railroads are discriminated against i 
their personal property is taxed. Th 
appropriate remedy, as awarded by th 
trial court, is to enjoin the collection o 
the discriminating tax, even though othe 
taxpayers do not receive the same bene 
fiU. 
Trailer Train Co. et al. v. Leuenbergei 
No. 8&-1118, slip. op. at 7 (8th Cir. Dec. IS 
1988). Following argument of the case ii 
this court, the Supreme Court of the Unite* 
States issued an order on May 15, 198S 
denying the petition for certiorari filed b; 
the Tax Commissioner of Nebraska. There 
fore, the Board's argument throughout it 
brief that the judgment of the U.S. Distric 
Court is not binding in this instance is n< 
longer valid. 
Enron assigns as error: (1) The Boar 
erred in dismissing its request for equalize 
tion; (2) the Board erred in failing to fin 
Enron's pipelines to be personal propert; 
and to equalize that portion of its correlat 
ed unit value with railroads and car compa 
nies doing business in Nebraska; (3) th 
Board erred in adopting and applying 
"blended" or "aggregate" equalization rs 
tio, composed of an average of the levels a 
which all various types of property ar 
valued; and (4) the Board erred in failin 
N. NATURAL GAS v. BD. OF EQUAL. & ASSESS. 
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to equalize Enron's property with unim-
proved agricultural land. 
Basically, Enron made two requests of 
the Board. First, it contended that its 
property should be equalized with the prop-
erty of the railroads and car companies 
operating in Nebraska, which were also 
assessed on a unitary basis. In other 
words, the final judgment of the federal 
court enjoined the State of Nebraska from 
assessing the personal property of rail-
roads and car companies, and Enron insists 
that it not be taxed on that portion of its 
unit value that represents personal proper-
ty. In that connection, it further argues 
that its pipelines are personal property and 
should not be assessed. Secondly, Enron 
did not want the Board to equalize its other 
property with the aggregate level of as-
sessment for all property in the state, in-
cluding centrally assessed property such as 
Enron's which is assessed at 100 percent of 
actual value. 
jfoiThe Board argues that it lacks author-
ity and jurisdiction to consider and act on 
the issues raised by Enron in the first 
instance, and therefore this court acquired 
no jurisdiction to consider the issues on 
appeal. In other words, the issues raise 
questions of law, including constitutional 
issues, and the Board insists that it has no 
authority to consider those issues. 
[3-5] Neb.Rev.Stot § 77-505 (Cum. 
Supp. 1988) requires the Board to review 
the abstracts of assessments of property 
submitted by the county assessors and to 
equalize such valuations for tax purposes 
within the state. More pertinent to this 
case, § 77-802 requires the Tax Commis-
sioner to determine the total taxable value 
of a public service entity like Enron for 
each of the local assessing districts. The 
action of the Tax Commissioner, of course, 
is appealable to the Board. This court has 
stated the Board has a wide latitude of 
judgment and discretion in equalizing as-
sessment of property. City of Omaha v. 
State Board of Equalization & Assess-
ment, 181 Neb. 734, 150 N.W.2d 888 (1967). 
The Board acta in a quasi-judicial capacity 
when equalizing property. Box Butte 
County v. State Board of Equalization & 
Assessment, 206 Neb. 696, 295 N.W.2d 670 
(1980). County boards of equalization are 
required to make the initial determination 
as to whether certain locally assessed prop-
erty is exempt from taxation, which in-
volves a mixed question of fact and law. 
See, e.g., Ev. Luth. Soc. v. Buffalo Cty. 
Bd. of Equal, 230 Neb. 135, 430 N.W.2d 
502 (1988); Bethphage Com. Servs. v. 
County Board, 221 Neb. 886, 381 N.W.2d 
166 (1986). 
Implicit in the determination of tax ex-
emption, as pointed out in Bethphage, was 
the application of the facts to 
§ 77-202(1 He), which provides that exempt 
from taxation is property "owned by . . . 
religious, charitable . . . organizations and 
used exclusively for . . . charitable . . . pur-
poses. ..-." Certainly this involves a mixed 
question of fact and law and involves the 
quasi-judicial power of the board of equali-
zation. 
[6] In the instant case, there is a differ-
ence between Enron being able to request 
equalization with the railroads and car com-
panies and Enron being entitled to be 
equalized with the railroads and car compa-
nies. It is common sense that Enron can-
not be equalized with those companies un-
less it makes ajj^request. It also seems 
clear that to make such a request, Enron 
must start with the Board, the only entity 
with statutory authority to equalize the 
valuations of centrally assessed taxpayers. 
As previously stated, our review on an 
appeal such as this is for error appearing in 
the record, but we review questions of law 
de novo on the record. 
I7J We therefore hold that in an appli-
cation before the Board, a taxpayer may 
employ any factual or legal argument in 
support of his, her, or its position request-
ing equalization, subject to the final deter-
mination of questions of law on a de novo 
basis by this court on appeal. 
[8] Article VIII, § 1, of the Nebraska 
Constitution provides in relevant part that 
except for motor vehicles, "[t]axes shall be 
levied by valuation uniformly and propor-
tionately upon all tangible property " 
It would seem that no question exists that 
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if the Board arbitrarily undervalues a par-
ticular class of property so as to make 
another class of property disproportionate-
ly higher, or achieves the same result be-
cause of legislative action, this court must 
correct that constitutional inequity by low-
ering the complaining taxpayer's valuation 
to such an extent so as to equalize it with 
other property in the state See, Kearney 
Convention Center v Board of Equal, 
216 Neb 292, 844 N W 2d 620 (1984), Ban-
ner County v State Ba\ of Equal, 226 
Neb 236, 411 N W 2d 35 (1987) This be-
ing the case, no logical reason exists why 
the same requirement of valuation reduc-
tion should not be imposed when the dis-
proportionality is brought about by a final 
judgment of the federal court exempting 
the personal property of the railroads and 
car companies from the imposition of a 
state tax 
[9] The state, by not taxing the person 
al property of railroads and car companies, 
although acting involuntarily and under 
compulsion of federal law, nevertheless, by 
complying with that mandate, has denied 
Enron equal protection of the law contrary 
to the 14th amendment to the U S Consti 
tution 
In Stoux City Bridge v Dakota County, 
260 U S 441, 43 S Ct. 190, 67 L Ed 340 
(1923), the county taxed the bridge compa-
ny's property at actual value while other 
property in the county was assessed at 
only 55 percent of its value The bridge 
company alleged this practice violated the 
equal protection lanclause of the 14th 
amendment to the US Constitution 
Citing Sunday Lake Iron Co v Wake 
field, 247 U S 350, 38 S Ct 495, 62 L Ed 
1154 (1918), the Court stated 
"The purpose of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
to secure every person within the State's 
jurisdiction against intentional and arbi 
trary discrimination, whether occasioned 
by express terms of a statute or by its 
improper execution through duly consti 
tuted agents And it must be regarded 
as settled that intentional systematic un 
dervaluation by state officials of other 
taxable property in the same class con-
travenes the constitutional right of one 
taxed upon the full value of his proper 
ty" 
(Citations omitted) Stoux City Bridge, 
supra, 260 US at 445, 43 S C t at 191 
The Court held that the taxing of the 
bridge company's property at 100 percent 
of its actual value while other property is 
taxed at 55 percent of its actual value 
violates the equal protection clause of the 
14th amendment 
[10] The Court also held that 
the right of the taxpayer whose property 
alone is taxed at 100 per cent of its true 
value is to have his assessment reduced 
to the percentage of that value at which 
others are taxed even though this is a 
departure from the requirement of stat 
ute The conclusion is based on the pnn 
ciple that where it is impossible to secure 
both the standard of the true value, and 
the uniformity and equality required by 
law, the latter requirement is to be pre-
ferred as the just and ultimate purpose 
of law 
260 US at 446, 43 SCt at 191 
As we have previously stated, it makes 
no difference if the undervaluation of the 
property of the railroad and car companies 
comes about because of deliberate action 
by the Board, legislative enactment, or the 
final and binding judgment of the federal 
courts The conclusion remains the same 
The equal protection clause of the 14th 
amendment mandates that the same result 
be reached with respect to the personal 
property of Enron as that in the case of the 
railroad and car companies 
It therefore becomes necessary to deter-
mine whether the pipelines of Enron are 
personal property and thus exempt from 
^jjpitaxation under the doctrine of Trailer 
Tram Co, et al v Leuenberger, No 
CV87-L-29 (DNeb Dec 11, 1987), affd 
No 8&-1118 (8th Cir Dec 19, 1988), cert 
denied, Boehm v Trailer Train Co et al, 
US , 109 S Ct 2066, 104 L Ed 2d 
630 (1989) 
[11] Neb Rev Stat $77-103 (Reissue 
1986) provides 
N NATURAL GAS v BD 
Cite M 443 NWJd 
The terms real property, real estate 
and lands Bhall include city and village 
lots and all other lands, and all buildings, 
fixtures, improvements, cabin trailers or 
mobile homes which shall have been per-
manently attached to the real estate 
upon which they are situated, mines, mm 
erals, quarries, mineral springs and 
wells, oil and gas wells, overriding royal 
ty interests and production payments 
with respect to oil or gas leases, units of 
beneficial interest in trusts, the corpus of 
which includes any of the foregoing, and 
privileges pertaining thereto 
Personal property includes all property oth 
er than real property and franchises Neb 
Rev Stat § 77-104 (Reissue 1986) The is 
sue therefore is whether pipelines are fix 
turea, and thus real property, or are per 
sonal property 
Section 77-103 does not provide a defini 
tion for fixtures However, this court in 
State ex rel Meyer v. Peters, 191 Neb 330, 
216 N W 2d 520 (1974), stated that the com-
mon law rules relating to futures are 
largely codified in ft 77-103 
[12] To determine whether an item con-
stitutes a fixture, this court looks at three 
factors (1) actual annexation to the realty, 
or something appurtenant thereto, (2) ap-
propriation to the use or purpose of that 
part of the realty with which it is connectr 
ed, and (3) the intention of the party mak-
ing the annexation to make the article a 
permanent accession to the freehold 
Bank of Valley v US Nat Bank, 215 
Neb 912, 341 NW2d 592 (1983), T-V 
Transmission v County Bd of Equal, 
216 Neb 363, 338 N W 2d 752 (1983) 
[13] The third factor, the intention to 
make the article a permanent accession to 
the freehold, is generally regarded as the 
most important factor when determining 
whether an article is a fixture The other 
two factors, annexation and appropriation 
to the use of the realty, have value pnmari 
ly as evidence of such intention See gen 
erally Bank of Valley v US Ui&Afa* 
Bank, supra The intention of the party 
making the annexation can be inferred 
from the nature of the articles affixed, the 
relation and situation of the party making 
OF EQUAL & ASSESS Neb 257 
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the annexation, the structure and mode of 
annexation, and the purpose or use for 
which the annexation has been made 
Bank of Valley v US Nat Bank, supra, 
Pick v Fordyce Coop Credit Assn., 225 
Neb 714, 408 N W 2d 248 (1987), Fuel 
Exploration, Inc v Novotny, 221 Neb 17, 
374 N W 2d 838 (1985) 
In this case, the pipelines are buried in 
the ground In Sulphur Sprtng$ Val 
Elec Coop v City of Tombstone, 1 Ariz 
App 268, 401 P 2d 753 (1965), affd 99 Ariz 
110, 407 P 2d 76, the Arizona court had to 
address whether the pipes, poles, and wires 
that were the chief components of a utility 
distribution system were fixtures and 
therefore real property that had to be sold 
at public auction To determine whether 
an article is a fixture, the Arizona courts 
consider the same three factors this court 
considers 
The pipes were buried in the ground 
The court noted that there was no evidence 
of an agreement between the city and own-
ers of the fee that the chattels were to 
become accessions to the realty The court 
held that because there was no proof of the 
adaptability to the use for which the real 
estate was appropriated and no proof of an 
intent by the annexor that the attachment 
of the chattels be permanent, despite an 
nexation to the realty, the utility equipment 
had not lost its character as personal prop-
erty 
[14] In considering the issue of annexa 
tion when determining whether an article is 
a future, some courts have looked at 
whether removal of the article will injure 
the realty or will injure the article itself 
Enron quotes at length from one such case 
In Stem Brothers, Inc v Alexandria 
Township, 6 N J Tax 537 (1984), the 
question was whether certain under 
ground storage tanks were fixtures or 
personal property In this case, the 
court focused upon the injury by removal 
test, and stated "These [the five under 
ground storage tanks] could be lifted 
from the subject property intact just as 
could be done with the 20,000 gallon 
above-ground tanks and no damage at all 
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would occur to iai»the tanks The only 
preparatory work that would need to be 
done before the tanks could be lifted 
onto a truck would be removal of the soil 
covering them The excavation that 
would result from uncover»np cme of the 
20,000 gallon tanks woul' 'urge 
Each such tank is ten feet m diameter 
and 80 feet long so that the excavation 
would have to be somewhat longer, 
wider, and deeper than those dimensions 
Despite this size, however, such an exca-
vation could not in any reasonable sense 
be said to constitute 'irreparable' physi-
cal damage to the land because the hole 
could easily be refilled As a result, the 
land would be virtually the same in all 
respects as it had been befoie The sole 
question, then, is whether the excavation 
would constitute 'serious' physical dam-
age to the land within the meaning of the 
phrase 'material injury* as used in the 
Business Personal Property Tax Act 
"Some of the factors which might have 
to be considered in determining whether 
'serious physical damage' had occurred 
to unimproved land are (a) any change 
in the market value of the land as a 
result of the condition, (b) the amount of 
time and the cost required to repair the 
condition, and (c) the hazard or disloca 
Uon caused by the condition 
"I find that no 'serious physical dam-
age' would be caused to plaintiffs land 
by an excavation to remove the under-
ground storage tanks and to restore 
plaintiffs unpaved parking yard to its 
original state There is no indication 
that the value of the land would be af-
fected by such an excavation The entire 
process of removing a tank and restoring 
the ground to its original state would 
require only two days and would create 
no serious hazard or dislocation Finally, 
the cost to excavate and refill the hole 
would be relatively insignificant 
"I therefore conclude that all nine of 
plaintiffs fuel oil storage tanks were 
business personal property for the tax 
year 1981 and that the tanks should not 
have been assessed by the taxing district 
for local property tax purposes 6 
N J Tax at 543 " 
las»Bnef for appellants at 26-27 
Earl Berdine, an Enron employee, testi 
fied in his deposition that very little dam 
age generally results to the pipe when it is 
removed and that the only damage to the 
land is "a temporary inconvenience while 
the work is actually going on and then 
after the work is completed the land is 
restored, put back into its original use " 
115] The second factor, appropriation to 
the use or purpose of that part of the 
realty with which the article is connected, 
focuses on the relationship between the 
article and the use which is made of the 
realty to which the article is attached If 
the chattel is a necessary or useful adjunct 
to the realty, then it may be said to have 
been appropriated to the use or purpose of 
the realty to which it was affixed If the 
chattel is attached for a use which does not 
enhance the value of the land, it is general 
ly deemed not to become a part of the land 
See 1 G Thompson, Commentaries on the 
Modern Law of Real Property § 56 (1980) 
The pipeline companies in Yellowstone 
Pipe Line Co v SL Bd. of Equal, 138 
Mont 603, 358 P 2d 55 (1960), cert denied 
366 U S 917, 81 S Ct 1095, 6 L Ed 2d 241 
(1961), were attempting to establish that 
their pipelines were real estate The pipe-
lines were imbedded in real estate rights 
of way obtained from the owners of the fee 
by written conveyance The State Board 
of Equalization argued that the pipelines 
did not improve the real estate, served no 
purpose on the land, did not enhance the 
value of the real estate, and could be re-
moved at any time by the company 
Under Montana case law, if property was 
placed on land to improve it or make it 
more valuable, it was generally deemed a 
fixture, but if it was attached for a use 
which did not enhance the value of the 
land, it remained a chattel Considering 
the established rules regarding fixtures, 
the Yellowstone Pipe Line Co court stat 
ed 
The line could as easily he on top of the 
ground were it not for the maintenance 
problem brought on by its exposed posi 
N NATURAL GAS v BD OF EQUAL 
Cite u 443 NWJtd 249 (Nab 1989) 
tion and the difficulty of crossing natural dence, of either 
and man made obstructions Does the 
pipe line improve the land and make it 
more valuable7 To the contrary the land 
182imakes the pipe line more valuable 
since it removes it from danger of dam 
age were it exposed To what purpose is 
the pipe line put7 It is used for the 
transportation of petroleum products 
and, in our opinion, such use bears no 
relationship whatever to the use of the 
realty There can exist here no presump-
tion that respondents intended the pipe 
to become part of the realty because the 
evidence is conclusive that they had no 
such intention 
Id 138 Mont at 630-31, 358 P 2d at 69 
The court concluded that the pipeline is not 
a fixture 
As Enron points out in this case, it has 
the right to remove its pipeline and does so 
on occasion According to Enron, and we 
agree, the pipeline is not adapted to the use 
to which the ground in which it is embed 
ded is applied Most of the ground is agn 
cultural land, and while the pipe is in place, 
a farmer or rancher may continue to con 
duct his normal operations The pipeline 
does not improve the land nor make it more 
valuable The ground is only a foundation 
upon which the pipes can rest Use of the 
pipeline bears no relationship to the use of 
the realty, the pipeline being buried in or 
der in part to minimize maintenance 
Finally, was the intention of Enron to 
make the article a permanent accession to 
the freehold7 
& ASSESS Neb 259 
a subjective or objective 
nature, indicating Southwestern had any 
such intention To the same effect, see, 
Sulphur Springs Val Elec Co op, Inc v 
City of Tombstone, 1 Anz App 268, 401 
P 2d 753 (1965), Liberty Lk Sewer v Lib-
erty Lk Utils 37 Wash App 809, 683 P 2d 
1117 (1984), In re Mobihfe Corp, 167 
So 2d 336 (Fla App 1964) 
|822The evidence here was that Enron's 
normal method of operation is to obtain 
easements for purposes of laying its pipe-
lines Its pipeline is generally located on 
nghts-of way rather than land Enron owns 
in fee Enron never intended, as we view 
the record, to part with the title to its 
pipelines by conducting its operation in this 
manner Furthermore, the evidence dis 
closes that Enron retains possession of the 
pipes for purposes of repair, replacement, 
and recycling if necessary 
In a number of cases, the courts have 
considered the fact that the annexor had an 
easement as establishing an intent that the 
article remain personal property In 
Southwestern Public Service Co v 
Chaves County, 85 N M 313, 512 P 2d 73 
(1973), the court had to decide whether 
certain equipment located on easements, 
including poles and transmission lines, was 
real estate The court noted that if South 
western intended the equipment installed 
on unowned land to become part of the 
realty, Southwestern would under general 
law, be parting with title to the equipment 
The court concluded that there was no evi 
(16] The Board cites only one case in 
which the court held that the gas pipeline 
of a gas transmission company was not 
personal property but, rather, was real 
property for tax purposes Transco Corp 
v Prince William Co, 210 Va 560, 172 
S E 2d 757 (1970) That court agreed that 
the chief test to be considered in determin 
ing whether the chattel has been converted 
into a fixture is the intention of the party 
making the annexation We agree, but 
conclude that in the instant case the in ten 
tion of Enron was not to convert its annex 
ations into fixtures Consequently, we find 
the pipelines to be personal property 
Finally because the unitary value of En 
ron may include some real property, it is 
necessary that we determine whether that 
portion of its valuation should be based on 
an aggregate or blended ratio, or on the 
average ratio of unimproved agricultural 
land 
117] In Kearney Convention Center v 
Board of Equal, 216 Neb 292, 344 N W 2d 
620 (1984) *< held that the uniformity 
clause of the Nebraska Constitution re-
quired that the complaining taxpayer's land 
had tx> be valued at 44 percent the lowest 
ratio of assessed valuation to actual valua 
tion We had concluded that although the 
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taxing authorities may classify different 
types of property for taxation purposes, 
nevertheless, the results reached by such 
different methods and reasonable classifi 
cations must be correlated so that the valu 
ations reached shall be uniform and propor 
tionate The record in this case does not 
support such a favorable finding for the 
Board 
Although article VIII, § 1, of the Ne-
braska Constitution was amended in 1984 
in an attempt to permit the valuation of 
agricultural land by a different method, 
this court concluded that the result must be 
correlated with the value of all other land 
At the risk of being redundant, we state 
that such a result laahas not been reached 
in this case 
The Board has asked us to reconsider our 
decision in Banner County v Stale Board 
of Equal, 226 Neb 236, 411 NW2d 35 
(1987) There is nothing to reconsider 
Neb Const art VIII, ft 1, providing that 
"(t)axes shall be levied by valuation um 
formly and proportionately" (emphasis 
supplied), to aay nothing of the 14th 
amendment to the U S Constitution, which 
directs that no state shall "deny to any 
person within lU jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws," both remain viable and 
in full force and effect Banner County 
could be written in no other way 
The order of the State Board of Equaliza 
tion and Assessment is reversed, and the 
cause is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion 
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
(p |llVMM«ISmfM> 
232 Neb 885 
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MILLER CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC, 
a Nebraska Corporation, and Lawrence 
Hoffman, Appellants, Carol Hoffman, 
Appellee. 
No 87-746 
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July 21, 1989 
Architect sued clients for breach of 
contract, in regard to client's refusal to pay 
architect on the ground that the actual 
construction costs were in excess of client's 
anticipation Clients counterclaimed for 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty 
The District Court, Douglas County, Law 
rence J Comgan, J , entered judgment on 
a jury verdict for architect, and clients ap-
pealed The Supreme Court, Shanahan, J , 
held that (1) a jury question was present 
ed as to whether architect's claim was de-
feated by clients' claim that the construe 
tion costs exceeded an alleged agreement, 
(2) the court did not abuse its discretion m 
rejecting clients' tendered instructions on 
tort claims, and (3) court properly rejected 
testimony of clients' expert concerning an 
architect's duties in the course of a con 
tracted project 
Affirmed 
1 Contracts «=»1W 
If there is express contract for archi 
tecturai services, architect's duties are de-
termined by contract for architect's em 
ployment 
2 Contracts *=»280<4) 
Implicit in every contract for architec 
tural services is duty of architect to exer 
else skill and care which are commensurate 
with requirements of profession 
3 Contracts *»28(K4) 
If architect fails to exercise reasonable 
professional care in discharge of his con 
GETZSCHMAN v MILLER CHEMICAL CO , INC Neb 261 
CIU u 443 N WJ4 240 (Neb 1989) 
when evidence compels but one reasonable 
conclusion regarding issue or question in 
litigation court can properly direct verdict 
on such issue or question 
tractual duties architect breaches contract 
of employment 
4 Action *=>27(1) 
Accompanying every contract is com 
mon law duty to perform thing agreed to 
be done with care skill, reasonable expedi 
ency, and faithfulness, and negligent fail 
ure to observe any of these conditions is 
tort as well as breach of contract 
6. Action «=>27(1) 
In context of negligence claim based 
on architectural contract, tort liability may 
arise when architect negligently fails to 
perform express or implied contractual 
duty 
t. Contracts <t»321(l) 
Architect employed to prepare plans 
and specifications for building, with under-
standing that construction would be accom 
plished within certain cost limitations, can 
not recover compensation for architectural 
services when building cannot be erected 
except at cost materially in excess of 
amount specified 
7. Contracts «=>312<1) 
When architect has no express contrac 
tual obligation to design structure within 
specified budget or to estimate construe 
tion cost of proposed project construction 
at cost greater than anticipated by or ac 
ceptable to owner is no defense to archi 
tect's action to recover fee 
8. Judgment «=>199(6) 
Entry of judgment notwithstanding 
verdict is authorized if appropriate motion 
is filed within ten days after reception of 
verdict to be set aside Neb Rev St 
ft 25-1316 02 
• Judgment «=» 199(3 9) 
Motion for judgment notwithstanding 
verdict may be granted when movant's pre-
vious motion for directed verdict, made at 
conclusion of all evidence, should have been 
sustained Neb Rev St (25-1316 02 
10 T r i a l •=•142 
Court cannot decide issue as matter of 
law unless facts adduced on issue are such 
that reasonable minds can draw but one 
conclusion from evidence, in jury trial, 
11 Contracts «=>352(3) 
In architect s breach of contract action 
against client arising from client's refusal 
to pay architect, evidence presented jury 
question as to whether architect's claim 
was defeated by client's defense that actual 
cost of construction was in excess of 
client's anticipation, evidence was conflict-
ing on question whether client informed 
architect that there was limitation on cost 
of construction, and there was no contrac 
tual provision concerning architect's eati 
mate of costs 
12 Appeal and Error «=»1032(3) 
To establish reversible error from 
court's refusal to give requested instruc-
tion, appellant has burden to show that 
appellant was prejudiced by court's refusal 
to give tendered instruction, that tendered 
instruction is correct statement of law, and 
that tendered instruction is warranted by 
evidence 
13 Contracts «=*353(8) 
In architect's breach of contract action 
against client, ansing from client's refusal 
to pay architect on ground that actual con 
struction coats were in excess of client's 
anticipation, court did not commit reversi-
ble error by rejecting client's requested 
instructions on architect's duty of reason 
able care, and breach of fiduciary duty, 
court's instruction on architect's contractu 
al duties expressed elements which, if 
proved, entitled client to recover on its 
counterclaim for tortious breaches of duty 
by architect 
14 Appeal and Error «=>970<2) 
Evidence *»99 
Admission or exclusion of evidence is 
matter for discretion of trial court, whose 
ruling on evidential question will be upheld 
unless such ruling constitutes abuse of dis 
cretion 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
